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Based on the premise that hegemonic practices involve a constant dialectic between 
consent and coercion, this dissertation explores the specific role and nature coercion 
in Chantal Mouffe’s theory of agonistic politics and its subjective presuppositions. It 
concludes that coercion is a ubiquitous and constitutive aspect of agonistic politics and 
pluralism. Focusing on Mouffe’s agonism and endeavours to apply this approach in 
empirical analysis, the thesis explicates its underlying ‘Ethics of the Real’ and 
elaborates a methodology centred on Poststructuralist Discourse Theory’s (PDT) 
‘ontology of the lack’. Both concepts centred on the recognition of the ineradicability 
and constitutive role of ‘lack’ in the constitution of social reality and subjectivity. 
Furthering Mouffe’s framework and its underlying ontological assumptions (PDT), the 
elaboration on the nature and role of coercion in this dissertation adds and foregrounds 
the fantasmatic dimension. This dimension marks the ‘lack’ that inevitably permeates 
the agonistic structure while, simultaneously, provides support for its cohesiveness. 
This is especially evident in forms of identification. The analysis thus starts by 
interrogating Mouffe’s theory of agonism and then elaborates the way that agonistic 
pluralism works through the fundamental mechanism of stabilization, which renders 
the latter constantly vulnerable to transformations of ‘relations of subordination’ into 
‘relations of oppression’. The latter is contingent on the dynamics of the fantasmatic 
dimension of social relations and the agent’s identification with the structure. Such 
theoretical points are further developed through an empirical analysis of the case of 
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collaborative planning and partnerships in North Ayrshire, Scotland. This urban 
regime is taken as an exemplary case, which has been acknowledged as exhibiting 
‘best-practice’ in terms of implementation of collaborative governance. The research 
contributes to a deeper understanding of the role and nature of coercion, while 
addressing some criticisms levelled at Mouffe’s political theory and developing 
elements in need of further elaboration.  
Keywords: coercion, agonism/agonistic-pluralism, Chantal Mouffe, fantasmatic dimension, 






From an ultimate ontological and epistemological point of view, religious 
fundamentalisms and the ‘most refined’ of Western socialisms are on equal 
footing (Laclau, 1990, pp. 242-243) 
1. The Need to Elaborate the Dimension of Coercion in Agonism and Hegemony 
 
‘Freedom’ or ‘Liberty’ is probably the most sought-after thing in the current crisis of liberal 
democracy. Yet, what these two terms substantively mean in actual situations may vary in one case 
to another. Their commonality is just that the demand for ‘Freedom’ or ‘Liberty’ signifies that 
such thing is lacking or absent and in its place there is something that obstructs its full 
manifestation. Parallel to ‘Freedom’ or ‘Liberty’, this ‘something that obstructs’ has diverse 
manifestations too. Their commonality lays not on their substance but on the actuality of being ‘an 
obstruction’ of something that would have otherwise fully manifested. These diversities have 
impacted all political movements all around the globe especially around and following the end of 
the Cold War. They manifest in the proliferation of demands and identities articulated as political 
movements that go beyond the then existing theoretical horizon, such as the dominant class 
struggle. This situation has been presenting dire challenges among the political movements not 
only to identify potential and build alliances but, prior to that, to identify the position of their 
counterparts. This challenge and the need to address it come to the fore especially during the 
current crisis of Liberal democracy. 
‘Coercion’ is the generic term usually used to represent ‘the obstruction’ to the full realization of 
freedom. However, the meaning of coercion is just as elusive as the meaning of ‘freedom’ and 
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‘liberty’. This dissertation aims exactly to answer and elaborate ‘what this coercion is’ and, further, 
to investigate its nature. Central to answering this challenge is the issue of ‘coercion’. At this point, 
it is enough to take the general definition of coercion as “… the use of threatened force, including 
the limited use of actual force to back up the threat, to induce an adversary to behave differently 
than it otherwise would” (Byman & Waxman, 2000, p. 9). Taken from an article on the 
effectiveness of air force to coerce the opponent into submission in the case of 1990s Balkan War, 
this definition can be generalized to reflect the general understanding on what coercion is and how 
it becomes a central issue this dissertation takes to address. In the context dominated by Liberal 
democracy one’s submission under another’s will is an anathema, especially when this submission 
involves the use of force. Such a negative perception on coercion and use of force has been 
extended to ‘politics’ leading to what Mouffe describes as depoliticization or anti-political view. 
Such a view presupposes the immediacy of individuality, including its freedom that should be 
jealously guarded against any outside intervention, whether it is the state or the society. Such an 
assumption has been, to various degrees, preventing many political movements from identifying 
and building actual political alliances with their counterparts and, worse, develops anti-political 
views and attitudes that, in turn, are counter-productive to their agendas. 
Elaboration on the topic of coercion here is expected to deconstruct this anti-political view 
especially its negative perception and portrayal of force and the political leading to aversion to 
politics. It does so by highlighting one of the most prominent theoretical frameworks that argues 
for, not only the constitutive role, but also the primacy of the political, including the use of force, 
for the constitution of our reality or social reality, namely agonism or agonistic-pluralism 
developed by Chantal Mouffe. Besides the deconstruction of such anti-political views; this 
research aims to further specify and elaborate the dimension of coercion in Mouffe’s 
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conceptualization of agonism/agonistic-pluralism. The usage of the ‘agonism/agonistic-pluralism’ 
signifier is based on the idea to make the agonistic dimension of democracy more explicit as well 
as its coercive dimension. Mouffe uses the term ‘agonistic-pluralism’ to describe her ideal (of no-
ideal) of democracy (Mouffe, 1993, p. 21). Despite Mouffe’s own conviction on the primacy of 
the political and the constitutive role of antagonism, the dimension of coercion has not been 
sufficiently elaborated in her works. The under elaboration of this dimension has prevented further 
elaboration and application of her agonism/agonistic-pluralism as an alternative logic to break 
through the impasse manifested in the current crisis to Liberal democracy. Mouffe’s 
agonism/agonistic-pluralism has been criticized of either giving too much emphasis on 
contingency or too much emphasis on antagonism, by extension too much emphasis on the political 
and power. The former prevents further elaboration and empirical application of Mouffe’s 
agonism/agonistic-pluralism, and its Poststructuralist Discourse Theory (PDT) underpinning. 
While the latter makes those who already have anti-political inclination to become more suspicious 
towards her concepts and theoretical framework.  
The elaboration of the dimension of coercion in Mouffe’s agonism/agonistic-pluralism in this 
dissertation aims to tackle both issues - the insufficient elaboration on this dimension in Mouffe’s 
work and the criticism levelled against her – by accentuating the distinction between two planes 
where coercion operates, namely the ontological and ontical, and the shift between these two 
planes. The ontical here refers to the thing as how we perceive them, while the ontological, how 
we come to perceive the thing as such. In the discussion on coercion, the ontical refers to ‘coercion’ 
as in “The act of A is coercive”, while the ontological refers to the condition the structure that 
enables the categorization of the said act of A as coercive. Politics belong to the former while 
political to the latter (Mouffe, 2005, p. 10). Elaboration of coercion on the ontological plane gives 
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insight to its ontological status, in line with the PDT’s presupposition of the primacy of the 
political, that its main role is to stabilize the contingency that precedes it. Through such lens, the 
constitutive role of coercion for our social reality is foregrounded. The elaboration is heavily based 
on the PDT’s underlying presuppositions, especially from Laclau and Mouffe’s theory of discourse 
and hegemony that presupposes radical contingency of social reality and the primacy of the 
political for its constitution. In addition, the elaboration also incorporates substantial elements 
from Lacanian psychoanalysis to complement the explanation on the role of fantasmatic dimension 
in the constitution of social reality and libidinal investment. The latter is central for explaining the 
shift of coercion between the ontological and the ontical planes. 
This research also explores Mouffe’s agonism/agonistic-pluralism on the empirical plane. An 
empirical case for investigation for several reasons namely as follows: i) to illustrate how coercion 
is constitutive for empirical reality, even if one is claimed to be non-coercive, such as the regime 
of collaborative governance; ii) to address the criticism of methodological and normative deficits 
levelled against Mouffe’s agonism/agonistic-pluralism as well as  Laclau and Mouffe’s theory of 
discourse and hegemony; iii) to contribute further to the development of PDT for empirical 
research. The investigation on the empirical case also reveals the more nuanced dimension 
underlying Mouffe’s agonism/agonistic-pluralism and also its theoretical underpinning, the theory 
of discourse and hegemony, namely the Ethics of the Real. The latter has been largely overlooked 
in the criticism against Mouffe’s agonism/agonistic-pluralism and Laclau and Mouffe’s theory of 
discourse and hegemony. Overlooking this ethical dimension would lead to disillusionment to 
most of their readers once they realize what Laclau describes in the quotes mentioned at the 
beginning of this chapter. There are crisscrossing frontiers in the field of the social and none of 
these frontiers and the discourse that entail them pre-determinedly has the privilege as the universal 
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representation for other demands and identities (Laclau, 1990, p. 229). Each of those discourses 
are always constituted on certain forms of limitations, exclusions, and coercion. In the same 
passage, following the statement quoted above, Laclau mentions that the analysis and elaboration 
should go further in the direction of the normativity underlying the interviewer question, thus the 
fantasmatic dimension, to complement the structural analysis (Laclau, 1990, pp. 243-244; Laclau, 
2015, p. 103). In short, by going through such a path, the explanation should be able to answer the 
questions, “Why, even though any structure is inherently coercive, do people still cling to it and 
why a certain structure and not others?” The answers to these questions are pivotal as the basis to 
answer further questions with regards to the nature of coercion and how its role is constitutive for 
the social reality. 
Last but not least, the application of Mouffe’s agonism/agonistic-pluralism on a certain empirical 
case requires a specific research strategy. This is due to the need to comply with the 
presuppositions of its theoretical underpinning, namely: radical contingency and the primacy of 
the political. The empirical investigation draws the strategy from Glynos and Howarth’s ‘Logics 
of Critical Explanation’ (LCE) that describes reality as comprised of three ontological dimensions, 
namely the social, the political, and the fantasmatic. Through this strategy, Mouffe’s 
agonism/agonistic-pluralism is not perceived as a fixed and reified category, permanently 
manifested in certain practice or regime of practice but as a certain logic or rule. Specifically, 
agonism or agonistic-pluralism is understood as a certain logic that foregrounds the contingent and 
political nature of the reality investigated and how these contingent and political natures are 
recognized and institutionalized as part of the said reality. Instead of being identified permanently 
to a certain practice or regime of practice, agonism, as logic, is engaged in hegemonic battle against 
other logics to characterize it. Through such an approach, the selection of the empirical case taken 
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to investigate the operation of the logic of agonism and its coercive dimension does not involve 
exhaustive verification on whether the case taken fits the certain features considered to be 
materially and immediately representative of agonism/agonistic-pluralism. On the contrary, it 
seeks the moments when such logic comes to the fore and how those moments are institutionalized 
in the case of practice or regime investigated. The dimension of coercion then appears when in 
such moments, the existence and operation of the logic of agonism/agonistic-pluralism can only 
take place through certain rules and the compliance of the subjects to those rules. 
2. Foregrounding the Coercive Dimension in the Constitution of the Social as Agonistic 
Space 
 
Laclau has explicitly states that radical democracy serves not as another grand narrative of 
liberation. He even describes it as “… a formally anti-utopian thought” (Laclau, 1990, p. 232). 
Because it does not project the eradication of all dislocations once the targeted hegemonic and 
dominant structure is dislodged from its position and new structure replaces it. The new structure 
is inevitably constituted on the dual political processes of inclusion/exclusion, thus inevitably also 
causes dislocations. The same logic also applies to Mouffe’s agonism/agonistic-pluralism. It is not 
a panacea to eradicate all dislocations and antagonisms, on the contrary, it is a political relation 
based on the very acknowledgement of the constitutive role of antagonism in the constitution of 
any social reality, including the agonistic one. Laclau and Mouffe see radical democracy and 
agonism/agonistic-pluralism as the project and political relations that revolve around the 
impossibility of total and permanent social harmony. This dissertation aims to foreground the 
limits of Mouffe agonism/agonistic-pluralism marked by its coercive dimension.  
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The reading on Mouffe’s agonism/agonistic-pluralism upon which the dissertation is based runs 
in contrast to the more common readings, including criticisms, to her concepts. It pertains to 
Mouffe’s own underlying presuppositions of radical contingency and the primacy of the political. 
Therefore, it perceives harmony, characterized by compliance to certain rules, as reality that is 
only possible to be constituted on the ever present potentials of disharmony that can only be 
constituted and retained by both convincing and forcing the subject to maintain their compliance 
with the corresponding rules.   
Why Mouffe’s theory of agonism/agonistic pluralism? It is because her theory of 
agonism/agonistic-pluralism, along with its underpinning post-structuralist discourse theory, has 
been gaining prominence not only in the field of political theory proper but also to broader fields 
from democracy, planning to policy analysis. The appeal of this concept has been more apparent 
amid the current crisis of liberal democracy in various parts of the world. The concepts of 
agonism/agonistic-pluralism as well as the theory of hegemony and discourse are the building 
blocks of the radical democracy project that Laclau and Mouffe propose both as critiques toward 
liberal democracy as well as an alternative solution to break the impasse manifested in the current 
crises. Prior to the liberal democracy crisis, the appeal of Mouffe’s agonism and its PDT theoretical 
underpinning was already felt, especially among the Left circles who refuse to capitulate to the 
dominant ideological mainstream of ideological convergence at the centre. In such context, the 
concepts of agonism/agonistic-pluralism that pertains to the ‘radical democracy’ project they 
initiate, seems to offer much needed fresh alternative. 
In the current crisis of Liberal democracy in Europe and elsewhere, the import of Mouffe’s 
contribution has been greater than ever. It is one among few other alternatives that offers a 
promising breakthrough from the current impasse by arguing for the recognition and 
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institutionalization of the constitutive role of antagonism for any polity, including democracy. This 
departs from the currently dominant regime of liberal democracy that perceives conflict either as 
a brief setback from the normal situation of harmony or, worse, as the reminiscence of a bygone 
era. When conflict and violence persist, its representations tend to be portrayed as ‘evil’ or ‘moral 
vice’, leading to what Mouffe describes as ‘moralization of politics’ (Mouffe, 2005, p. 75). 
Mouffe’s emphasis on the constitutive role of antagonism is based on the theoretical 
presuppositions of radical contingency and the primacy of the political, the underpinning of the 
theory of discourse and hegemony she develops with Ernesto Laclau. The constitutive role of 
antagonism, Mouffe argues, is apparent in democracy as it is basically constituted on continuous 
tensions between two principles which are irreducible from one another, namely ‘liberty’ and 
‘equality’ (Mouffe, 1993; 2000). She further argues that the tensions between these two principles 
are not only ineradicable but they are necessary for the constitution of democracy itself. 
Mouffe is not the only one who sees democracy as a function of tensions between more than one 
unitary principles. Other scholars, such as Farid Zakaria, also hold similar ideas (Zakaria, 1997). 
However, in contrast to Zakaria who offers positive solutions of ‘economic liberalization and rule 
of law first, democracy later’ (Carothers, 2003, p. 138), Mouffe’s offer is more nuanced. The 
nuance lies in her emphasis on the ‘impossibility of democracy’ and the constitutive role of this 
impossibility to constitute democracy. This nuance is based on the theoretical presuppositions 
derived from the theory of discourse and hegemony that Mouffe develops with Laclau and 
underpins the Radical democracy project that they propose. Through Mouffe’s lens, a critique to 
Zakaria can be summarized as following: If constitutional liberalism or economic liberalization is 
the solution for the current crisis of liberal democracy, its status as solution cannot be 
predetermined and is not fixed and total either, but a result of a hegemonic intervention.  
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Mouffe formulates her offer through the concept of agonism/agonistic-pluralism, where it 
precludes any positivization and predetermination of certain elements as foundational to 
democracy. This inclination is also reflected in Laclau’s statement quoted in the beginning of this 
chapter. In the passage where this quote is taken from, Laclau is addressing the question on the 
possible danger of abandoning the rooting to social reality, based on the orthodox Marxist 
interpretation that, the interviewer argues, may lead to the conflation of class identity with arbitrary 
and fanciful identities constructed by the likes of religious fundamentalism. Laclau exposes how 
such a question is actually a normative question as ‘from an ultimate ontological and 
epistemological point of view, religious fundamentalism and the most ‘refined’ of Western 
socialisms are on an equal footing.’ The latter, Laclau argues, is impossible to find in our reality 
(Laclau, 1990, p. 243). In other words, Laclau says that both the religious fundamentalism and the 
most refined Western social democracy, structurally and inevitably causes dislocations as their 
constitutions inevitably involves double movements of inclusion/exclusion. Parallel to Mouffe, 
who states: “every order is political and based on some form of exclusion.” (Mouffe, 2005, p. 18). 
They are products of (successful) hegemonic intervention constituted on certain relations of 
subordination between the nodal point and the internal moments and inclusion/exclusion between 
moments and elements. The interviewer asks this question with certain assumption in mind that 
normatively favours certain social grounding over the others. This hierarchy of certain social 
rooting over the others, in Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory, is not given and predetermined. 
The privilege given to certain social rooting does not follow either a pre-given natural or objective 
law or internal logic of the corresponding structure either. Thus, such a question and its answer as 
well, are always normative questions as they are always imbued with certain moral principles. In 
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this exposition Laclau further argues that it is this imbued certain moral principle that is the 
condition of possibility as well as the impossibility for hegemony (Laclau, 1990, pp. 242-245). 
The passage from Laclau’s exposition is quoted as a prelude to the discussion presented in this 
dissertation because it exposes the research problem that this dissertation aims to address that is 
the status of coercion in Mouffe’s agonism/agonistic-pluralism. Laclau’s exposition points out that 
the interviewer question is a normative question in which certain structure and the corresponding 
identity is assumed to occupy a higher position than the others. In his reply, Laclau explicates that 
such assumed hierarchy is not permanent because final closure is impossible not only on the 
structural but also on the ethical planes. In its place Laclau argue for a structure that recognizes 
and institutionalizes the impossibility of the final closure through which continuous debates can 
take place to continuously produce common sense (Laclau & Mouffe, 2014, p. 243). Laclau’s 
explication in this passage implies his ethical stance that fits the description of ‘the Ethics of the 
Real’ (Stavrakakis, 1999, p. 130; see also Zizek, 1990, p. 259) even though he never explicitly 
uses this term. The explication, however, does not elaborate explicitly enough how contingency 
and stabilization are co-constitutive to each other and to realize this ethical principle either. 
Acknowledgement of the impossibility of the final closure can only take place through submission 
to the structure in the first place. This may lead to overemphasis on one over the other and 
overlooking the constitutive constant tensions between the two. This contributes to the tendency 
to overlook the ethical underpinning of Mouffe’s, as well as Laclau’s, by the commentators 
reviewed in the following chapter. Overemphasis on contingency tends to disregard the role of the 
structure and its coercive nature in identifying and articulating the limits, thus the impossibility of 
the final closure. On the other hand, overemphasis on stabilization reifies the structure as if there 
is no other possibility. Therefore, it is central to elaborate the role of the structure and its coercive 
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feature in this quest of traversing it in order to locate and identify its limits before it becomes 
possible to question it.  
The radical democracy project that Laclau and Mouffe initiate clearly represents their ethical 
stance. They embrace democracy not because democracy is something of value in itself, but 
because in democracy the absence of such ultimate value and its recognition becomes the ultimate 
value itself. Mouffe attempts to translate this general idea of Radical democracy into theoretically 
closer concept in the study of democracy. The project is undertaken on Mouffe’s 
agonism/agonistic-pluralism as it represents an alternative to the mainstream discourses on 
democracy and democratization, ranging from Habermas’ communicative action to the actual 
practice or regime of collaborative governance. Despite the appeal, however, Mouffe’s 
agonism/agonistic-pluralism shares the ambiguities as Laclau’s exposition discussed in the 
preceding paragraph. This ambiguity comes to the fore due to insufficiency in Mouffe’s 
elaboration on antagonism and agonism (Norval, 1997; Abizadeh, 2005; Roskamm, 2015; Menga, 
2017). However, the ambiguities have also been exacerbated by the criticism levelled against her 
as most of them miss or overlook the specific ethical underpinning of Mouffe’s agonism/agonistic-
pluralism, namely the Ethics of the Real. In contrast to the Ethics of Harmony, this Ethics of the 
Real is an ethical stance that recognizes and institutionalizes the ineradicability and constitutive 
role of the ‘lack’ thus precluding any ideal of imaginary unity denoting the immediacy and 
transparency of social reality, meaning and identity (Mouffe, 1993, p. 5; Mouffe, 2000, p. 98; 
Mouffe, 2013). Further, this ‘lack’ permeates not only the structure but also the subjectivity of its 
agents (Zizek, 1990). 
The Ethics of the Real is an ethical principle that encourages the subject to confront the impossible. 
It is an ethic without any ideal but the continuous pursuit of confronting with this very lack of ideal 
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( Stavrakakis, 1999, p. 130; Zizek, 2009, p. 259). Mouffe and Laclau’s conviction on this certain 
ethical principle is obvious and recognized by other scholars. Their opus magnum of Hegemony 
and Socialist Strategy is acknowledged as a work that articulates such ethical stance and it becomes 
one of the main reasons that work stands out among other works in ‘post-works (Zizek, 1990, p. 
259). It addresses the constant failure of the chase of final closure, manifesting in the absence and 
the idealized state often describe as ‘the good’, not by replacing it with another final closure but 
by confronting the impossibility of these successive goods. Yannis describes that this ethic of the 
real “… breaks the vicious cycle of traditional ideological and utopian ethics” (Stavrakakis, 1999, 
p. 131; see also Laclau, 1990, p. 232). Mouffe’s agonism is an attempt to ensure that this 
impossibility and its constitutive role is recognized and institutionalized through the agonistic 
moments institutionalized in the regime of democracy. 
This research argues that Mouffe’s underdevelopment of the concept of coercion is that because 
she has not gone beyond the discourse analysis to incorporate the fantasmatic dimension, thus 
complementing the elaboration on the constitutive role of lack on the structure with the constitutive 
lack in the divided subject. This is rather surprising because she clearly states that there are “(T)wo 
key concepts – ‘antagonism’ and ‘hegemony’ – necessary to grasp the nature of the political”. 
‘Coercion’, in its continuous dialectics with ‘consent’, is the main characteristic of hegemony 
(Anderson, 1976; Davies J. , 2013; Davies J. , 2014). However, this may be understandable due to 
her focus on the structural aspect in her elaboration of agonism/agonistic-pluralism. Therefore, 
further elaboration on this topic of ‘coercion’ as a dimension in Mouffe’s agonism becomes 
necessary and this is the challenge that this research aims to address. 
Elaborating the dimension of coercion in Mouffe’s agonism/agonistic-pluralism, however, is a 
challenging task due to the specific theoretical presuppositions underlying Mouffe’s 
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agonism/agonistic-pluralism, namely ‘radical contingency’ and ‘the primacy of the political’ and 
also the ethical underpinning. Employing Steven Lukes’ categories of the dimensions of power 
(Lukes, 2005) it can be mapped out that the studies on coercion have been predominated by 
analysis on coercion as the exercise of power of A-over-B. In other words, they focus mainly on 
the overt dimension of coercion. Some studies have ventured beyond this overt dimension by 
elaborating the covert dimension of coercion such as Bourdieu (Bourdieu, 1991) and Foucault with 
his concept of governmentality (Foucault, 1991). Much fewer studies, however, cover the latent 
dimension of power and coercion. 
The research aims to elaborate the dimension of coercion in Mouffe’s agonism/agonistic-pluralism 
on this latent dimension. In doing so, it is necessary to specify how Mouffe misses or overlooks 
this dimension on that particular plane and thenceforth the starting point can be determined in the 
form of a research problem and question. The elaboration in this first chapter focuses on how 
Mouffe has been ambiguous in elaborating this concept of coercion. This ambiguity is parallel 
with the ambiguity in her conceptualization of antagonism and agonism that entails the various 
critical responses towards her work. 
3. Research Problem and Question: the Dimension of Coercion in Mouffe’s Agonism 
 
The mapping and elaboration of Mouffe’s agonism/agonistic-pluralism, including its underlying 
theoretical presuppositions, and its critiques have given some important points to inform the 
inquiry this research aims to address. Those points can be summarized as following: (i) Mouffe 
has not sufficiently elaborated on the concept of antagonism and hegemony, which is necessarily 
characterized by constant dialectics between consent and coercion. She, however, gives crucial 
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hints by implying it through the use of terms such as ‘grammar’, ‘identity’ and ‘identification’, 
and the incorporation of Freudian ‘libidinal investment’ and Lacanian ‘jouissance’ or enjoyment; 
(ii) when Mouffe discusses this topic, especially in relations to the topic of ‘grammar’; identity; 
and identification, Mouffe does so on the ontological plane; (iii) the combination between points 
(i) and (ii) has led to the emergence of ambiguities in her portrayal of antagonism and its 
ontological status and its transformation or sublimation into ‘agonism’; (iv) the ambiguities 
highlighted by her critics have been exacerbated by incomplete misunderstandings on the 
theoretical presuppositions in many of her critiques; (v) the emphasis almost exclusively on the 
ontological plane puts Mouffe’s agonism/agonistic-pluralism and its theoretical underpinning pose 
a challenge if it is to be employed for empirical research. More detail elaboration and discussion 
that lead to these points are presented in the Chapter I.  
Based on those points above, this research aims to address the issue of coercion in Mouffe’s 
agonism on the ontological plane. In doing so, the taming of ‘the antagonist’, the ever present 
contingency and fluidity of meaning and identity, into agonism is the starting point to formulate 
the research problem and question. The main research problem is: “How to explicate coercion 
on the ontological plane and define its constitutive role within the framework of Laclau and 
Mouffe’s theory of discourse and hegemony?” The main challenge in addressing this research 
problem within the framework of Laclau and Mouffe’s theoretical presuppositions are twofolds; 
first, it is necessary to explicate coercion prior to subjectivity and its constitutive role to the 
subjectivity and second, the explication also should include how coercion itself is contingent in 
parallel with the contingency of the social and political dimensions of the reality that belongs to 
the register of the symbolic.   
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With presumption of agonism/agonistic-pluralism as an order, that is a hegemonic discourse,  
which owes its reality to its contingent articulation, the research question can be formulated as 
follows, “How does coercion operate in the constitution of the agonistic structure and 
agonistic subject?” and “How is the shift of coercion between ontological and ontical planes 
always possible?”. This question is underpinned by the ethics of the real as it presumes that no 
matter how agonism/agonistic-pluralism presupposes the impossibility of final closure, it is still 
an order that implies exclusion and normative or fantasmatic support to maintain its cohesiveness. 
The Ethics of the Real is this normative support and the second question points to the ever present 
possibility of this normative support to lose its grips to maintain the cohesiveness of the 
corresponding structure.  
The research questions based on the point where Mouffe stops short in her elaboration on identity 
and identification as the condition for the constitution of a structure as a structure. She does not 
explicate it further with the concept of hegemony that herself, with Laclau, develop and only 
employs the elaboration to justify her argument of the ontological status of antagonism. The 
ambiguities that this half-way explication entails are tremendous, especially when Mouffe insists 
on using Schmitt’s category of friend/enemy to define her concept of political. Mouffe only 
slightly touches the topic of agonism/agonistic-pluralism as an order or structure that, inevitably, 
requires the submission of its subjects to its specific rules and to identify themselves with it. While 
she mentions the necessity of this identification, most portions of her elaborations on 
agonism/agonistic-pluralism revolve around juxtaposing it with other concepts of which 
agonism/agonistic-pluralism-is-not. This insufficient explanation has drawn criticisms reviewed 
in detail in the following chapter, especially ones that highlight her ambiguity in conceptualizing 
and distinguishing between antagonism and agonism (Menga, 2017) and her insufficient 
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explanation on the limits of agonism or the impossibility of agonism in the final instance 
(Roskamm, 2015). The insufficient explanation of this aspect also contributes to the inclination to 
misunderstand her points, starting with the underlying theoretical presuppositions of her 
conceptualization, leading to the two emerging almost totally contradictory criticisms toward her 
agonism/agonistic-pluralism. 
The theoretical exposition, research strategy, and analysis on the empirical case of collaborative 
governance in North Ayrshire Council Area is intended to expose and highlight how this 
dimension of coercion is inevitable and necessary in the constitution of agonism/agonistic-
pluralism. The theoretical exposition highlights how coercion at work on the ontological plane 
constitutes the reality that belongs to the symbolic register through the stabilization. The 
introduction of the notion of governance as the counter-discourse to government has often been 
perceived rather as the dissolution of the hierarchical structure that rigidly stabilizes the otherwise 
fluid and contingent relations. The discourse of governance and its multiple variants promises the 
liberty to choose and flexibility of options in contrast to the previously dominant discourse of 
government. This is especially central in the participatory variant as it brings to the fore that every 
decision should be subjected to question, review, and requires consent from the parties involved, 
beyond the government. While in such moment the contingent nature of the decision comes to the 
fore, the moment itself requires to be specified against the background of stability of the 
governance and policy cycle. It is this stabilization that is, simultaneously, cancelled yet becomes 
the condition of possibility for the foregrounding of the contingency, the political nature of the 
decision as well as the structure that constitutes it, that indicates the coercion.  
The acknowledgement of the constitutive role of contingency and the political moment described 
above specify agonism/agonistic-pluralism from other kinds of political relations. Yet, still, the 
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stabilization as a form of imposition of certain rules to regulate the innumerable possibilities is 
required to constitute it. This stabilization signifies that things could have gone other ways and 
therefore stabilization becomes necessary and relevant. Just as the foregrounding of contingency 
requires stabilization as its condition of possibility, the stabilization is only relevant and necessary 
only against the background of contingency that cannot be totally eradicated but continuously 
permeates the reality it constitutes. It is because this contingency is impossible to be dissolved in 
the final instance, coercion on this plane is also impossible to eradicate as it is vital to maintain the 
cohesiveness of the reality. By doing so, the exposition further highlights and foregrounds how the 
two underlying presuppositions of Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory are co-constitutive to 
each other in constant tensions. 
The co-constitutive nature of the radical contingency and the primacy of the political have 
apparently been eluding the criticisms directed towards Mouffe. Most of them have given too much 
emphasis on one over the other. Besides this, the little attention given to empirical analysis from 
Mouffe and Laclau, pointed out by some of the criticisms, has its contribution to the tendency to 
overemphasise on one presupposition over the other. The lack of attention on the application of 
this theoretical framework, both agonism and the theory of hegemony and discourse, for empirical 
analysis gives the impression that Wagenaar describes as the “The relentless impermanence of 
social and political categories and phenomena (following upon its equally obsessive anti-
essentialism), and a concurrent unwillingness to acknowledge the institutional character of many 
social and political arrangements” (Wagenaar, 2011, p. 155). This impression of impermanence of 
social and political categories and phenomena are the consequences of Laclau and Mouffe’s 
presuppositions that put emphasis on their conflictual co-constitutions which they do not 
sufficiently provide methodological framework for its application on empirical analysis. This has 
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been exacerbated by the tendency to overlook the Ethics of the Real that becomes the ethical 
underpinning of Laclau and Mouffe’s theory of discourse and hegemony and Mouffe’s 
agonism/agonistic-pluralism. 
The research strategy deployed in this dissertation addresses this insufficiency of methodological 
framework by drawing from the Logics of Critical Explanation (LCE) that Glynos and Howarth 
develop inspired by Laclau and Mouffe’s post-structuralist discourse theory PDT and Lacanian 
psychoanalysis. Through the category of ‘logic’ this framework enables to overcome relentless 
impermanence of social and political categories and phenomena that Wagenaar describes without 
compromising the presuppositions of radical contingency and the primacy of the political. This 
framework also incorporates vital aspect of the constitution of reality that is the fantasmatic 
dimension that is also central to the elaboration on the dimension of coercion in Mouffe’s 
agonism/agonistic-pluralism here. This dimension of reality is central to the exposition of how 
coercion at work on the ontological plane and how it potentially shifts between the ontological and 
ontical planes and between objective and subjective coercion. 
The move to take an empirical case for analysis is intended rather for illustrating the thesis of this 
dissertation that focuses more on theoretical plane. The exposition of the key points of the thesis, 
however, is better to be explained if the explanation refers to empirical context. The latter is 
especially related to key points such as the co-constitution of radical contingency and the primacy 
of the political and the role of the fantasmatic dimension in the constitution of reality. The latter is 
important to avoid falling into being misunderstood of overemphasizing and justifying coercion as 
the thesis here is the ontological status of coercion which is co-constitutive with the radical 
contingency that becomes its condition of possibility as well as impossibility in the final instance. 
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The answers for these research questions also contribute to the study on coercion. As an attempt 
to better understand and elaborate the contingency of coercion, the answers provide non-
essentialist formulation of coercion that deconstruct the essentialist paradigm that attempts to fix 
certain acts as coercive in-itself and, thus, obscure other forms of coercion. Laclau and Mouffe 
have implied the constitutive role of coercion and its contingency in Hegemony and Socialist 
Strategy through the concepts of relations of subordination, domination, and oppression and the 
ever-present potentiality for transformation from one form to the others (Laclau & Mouffe, 2014, 
pp. 137-139). 
Through the notions of relations of subordination, oppression, and domination Laclau and Mouffe, 
take different path to portray ‘coercion’ as reality that is contingent and politically constituted, in 
contrast to essentialist point-of-view where any form of exclusion or subordination will be almost 
immediately categorized as oppression. Relations of subordination refer to situations where an 
agent is subjected to another’s decision. Relations of oppression refer to the relations of 
subordination that have transformed into site of antagonism.  Relations of domination refer to the 
relations of subordination that are judged as illegitimate from the perspective of an agent external 
to the relations. The latter is not always congruent with the relations of oppression (Laclau & 
Mouffe, 2014, pp. 137-138). Their transformation from one form to another is contingent to their 
articulation. 
Laclau and Mouffe also explicate the discursive condition of their transformation. The 
transformation of relation of subordination requires, first, the subversion of the specific differential 
relations that constitute the relations of subordination. Referring to the illustration of relations of 
subordination between employer and employee, Laclau and Mouffe explicate how the relations 
between the two are not necessarily antagonistic. Both are subject positions, internal differential 
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relations, commonly belonging to the discourse of capitalism. Antagonism emerges in the example 
when the employee identity in the discourse of capitalism obstructs the full realization of its other 
identities that belongs to other discourse. This explains Laclau and Mouffe’s definition of 
antagonism as ‘the limit of objectivity’ or totality. Second, the subversion of the specific 
subordinate relations requires ‘discursive exterior’. The relations of subordination cannot be 
interrupted from inside since within the discourse they belong to, they are just internal differential 
relations. The effects of the discourse that constitute the relations of subordination are displaced 
to other discourse (Laclau & Mouffe, 2014, p. 138). 
‘Keeping the constitutive lack at the center’ becomes the main point that this dissertation aims to 
reiterate and argue for. The coercive dimension in agonism/agonistic-pluralism as a structure or 
order marks its limits and this ineradicable yet constitutive lack. Foregrounding the coercive 
dimension in Mouffe’s theory of agonism is intended to make it more explicit to argue that it is 
not and never intended to become a panacea for the eradication of all dislocations and antagonisms, 
but rather an open-ended course to take its subject to traverse the fantasy of fullness and finds and 
accept its impossibility yet keep traversing the circuitous course around it. 
4. The Structure and Organization of the Argument 
 
Despite the extensive explication on the ubiquity of coercion in the constitution of reality and 
identity, coercion as a dimension of agonism/agonistic-pluralism has been insufficiently 
elaborated by Mouffe in her works. The following Chapter I reviews and elaborates this 
insufficiency in Mouffe’s works and how it has been portrayed by its critics. This review also 
foregrounds the dimension of coercion for further and more nuanced elaboration in this 
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dissertation. The latter requires capturing antagonism beyond its overt manifestation, such that is 
implied in the critics that portrays Mouffe to overemphasis on antagonism. The discussion includes 
reviews on Mouffe’s conceptualization of agonism/agonistic-pluralism and some prominent 
criticisms levelled against agonism/agonistic-pluralism and the theory of discourse and hegemony. 
The insufficiency of her elaboration on antagonism on the ontological and ontical planes (Menga, 
2017) and the impossibility of agonism in the final instance (Roskamm, 2015) serve as the starting 
points to highlight the main criticisms toward her. The elaboration on these criticisms includes 
discussion on how these insufficiencies are related with Mouffe’s underdeveloped elaboration on 
the dimension of coercion in her works on agonism/agonistic-pluralism. This is followed with the 
author’s response to the tendency of most of the criticisms reviewed to overlook the underlying 
theoretical presuppositions of Mouffe’s agonism/agonistic-pluralism and ethics, while 
acknowledging the validity of their criticism of Mouffe’s insufficient elaboration. The research 
problem and questions stated in the preceding section are intended to contribute to fill this gap as 
well as making explicit what Mouffe has only implied so far in her works with regards to the 
dimension of coercion, its nature, and its role on the ontological plane. 
Chapter II highlights this latent dimension of coercion as one manifestation of power. This 
includes elaboration on how subjectivity is constituted through the agent’s insertion into the 
structure of symbolic order and its willingness to castrate itself in the process. The categories of 
overt, covert, and latent dimensions of power are drawn from Steven Lukes (Lukes, 2005). 
Focusing the investigation on coercion on ontological plane, this chapter discusses how coercion 
is possible, operates, and what its role is in the constitution of social reality and subject. Following 
a review on several theories on coercion, the discussion in this chapter focuses on how the 
constitution of social reality belongs to the register of the symbolic. It is the constitution of 
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symbolic reality that Laclau and Mouffe argue as the plane where hegemony also takes place as 
for them the social reality, which is symbolic in nature, is always a result of a (successful) 
hegemonic intervention. Hegemony itself, following the Gramscian tradition, is always a constant 
dialectic between consent and coercion. Thus, coercion is inevitably embedded in the constitution 
of social reality. The discussion here also includes how this coercion on the ontological level 
always involves the agent’s complicity thus rendering the coercion on this plane as something that 
is natural and given among those who adhere to it. The topic of subjectification comes to the fore 
in this discussion, pointing to the need to further the analysis beyond the structural discourse 
analysis to include the fantasmatic dimension to explain why a discourse has its grips upon the 
agents. This chapter is concluded with the description of the need to elaborate the three ontological 
dimensions of reality, namely: the social, political, and fantasmatic dimensions, for portraying the 
reality of agonism/agonistic-pluralism and highlight its coercive dimension that it shares with any 
other structure. 
Chapter III focuses the discussion on the research strategy taken to utilize Mouffe’s concept of 
agonism/agonistic-pluralism on empirical case. It continues the elaboration from the point where 
it left off in Chapter II:  how agonism/agonistic-pluralism should be perceived and treated as a 
category in empirical research frameworks. This section elaborates how in the analysis on the 
empirical case taken, agonism/agonistic-pluralism is perceived and treated as a logic or discourse 
that attempts to hegemonize the case investigated. The strategy is derived from Glynos and 
Howarth’s LCE where the three ontological dimensions of social, political, and fantasmatic also 
serve as the logics to be “… articulated together to account for a problematized phenomenon” 
(Glynos & Howarth, 2007, p. 133). This chapter also elaborates the LCE as a methodological 
framework and how it is utilized in the research strategy to investigate the empirical case. This 
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elaboration is followed with a description of methods for data collection and analysis adopted in 
the empirical research. This chapter also discusses the application of the research strategy on 
empirical case of North Ayrshire Community Planning Partnership (NACPP), justifying why 
empirical case facilitates the exposition of the dissertation’s main thesis and why NACPP, among 
other possible cases, is taken.  
Chapter IV focuses on a general description on the empirical case taken to illustrate the points 
this dissertation aims to highlight. This includes descriptions on the history of the regime of 
collaborative governance in North Ayrshire (NA) council area, Scotland, the development and 
state of the said council area, and the prominent issues related to the collaborative governance 
framework it adopts. The elaboration of the general context of the case of NA includes justification 
on why this case is taken. One of the main reasons that justify its selection is its achievements for 
innovations in the formulation and adoption of a collaborative governance framework that makes 
this council area stand out in comparison to other council areas. The contrast between the 
achievements and the relatively below-expectation performance in terms of policy effectiveness 
found later during the research, also justifies further the selection of this council area. 
Discourse analysis on the empirical case of collaborative governance in the NA council area 
becomes the focus in Chapter V. The analysis starts on the general articulations of collaborative 
governance in UK and Scotland. This is followed with more specific analysis on its articulation in 
the case of NA and it is correlated with the broader general articulations. The discourse analysis 
here goes beyond the linguistic dimension to cover any meaningful production practices. Therefore 
the analysis here includes how the public is constituted through an ensemble of practices that are 
regulated by a certain set of rules and norms. The articulation of agonism or agonistic-pluralism is 
identified and analysed at the moments when these rules, norms, and the decision produced 
31 
 
through their enactments are questioned, debated, and new decisions whether they are to be 
retained, modified, or altered altogether. This includes how such moments are recognized to be 
constitutive and institutionalised in NACPP regime investigated. The coercive dimension is 
highlighted by exposing how the institutionalization of such moments involves exercising of 
power where a certain set of rules are put forward and the agents are ‘forced’ to comply with it. 
This compliance, on its turn, determines the justifiability of the regime itself and its existence as a 
regime. Further analysis on the compliance is carried out by identifying the fantasy that serves to 
mobilize it and, thus, supports the cohesiveness of NACPP regime. 
Chapter VI presents elaboration on the findings discussed in the previous chapter. The exposition 
of the dimension of coercion on the ontological plane is discussed on how the foregrounding of 
the contingency and the exposure of the political nature of the agonistic moments is also basically 
political. It follows a certain set of rules and norms that demands the compliance and the 
compliance with those rules and norms signifies the frontiers between ‘us’ and ‘them’. The ‘us’ 
and ‘them’ here may not refer to a specific person or group of people but to ‘order’ and ‘disorder’. 
This is followed with analysis on the ‘naturalization’ of this compliance with the rules and norms 
through analyses on the fantasies of harmony that go hand in hand with participation and consent. 
In addition, the finding on the discourse of ‘Kind Society’ during the field research also becomes 
an important part as this discourse serves to present new fantasy a harmonious society comprised 
of kind subjects exactly when the collaborative arrangement seems to be ineffective in producing 
the intended impacts in the society. These fantasies serve to maintain the subjects’ compliance 
with existing norms and rules even though they do not necessary lead to the intended results. 
Chapter VII gives exposition on how the elaboration in the previous chapters addresses the 
research problem and questions. The focus is on how coercion has ontological status as it is the 
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substance or the lack of it that makes it necessary as an attempt to suspend and stabilize the 
contingency of meanings and identities. In the case of agonism/agonistic-pluralism, the logic may 
differ in the sense that this logic argues for the ineradicability and the constitutive role of 
antagonism or the lack of the stability and the need for its recognition and institutionalization. 
While it may refer to a different kind of nodal point and ethical principle, it however still 






CHAPTER I. PROBLEMATIZING THE ISSUE OF COERCION IN 
MOUFFE’S AGONISM 
 
My Introduction has pointed out the main reason that the ‘coercion’ becomes central in the 
discussion and application of Mouffe’s agonism/agonistic pluralism due to the latter’s ambiguous 
elaboration on this topic. This section reviews how this ambiguity has been exposed in various 
critical studies on Mouffe’s works and how some of them overlook the ethical underpinning of 
Mouffe’s theory of agonism, partially due to the deficit of elaboration on the topic of coercion in 
her own works. However, prior to that, it is necessary to elucidate Mouffe’s concept of 
agonism/agonistic pluralism and the context of its emergence. 
1. The Ambiguities in Mouffe’s Agonism 
 
Mouffe develops her notion of agonism/agonistic pluralism as part of the Radical democracy 
Project she initiates with Ernesto Laclau. Her work on agonism/agonistic pluralism is a response 
to the seemingly converging world following the collapse of Left and Right division of the Cold 
War. In tone with many other scholars who are critical toward the ongoing trend of convergence, 
she argues against the rationalistic, universalistic, and individualistic pretention of the currently 
dominant Liberal democracy. She argues that the liberal democracy owes its existence to the 
constant tensions of two different and irreducible logics. The ascendancy of liberal democracy 
since the end of the Cold War tends to obscure this constitutive tension by naturalizing the existing 
configuration of power and, thus, precluding any legal expression of alternative configuration of 
power (Mouffe, 2000, p. 5). In the long run, she argues, this would endanger liberal democracy 
34 
 
itself. Mouffe may claim that her argument is right when the dominant liberal democracy has been 
coming face-to-face with a series of crises following the economic crisis in the US and Europe 
starting in 2008 in various parts of the globe. Therefore, acknowledging the ineradicability and the 
constitutive role of conflict and antagonism, thus shedding the rationalism; universalism; and 
individualism pretentions, and giving it channels and outlets for legal expression is crucial to 
maintain Liberal democracy.  
Based on the theory of discourse and hegemony that she develops with Laclau, Mouffe offers an 
alternative to this monolithic view of democracy. It revolves around the underlying 
presuppositions that every structure is always a result of hegemonic intervention and its stability 
is always contingent and partial. The incompleteness manifests in the form of ‘the Other’ or its 
radical negativity, referring to whatever the said structure-is-not. Drawing from Derrida’s concept 
of ‘constitutive outside’, Mouffe argues that ‘the Other’ serves not only to mark the limits of the 
said structure but it is also constitutive for the apparent completeness or totality of the said structure 
(Laclau & Mouffe, 2014, pp. 130-131; Mouffe, 1993, p. 114). ‘The Other’ serves the function to 
specifies the meaning and identity of the said structure by representing what-it-is-not. Mouffe uses 
this theoretical presupposition to construct her argument against the claim of the universality of 
Liberal democracy as the only reasonable way forward following the end of the Cold War. In order 
to specify her aim, she uses Carl Schmitt’s criticism towards liberal democracy utilizing the 
strategy of ‘to think with Schmitt against Schmitt’ (Mouffe, 1993, p. 2; 1993, pp. 106-108).  
It is understandable that Mouffe incorporates Schmitt’s criticism toward liberal democracy as the 
starting point of her conceptualization of agonism/agonistic pluralism. Schmitt’s criticism gives 
primacy to ‘the political’ and the ineradicability of ‘antagonism’ that Mouffe requires as the 
starting point to articulate the theoretical presuppositions of PDT as a discourse of democracy 
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(Mouffe, 2005, pp. 13-14). In line with Schmitt, Mouffe states explicitly that her conceptualization 
of agonism/agonistic pluralism gives primacy to the dimension of ‘political’ and argues for its 
ontological status (Mouffe, 1993, p. 3; 2005). She, however, turns against Schmitt by denouncing 
the latter’s claim of the inevitability of antagonism between the contradictory elements that 
constitute liberal democracy and argue for its contingency (Mouffe, 2000, p. 57). She argues 
further that it is their constant tensions that have been the condition of possibility for the 
constitution of Liberal democracy, as well as the condition of impossibility in the final instance 
(Mouffe, 1993, p. 5). 
It is the concept of agonism that Mouffe offers to counter Schmitt’s claim of the inevitability of 
antagonism. Mouffe draws from various sources to justify how such arrangement is possible and 
even constitutive within the framework of Liberal democracy. She refers to Niklas Luhman and 
Claude Lefort who respectively characterize democracy as ‘the splitting of the summit’ (Mouffe, 
1993, p. 5) and ‘the emptiness of its center’ (Laclau & Mouffe, 2014, pp. 170-171; Mouffe, 2000, 
p. 1). By ‘thinking with Schmitt and against Schmitt’, Mouffe also argues for the contingency of 
antagonism among the constitutive elements of liberal democracy by pointing out that those 
elements have engaged in the common front against absolutism, demonstrating how they are not 
necessarily antagonistic against each other. Absolutism provided the constitutive other against 
which a certain nodal point and chain of equivalence among the anti-absolutist elements are 
articulated. The disappearance of the absolutist regime dissolves this chain of equivalence, 
prompting the need to constitute a new one. It is in this new chain of equivalence the antagonism 
among the elements that previously engaged on the common front against absolutism comes to the 
fore. The contingency of antagonism in Mouffe’s elaboration of agonism/agonistic pluralism refers 
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to what she and Laclau discuss in the HSS as the ever-present transformation among the relations 
of subordination, domination, and oppression (Laclau & Mouffe, 2014, pp. 137-139).  
She characterizes agonism as a struggle between adversaries, in contrast to antagonism that she 
defines as a struggle between enemies (Mouffe, 2000, pp. 102-103). She further specifies the 
definition of agonism by further describe what the term of ‘adversary’ means and the relations 
among them: 
This category of the 'adversary' does not eliminate antagonism though and it should be 
distinguished from the liberal notion of the competitor with which it is sometimes 
identified. An adversary is an enemy, but a legitimate enemy one with whom we have 
some common ground because we have a shared adhesion to the ethico-political 
principles of liberal democracy: liberty and equality. But we disagree concerning the 
meaning and implementation of those principles, and such a disagreement is not one 
that could be resolved through deliberation and rational discussion. (Mouffe, 2000, p. 
102) 
In short, Mouffe differentiates agonism to antagosnism by defining that the conflict in the former, 
in contrast to the latter, does not involve the involved parties to question each other’s legitimacy. 
In agonism, the conflicting parties may clash with against each-others, but they perceive their 
counterparts as legitimate parties based on their co-adherence to common principles. 
Typical among post-structuralists, she specifies that the ‘the ethico-political principles’ and ‘the 
adherence to it’ are neither given nor fixed. In the case of liberal democracy, the identification of 
‘the ethico-political principles’, Mouffe argues, is necessary if it is to thrive. The ethico-political 
principles she refers to in the passage are open to and inevitably produce different interpretations 
and she envisages the agonistic field, revolving around the adherence to those principles including 
the liberty for everyone to come with its own interpretations and the equality among those 
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interpretations, provides the outlet for those interpretations to engage against each other in 
adversarial relations. Each decision that temporarily suspends the fluidity of meanings and 
identities should be anticipated to be temporary and the chance for it to be subjected to questioning 
and reconfiguration should be kept open. The consensus on the adherence to the said ‘ethico-
political principles’ is, Mouffe defines, ‘conflictual consensus’ (Mouffe, 2000, p. 103; 2013). 
It is necessary to underline here that Mouffe defines the adherence to the ‘ethico-political’ 
principles as not the sort of blind and strict compliance among the subjects toward certain strict 
rules and regulations, but rather in the form of identification. Mouffe describes the latter, referring 
to Freud, to identification with or internalization of those values that constitute the agents’ 
subjectivity that is more related to the dimension of passion or affection than is merely compliance 
based on rational calculation (Mouffe, 2000, p. 103; 2005, pp. 25-29). Her explication is quoted 
as following:  
Freud’s analysis of the process of identification brings out the libidinal investment at 
work in the creation of collective identities and it gives important clues concerning the 
emergence of antagonism. In Civilization and Its Discontents, he presents a view of 
society as perpetually threatened with disintegration because of the inclination to 
aggression present in human beings. According to him ‘men are not gentle creatures 
who want to be loved, and who at the most can defend themselves if they are attacked; 
they are, on the contrary, among whose instinctual endowment is to be reckoned a 
powerful shares of aggressiveness.’ Civilization, in order to check those aggressive 
instincts, needs to use different methods. One of those consists in fostering communal 
bonds through the mobilization of the libidinal instinct of love. As he asserts in Group 
Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, ‘a group is clearly held together by a power 
of some kind: and to what power could this feat be better ascribed than to Eros, which 
holds everything together in the world.’ (quoted in Mouffe, 2005, p. 26) The aim is to 
establish strong identifications between members of the community, to bind them in a 
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shared identity. A collective identity, a ‘we’, is the result of a libidinal investment, but 
this necessarily implies the determination of a ‘they’. To be sure, Freud did not see all 
opposition as enmity, but he was aware that it could always become enmity. As he 
indicates, ‘It is always possible to bind together a considerable amount of people in 
love, so long as there are other people left over to receive the manifestations of their 
aggressiveness.’ In such a case, the ‘we/they’ relationship becomes one of enmity, i.e. 
it becomes antagonistic. (Mouffe, 2005, pp. 25-26)       
With this description on Mouffe’s conceptualization of agonism/agonistic pluralism at hand, the 
elaboration can proceed to see how other studies respond to it. The elaboration and review below 
focus on the responses towards Mouffe’s central concept of antagonism and agonism that covers 
both planes of theoretical and its practical application. The focus on her concepts of antagonism 
and agonism is given the focus here because it is on this aspect the ambiguity on Mouffe’s 
theoretical edifice with regards to coercion comes to the fore. As it will be elaborated and argued 
below, the ambiguity comes to the fore due to two factors, namely: Mouffe’s own shortfall in her 
elaborations and the tendency of the critical commentators to overlook the dimension of ‘beyond 
discourse analysis’, borrowing the term from Zizek’s response to Hegemony and Socialist 
Strategy, underlying Mouffe’s conceptualization. One of the most prominent critics toward Mouffe 
highlights her portrayal of antagonism and the primacy she gives to it. Some focuses on her 
ambiguous conceptualization on the relations between antagonism and agonism (Abizadeh, 2005; 
Roskamm, 2015). Some other critics even argue further that Mouffe seems to reify ‘antagonism’ 
(Norval, 1997; Fristch, 2008; Menga, 2017). The image that Mouffe seems to reify antagonism 
especially rises from the juxtaposition she makes between her agonism/agonistic-pluralism with 
Arendt in several of her works, one of them is quoted below:  
In my view, the main problem with the Arendtian understanding of ‘agonism’ is that, 
to put it in a nutshell, it is an ‘agonism without antagonism’.  What I mean is that, 
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although Arendt puts great emphasis on human plurality and insists that politics deals 
with the community and the reciprocity among human beings who are different from 
each other, she never acknowledges that this plurality is at the origin of antagonistic 
conflicts. According to her, to think politically is to develop the ability to see things 
from a multiplicity of perspectives. (Mouffe, 2013, pp. 9-10) 
The central issue in these critiques is that Mouffe seems to be ambiguous in defining antagonism 
and its relations with difference. On some of her passages, she explicitly mentions that the 
difference, as the source of meaning and identity, comes first and from which the antagonism 
always potentially stems out. However, in some other passages, especially when discussing 
agonism, her statements imply that antagonism is given or predetermined. This is a central issue 
because, as seen in the quote above, Mouffe constructs her distinction between her 
agonism/agonistic pluralism and Arendt’s around these concepts of ‘difference’ and antagonism. 
However, some of the commentators see that Mouffe’s ambiguity, accepting antagonism as 
potential in some passages and antagonism as actually given in some others. Criticisms on her 
ambiguity mostly highlights Mouffe’s decision to position Schmitt’s friend/enemy as ‘quasi 
transcendental condition of possibility’ for democracy (Mouffe, 2013, p. 135). 
Critics, such as Menga, agree with Mouffe’s theoretical presuppositions. Menga, however, parts 
ways with Mouffe when Mouffe takes Schmitt’s friend/enemy categories or antagonism as ‘quasi-
transcendental condition of possibility’ because he sees Schmitt’s presupposition is contradictory 
to Mouffe’s intention to incorporate it to strengthen democratic plurality (Menga, 2017, p. 541). 
Mouffe describes the constitution of collective self in such situation as the result of hegemonic 
intervention, since there is no transcendental ground, and each formation of collective self 
inevitably causes double movements of inclusion and exclusion. It is this inevitable exclusion that 
makes the said collective self always remain contingent and open for possible reconfiguration. It 
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is this ever-present possibility in its contingency that becomes the condition of possibility of the 
rearticulation of the collective self as democratic order. Menga sees, however, that Schmitt’s 
antagonism does not starts from this presupposition of contingency nor allows for its articulation, 
thus foreclosing the inner-dynamics and inner-self-questioning that characterizes democratic 
plurality (Menga, 2017, p. 542). He criticizes Mouffe whom he sees to overlook the structural 
difference between antagonism and agonism, manifests in the ambiguity of her depiction of 
relations between ‘antagonism’ and ‘agonism’ (Menga, 2017, pp. 544-548). To be more precise, 
Mouffe equates the condition of possibility of antagonism and agonism as the plurality and 
contingency of values and identities.   
Instead of Schmitt, Menga proposes to take Mouffe’s underpinning presuppositions for critical 
appropriation of Arendt’s idea of plurality and natality. Through critical appropriation of Arendt’s 
idea, Menga argues, it would be more viable and feasible to carry Mouffe’s concepts of 
agonism/agonistic pluralism further. Menga argues, based on closer reading on Arendt’s concept 
of plurality and distinction, that Arendt’s concept is more appropriate for the articulation of 
Mouffe’s democracy design. Menga presents his reading on Arendt as follows: 
Arendt’s characterisation of plurality, if one follows what she makes of it, does not 
imply the mere condition of cohesion among the many and, accordingly, a presumptive 
unifying grounding thereof; it asserts precisely the opposite. It bespeaks the 
constitutive condition of human interaction, such that this condition, insofar as 
constitutive and, therefore, not grounded in any metaphysical or otherwise prior 
substantive foundation, is and remains irreducibly contingent. And insofar as it is 
effectively interactive, it cannot but reflect the open interplay of what Arendt defines 
as the ‘twofold character of equality and distinction’ among individuals. As a 
consequence, plurality, being structurally informed by such a contingent dynamic of 
interaction between equal and distinct beings, cannot give rise to any final unitary 
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formation of common space or collective order. Rather, it engenders realms of 
commonality which inevitably display traits of conjunction and disjunction—of accord 
and conflict. And what is additionally crucial in Arendt’s depiction of plurality is that 
she by no means accentuates its component of equality, but much rather the primacy 
of distinction as the very source for dynamism and participation within collectivity. 
Distinction, in other words, informs the contingent, ‘differential’ and conflictual 
character of plurality, thereby making plurality effectively ‘plural’. The primacy of 
distinction is best illustrated by Arendt’s emphasis on the notion of natality as a notion 
which, by breaking the logic of sameness and generalisation, displays the constitutive 
inequality of singular beings within plurality, along with their intrinsic capacity of 
acting as initiating, beginning, and therefore of possibly inserting strands of innovation 
and conflict into a common space. (Menga, 2017, pp. 548-549) 
Menga argues that had Mouffe incorporated Arendt’s concept of plurality, instead of Schmitt’s, 
she would not have had gotten herself entrapped in ambiguous conceptualization of antagonism 
and agonism.  
Aletta Norval also levels criticism toward this emphasis on antagonism. Norval’s criticism though, 
operates on a different level and is not exclusively levelled toward Mouffe and her works but 
covers the whole theory of discourse and hegemony Mouffe develops with Laclau. Norval 
problematizes Laclau and Mouffe’s emphasis on the constitution of political frontiers and 
antagonism that gives the impression that identity can only be constituted in oppositional, and thus, 
antagonistic relations. She points out that Mouffe and Laclau have gone too far in their anti-
essentialist endeavour by taking up the position of seemingly to privilege negativity in the 
individuation of identity. 
It is crucial to proceed carefully here, for it is at this point that an important ethico-
theoretical decision can be located in the argument. The manner in which their critique 
of essentialist forms of argumentation is developed lead Laclau and Mouffe to a 
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position which privileges the dimension of negativity in the individuation of identity.  
In this process, the critique of essentialist forms of theorising identity is conflated with 
the further proposition that the only manner in which identity can be thought in a non-
essentialist fashion is through negativity. I will pursue this argument and the 
consequences of this shift in more detail throughout this article. At this point it is 
simply necessary to highlight the fact that the way in which their critique of 
essentialism is articulated closes off other possibilities of thinking about identity which 
does not, at the outset, privilege the moment of frontiers and antagonisms. (Norval, 
1997, p. 57) 
Later, in the same work, Norval specifies her criticism toward Mouffe and her inclination to 
Schmitt to highlights the constitutive role of the political moment in the constitution of the social 
(Norval, 1997, p. 58).  
Norval’s criticism points to the conflation of the antagonism, understood as frontiers drawing, as 
the articulation of difference as well as the constitution of antagonism in Laclau and Mouffe. She 
refines the topography all the while by keep adhering to the non-essentialist presupposition while 
avoiding overemphasis on exclusion, opposition, and antagonism. In the topography she proposes, 
she distinguishes among (i) the individuation of identity; (ii) the relation of the process of 
individuation of identity to antagonism and frontiers; and (iii) the theorisation of frontiers 
themselves related to the complexity and the problem of homogeneity (Norval, 1997, p. 67). 
Referring to Wittgenstein and Derrida, Norval argues that there is no inherent logic or 
predetermined law that necessitates the logic of identity individuation with where and how 
antagonism may arise (Norval, 1997, p. 70; 73). 
Mouffe problematizes the overemphasis on antagonism as the only way for individuation of 
identity by arguing that the constitution of binary opposition in antagonism tends to overlook the 
complexities of constituted multiple identities that cannot be accounted for by the binary 
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oppositions (Norval, 1997, p. 63;67). Norval’s central argument in her criticism is the necessity 
not to conflate the individuation of identity and the drawing of political frontiers. She refers to 
Wittgenstein’s concept of ‘family resemblance’ and Derrida’s ‘iterability’. The former argues that 
individuation of identity does not necessarily require specification of determined definition of the 
said identity as it can be constituted through a series of overlapping resemblances between the said 
identity and the others. The latter emphasises the role of iterability in individuating identity that 
argues as long as the articulation of such identity is repeatable the identity is relatively stable. It is 
necessary to underline here, following Norval, that the repetition here is not “merely repetition of 
the same as essentially the same, since every repetition already involves alteration” (Norval, 1997, 
pp. 68-69). She further argues that nowhere in both Wittgenstein’s and Derrida’s concepts of 
identity does formation antagonism become a necessary condition and its point of emergence can 
be ascertained (Norval, 1997, p. 70).  
Nikolai Roskamm takes a similar trajectory in his critical response to Mouffe’s agonism/agonistic 
pluralism. He further argues that agonism is not necessary and it is more fruitful to use the concept 
of ‘constitutive’ other from Laclau (Roskamm, 2015). In his critical response, Roskamm contrasts 
Laclau and Mouffe in order to construct his critical response to Mouffe’s agonism and the apparent 
primacy she gives to ‘antagonism’ in her conceptualization. There are three central points in 
Roskamm’s critical response to Mouffe’s agonism. First, Roskamm argues that “(Mouffe) does 
not stress enough the impossibility of taming antagonism.” (Roskamm, 2015, p. 397) Though 
Roskamm acknowledges that Mouffe recognizes and mentions it explicitly (Mouffe, 2013, p. 15) 
Roskamm and I agree with him, she does not substantiate it sufficiently. The insufficiency will be 
elaborated in the next section. The political where antagonism belongs is given primacy in 
Mouffe’s conceptualization of agonism. Her criticism to the currently dominant regime of 
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democracy is exactly their denial to the constitutive role of this antagonism. As an alternative, 
Mouffe offers her model of agonistic pluralism that she claims to be based on the recognition of 
the constitutive role of antagonism and its sublimation into agonism. However, Roskamm’s 
critique points out that this transformation can never be total and complete and Mouffe does not 
elaborate further how to deal with this excess. Roskamm argues that Mouffe does not want to 
elaborate this further because by doing so “… would counter her main project: to create a positive 
alternative for democratic politics” (Roskamm, 2015, p. 397).   
Second, as part of his critiques Roskamm also elaborates how the transformation of antagonism 
into agonism deprives ‘the political’ that Mouffe gives primacy in her conceptualization. 
Roskamm argues that the sublimation process is a shift from the plane of the ontological into the 
ontical or from the political into politics. This shift, Roskamm argues, deprives antagonism of its 
radical negativity or, in other words, deprives Mouffe’s theory of antagonism its power to define 
and explain the political. Third, based on his reflection on Carl Schmitt and Ernesto Laclau, 
Roskamm argues that the constitutive outside is not the enemy and antagonism is not a personal 
feature but a structural principle (Roskamm, 2015, p. 398). Similar to Norval, Roskamm suggests, 
instead of thinking about the other in friend/enemy categories, to turn to the notion of constitutive 
other, or difference in Norval’s term based on his reflection on Schmitt and Laclau. 
Norval, Roskamm, and Menga share the same concern that is Mouffe’s and Laclau’s, apparent 
overemphasis on exclusion, opposition, and antagonism. In different words, they argue that such 
overemphasis may lead to the reification of antagonism and obscure or even cancel the ever present 
openings they have argued for against the essentialist paradigm. Many other Scholars share their 
criticism of Mouffe on this issue. Reification in general can be defined as the treatment of 
immaterial thing into a material one. More specific to Marxian tradition, the term reification here 
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refers to the process by which social relations are perceived as inherent attributes of the people 
involved or the product of such relations (Lukacs, 1972, p. 86). Roskamm’s elaboration and 
specification of antagonism as a structural principle and not a personal feature partially clarifies 
this criticism. Yet, further response to specify this category of antagonism is required as it is central 
to the elaboration on the dimension of coercion at work on the ontological plane. This elaboration 
is part of the next section. Prior to that, however, it is necessary to review other kinds of criticism 
levelled towards Mouffe’s agonism/agonistic pluralism and its theoretical underpinning.  
Criticism towards Mouffe’s agonism/agonistic pluralism are not exclusive on this issue of 
reification or overemphasis on antagonism. Her agonism/agonistic pluralism, as well as the theory 
of discourse and hegemony, also receive criticism of being too fluid and impermanent. Andrew 
Schaap elaborates Mouffe’s agonism/agonistic pluralism based on his reflection on the cases of 
reconciliatory projects in Chile, South Africa, and Timor Leste. Besides acknowledging its 
strength and promising potential, Schaap highlights the overemphasis of Mouffe’s agonism, and 
its theoretical underpinning on the contingent nature of social reality and does not address, in the 
specific cases in his analysis, the need for stable structure in order to transform the antagonism 
among elements in divided societies into agonism (Schaap, 2006). For Schaap, Mouffe’s agonism 
seems to be an ethos that always seeks to postpone the moment of decision in order to affirm the 
openness of political life (Schaap, 2006, p. 270). He poses the question that demands an immediate 
answer from the agonist camp that is, paraphrasing Schaap, “How (and why) do the parties 
involved come to have ‘agonistic respect’ for each other that would ensure their conflicts remain 
non-violent?” (Schaap, 2006, p. 269). This emphasis on the openness and broadening of the 
political space is, Schaap argues, more likely to reify the conflicting identities in the context of 
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reconciliatory politics. This is despite his acknowledgement on the merit of such a view and 
approach that sees reconciliation as basically political undertaking.  
Other studies argue that these weaknesses become more apparent when the theoretical frameworks 
and concepts are applied to empirical cases, such as in the fields of peace building/reconciliation 
and planning. Yamamoto highlights the other side of this ‘relentless impermanence’, to use 
Wagenaar’s words, by pointing out that since it is possible for antagonism to transform into 
agonism, it is also possible for agonism to transform into antagonism. Thus, the task of radical 
democracy theory is not only to transform enemies into adversaries, but also to prevent the 
transformation of adversaries into enemies.  In doing so, he reiterates that agonism is possible if 
there is a shared desire for order among the contending elements (Yamamoto, 2018).  
Lois McNay, focusing specifically on Mouffe’s agonism, highlights this perceived drawback and 
attributes it to the primacy that Mouffe gives to the ontological status of the political without 
considering the actual existing power relations that take place on the plane of the politics (McNay, 
2013, pp. 65-66). She further argues that this emphasis on the ontology and the exposure of the 
contingency of reality tend to foreclose the agenda of radical democracy that is to disclose and 
challenge the existing forms of domination and inequality (McNay, 2013, p. 66). Ontological 
reflection on the political, McNay argues, “carries within itself, then, the danger of reification, of 
becoming an empty abstraction that neglects the analysis of existing oppression in favour of formal 
models of democracy or what Bourdieu calls ‘a fictitious universalism’ unaccompanied by ‘any 
reminder of the repressed economic and social conditions of access to the universal or by any 
(political) action aimed at universalizing these conditions in practice” (McNay, 2013, p. 66). 
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Criticism towards Laclau and Mouffe’s emphasis on the ontological also comes from Wagenaar. 
He also describes its drawbacks in the context of the practical purpose of policy analysis as: “(1) 
the lack of … empirical applications of poststructuralist political theory. (2) The relentless 
impermanence of social and political categories of phenomena …, and a concurrent unwillingness 
to acknowledge the institutional character of many social and political arrangements. (3) The 
generalist, ineffectual nature of its ethos” (Wagenaar, 2011, pp. 154-155). However, Wagenaar 
acknowledges the merits of Laclau and Mouffe that he describes as: “(1) An awareness of deep 
difference as well as the prevalence of struggle (plus a commensurate conceptual vocabulary) as 
defining principles of politics. (2) A well-developed ethos of pluralism that functions as a critical 
standard against which to judge the democratic quality of policy making (Wagenaar, 2011, p. 154). 
In relations to the context of practical purpose of policy analysis Wagenaar also highlights the 
‘methodological deficiency’ where he points to Glynos and Howarth’s LCE as the most recent and 
promising attempt to formulate research methodology based on Laclau and Mouffe’s theoretical 
framework. This will be discussed in further details in the Chapter III Research Strategy. The 
important point here is Wagenaar’s critical highlight on the “… unending, disembodied 
discussions about the amount of contingency versus stability or the possibilities for political 
change …” (Wagenaar, 2011, p. 155) in post-structuralist theoretical framework, including Laclau 
and Mouffe’s.    
Review on those critical responses towards Mouffe’s agonism/agonistic pluralism and its 
theoretical underpinning present the image of divided opinion toward one same picture. On one 
hand, there are the likes of Norval, Roskamm, and Menga who focus their criticism, in various 
ways, towards Mouffe, and Laclau as well, overemphasis on antagonism. On the other hand, we 
also find critics, such as McNays’ and Wagenaar’s, that highlight the unending dialectics between 
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contingency and stability that seem, at least for them, do not provide stable ground to serve the 
practical purpose for either pursuing the cause of radical democracy or for policy analysis. The 
ambiguities presented in this section turn out to be not exclusive within Mouffe’s conceptualization 
but also the responses toward it. 
The review on two general kinds of criticism levelled against Mouffe’s agonism/agonistic 
pluralism and its theoretical underpinning oscillate between two poles. On one hand there are 
criticisms directed toward the Mouffe and Laclau emphasis on antagonism both in the concepts of 
agonism/agonistic pluralism and the social as a result of hegemonic intervention. On the other 
hand, there are criticisms that focus on agonism/agonistic-pluralism and its theoretical 
underpinning on contingency. Closer inspection tells that these two are basically the underlying 
theoretical presuppositions of Laclau and Mouffe’s theory of discourse and hegemony that 
underpins Mouffe’s agonism/agonistic pluralism namely: the radical contingency and the primacy 
of the political. Laclau and Mouffe explicate how these two presuppositions are co-constitutive as 
well as constantly in tension with each other. 
Those criticisms reviewed above have some valid points. Those points can be enumerated as 
following: i) the insufficient elaboration on the limits of agonism/agonistic pluralism as an order. 
The insufficiency on the elaboration on the dimension of coercion, as the limits of the objectivity 
of agonism/agonistic pluralism, is related to this point. Insufficient elaboration on this point also 
contributes to obscure the understanding of agonism/agonistic pluralism as an order that inevitably 
is based on a certain set of rules that the agent is expected to comply with. ii) There has been a 
lack in applying the theoretical framework of both agonism/agonistic pluralism and theory of 
discourse and hegemony for empirical research. As elaborated in the next section, this lack 
contributes to obstruct comprehensive analysis based on the underlying presuppositions of 
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Mouffe’s agonism/agonistic pluralism that does not favour one at the expense of the other and 
highlights the constitutive role of their constant tensions. 
The following section explicates how these valid points from the criticism levelled toward Mouffe 
agonism/agonistic pluralism are useful to pinpoint the dimension of coercion in Mouffe’s concept 
as well as locating where she has insufficiently elaborated it. This requires careful inspection 
because while the criticisms have some valid points, they also fall into the same perceived mistakes 
they criticize in Mouffe’s and Laclau’s concepts. In order to disentangle these complex webs of 
ideas and concepts the inspection sets based two underlying presuppositions of radical contingency 
and the primacy of the political as its main reference.     
2. Rectifying the Ambiguities: Radical Contingency, the Primacy of the Political, and 
the Absence of Constant Dialectics between Consent and Coercion 
 
This section discusses how this research responds to the ambiguities of Mouffe’s 
agonism/agonistic pluralism elaborated in the previous section. The responses in this section 
revolve around two pivotal points, namely (i) the misrepresentation of the underlying 
presuppositions of radical contingency and the primacy of the political that support Mouffe’s 
concept of agonism/agonistic pluralism and (ii) the ambiguity within Mouffe’s own 
conceptualization that overlooks the import of identification and, as Roskamm mentions, ‘the 
impossibility of antagonism in the final instance’ (Roskamm, 2015, p. 397). These two points are 
important to disclose the underdevelopment of the dimension of coercion in Mouffe’s 
conceptualization of agonism/agonistic pluralism as well as how to further investigate it within the 
framework of Post-Structuralist Discourse Theory (PDT). As mentioned in the end of the previous 
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section, the elaboration here is based mainly on the underlying presuppositions of the theory of 
discourse and hegemony, the radical contingency and the primacy of the political, and their 
continuous tensions that is constitutive for the social. With reference to these presuppositions, the 
validity of the criticism reviewed in the previous section can be measured and useful elements can 
be incorporated in this research. 
The pivotal point in relation to the topic of coercion here is the underdevelopment of this topic in 
Mouffe’s works and the tendency of the criticisms to overlook the underlying theoretical 
presuppositions in Mouffe’s works. In the former, Mouffe only slightly touches upon the topic of 
how her agonism/agonistic pluralism is basically a hegemonic order that necessarily characterizes 
by constant dialectics between consent and coercion (Anderson, 1976; Davies, 2013). The limits 
of Mouffe’s elaboration of this topic in her conceptualization have been pointed out by the critics 
such as Roskamm (Roskamm, 2015); Yamamoto (Yamamoto, 2018) and Menga (Menga, 2017). 
Mouffe does not elaborate in detail about the limits of her agonism/agonistic pluralism. She only 
briefly mentions that the general characteristic of the form of conflicts an agonistic structure can 
be allowed is one that does not jeopardize the institutions or the political associations. (Mouffe, 
2005, p. 20; 2013, p. 13). Mouffe’s emphasis on antagonism is tightly related to her discussion on 
the constitution of identity or individuation of identity. Mouffe sees that such identity is not 
predetermined or given prior to one’s insertion into a structure or a political community (Mouffe, 
2013). However, Mouffe, following the underlying presuppositions of the theory of discourse and 
hegemony, sees that such community is not constituted on a certain privileged value or principle 
either. Through such a move, she aims to deconstruct the essentialist elements in both the liberal 
and the communitarian view of liberty, more specifically the view of the complete individual prior 
to its insertion into the political community of the former and the essentialist of a certain view of 
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common good in the latter. She aims to propose a certain form of political community that is based 
not on a single substantive view of ‘common good’ but by constant adherence of its subjects based 
on their acknowledgement that whatever their idea of ‘good life’ is, it is only possible to be 
achieved only in and through the said political community. She describes it as the following: 
What we share and what makes us fellow citizens in a liberal democratic regime is not 
a substantive idea of the good but a set of political principles specific to such a 
tradition: the principles of freedom and equality for all. These principles constitute 
what we can call, following Wittgenstein, a 'grammar 'of political conduct. To be a 
citizen is to recognize the authority of such principles and the rules in which they are 
embodied, to have them informing our political judgement and our actions. To be 
associated in terms of the recognition of liberal democratic principles: this is the 
meaning of citizenship that I want to put forward. It implies seeing citizenship not as 
a legal status but as a form of identification, a type of political identity: something to 
be constructed, not empirically given. (Mouffe, 1993, pp. 65-66) 
There are two important terms which are seen to be pivotal here: ‘grammar’ and ‘identity’ or 
‘identification’. Mouffe’s elaboration in the work quoted above does not further discuss these two 
concepts, since it focuses on the options of forms of political community that fits her description 
above. 
She elaborates those concepts, especially on ‘identity’ and ‘identification’ in more detail in The 
Return of the Political. In the latter, she starts to explicitly elaborate the need of the political and 
democracy theories to consider and incorporate the dimension of ‘affect’ that is mobilized through 
political identification (Mouffe, 2005, p. 6). She points to the deficiency she perceives in the 
dominant liberal rationalist paradigm that has excluded the dimension of affect and this, she 
argues, has caused the unpreparedness to deal with ‘mass’ political movements such as 
nationalism. She elaborates these themes of affect and identification following Freud (Mouffe, 
52 
 
2005, pp. 25-29). There is a passage that is central not only for the discussion in the following 
section on responding to some of the critical responses toward Mouffe’s agonism/agonistic 
pluralism but also to highlight the insufficiency of Mouffe’s elaboration on the dimension of 
coercion in her conceptualization.  
In comparison, it is clear that Mouffe equates ‘the grammar’, mentioned in former, with what 
Freud mentions as ‘civilization’ she refers to in the latter. From the two passages above it can also 
be drawn that it is through this process of identification with a certain ‘grammar’ or ‘civilization, 
by way of libidinal investment, one’s identity is constituted. Later in the same passage, she draws 
the idea of ‘enjoyment’ from Lacan, via Stavrakakis and Zizek (Mouffe, 2005, pp. 27-28), to 
demonstrate how the libidinal investment is mobilized, that cannot be reduced merely to symbolic 
identification but toward the incarnation of the Thing in one of the signifiers that is perceived (or 
sublimated) to be its incarnation (see also Stavrakakis, 1999, p. 131). 
Once again, following this passage, Mouffe does not pursue further how the identification process 
is related to the continuous dialectics between consent and coercion of hegemony. She keeps using 
this elaboration to back her argument of the ontological status of antagonism as we/they or 
friend/enemy division. The import of this passage, however, lays in the hint that indicates how 
Mouffe perceives and places the antagonism she purports to portray, namely on the ontological 
plane. This is something that some of her critics do not take into consideration sufficiently, with 
Norval and Roskamm as exceptions. Many of the critics sometimes conflate between antagonism 
on the ontological and the ontical plane. Mouffe has anticipated this by distinguishing between 
‘political’ and ‘politics’. She defines the former as “the dimension of antagonism”, while the latter 
as “… the set of practices and institutions through which an order is created, organizing human 
coexistence in the context of conflictuality provided by the political” (Mouffe, 2005, p. 9). 
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Mouffe’s insufficient elaboration on the concept of grammar, identity, and identification has been 
proven to be costly for her. She becomes enmeshed in the oscillating process between ontological 
and ontical plane leading to the ambiguities in her framework as pointed out by Norval, Roskamm, 
and Menga. Unfortunately, many of the criticisms also fall into the conflation of antagonism 
between the ontological and ontical plane. Partially due to Mouffe’s own ambiguity, they criticize 
Mouffe for her overemphasis on ‘antagonism’ with the image of substantive ‘enemy’ in their 
minds, either potential or actual. Roskamm aptly rectifies this by arguing that, drawing from 
Laclau, the category of antagonism or enemy here refers to structural principle and not a personal 
feature (Roskamm, 2015, p. 398). Antagonism as a structural principle is not something totally 
alien for Mouffe. Roskamm draws this understanding of antagonism partially from the Hegemony 
and Socialist Strategy, that Mouffe co-authors with Laclau, and some others from the New 
Reflection of the Revolutions of Our Time. The critical juncture, however, is Mouffe’s 
incorporation of Schmitt’s definition of the political that defines the antagonism as friend/enemy 
relations as if it is given and not discursively constructed. Therefore, it is not surprising that some 
critics perceive Mouffe as ambiguous on this matter (Roskamm, 2015; Menga, 2017). 
However, I also find that the suggestions for Mouffe to replace the concept of antagonism with 
Derrida’s concept of difference problematic. These suggestions presuppose that antagonism takes 
place only on the ontical plane and overlook one that takes place on the ontological. It gives the 
impression that there is only difference on the ontological plane. I would like to argue here that 
antagonism also takes place on the ontological level by drawing from Roskamm’s description of 
it as structural principle and the sources he refers to, Laclau and Mouffe’s Hegemony and Socialist 
Strategy and Laclau’s New Reflection of Revolutions in Our Time.  
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Let us begin the elaboration with a brief reminder on the underlying theoretical presupposition in 
Mouffe’s agonism/agonistic pluralism, the radical contingency and the primacy of the political. 
This theory defines that all social formation is a result of a certain hegemonic formation to which 
the radical contingency is its conditions of possibility as well as its impossibility and the practice 
to constitute it is always political. Hegemony emerges as a particular social element come to 
represent the totality of the social. This totality, its configuration, the relations among its 
comprising parts, however, are never fully closed and fixed and neither do they follow pre-given 
objective law. They are a product of contingent articulation that is political in nature. 
Radical contingency, Laclau and Mouffe argue, is the condition of possibility as well as 
impossibility for hegemony. The contingency here should be understood in the sense of radical 
contingency. Radical here means that everything social has equal potential equal to be altered and 
questioned. In this regard, total absence of totality and totality that is fully closed and completely 
internalized to all particular elements, are equally impossible. In the former, there is nothing fixed 
to alter in the first place and in the latter, everything is already neatly fixed in their position. Thus, 
the radical contingency here should be perceived as a totality that is only partially closed and fixed. 
The totality of the structure is always threatened by potential question and alteration. Laclau 
explains: 
This link between blocking and simultaneous affirmation of an identity is what we call 
contingency, which introduces the elements of radical undecidability into the structure 
of objectivity. (Laclau, 1990, p. 21)     
Laclau and Mouffe elaborate this radical contingency in detail in its relations to the notion of 
antagonism and its constitutive role. They define antagonism as the limit of all objectivity. Laclau 
specifies further that antagonism does not have any objectivity but it is something that prevents 
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the constitution of objectivity itself (Laclau & Mouffe, 2014, p. 112; Laclau, 1990, p. 17). This 
should be perceived in the sense that antagonism subverts objectivity into a limited threat or partial 
objectivity instead of fully complete and fixed one. 
This decision, no matter how partial and transient it is, is a decision and decision-making is 
inevitably political. This is the second underlying presupposition of the theory of hegemony and 
discourse and Mouffe’s agonism, the primacy of the political. Situated in the radical contingency, 
the nodal point around which the differential relations among diverse elements that comprise the 
society has to be determined in order to stabilize it. There is no pre-given law or natural order that 
determines what should be the nodal point or the certain form of differential relations. It is a result 
of articulation and it is always political because whichever the nodal point and differential relations 
constituted it always implies exclusion of other possibilities. Therefore Mouffe, with Laclau, 
defines the political logic here as double process of inclusion/exclusion. This is related to the 
constitution or drawing of frontiers inevitable in the overall process of fixation. It is this drawing 
of frontiers that Mouffe describes as the political and she argues that it always involves the 
articulation of we/they, or antagonism (Mouffe, 1993; 2005). 
This is the point that scholars such as Norval and Roskamm highlight. Norval questions the 
ontological status of ‘antagonism’ in constituting difference or drawing the frontiers. While she 
acknowledges that all social realities, including meaning and identity, are constituted through 
differential relations, she critically examines whether this differential relation is inevitably 
articulated as antagonism. Antagonism here is defined as described by Laclau and Mouffe as: “the 
presence of the Other prevents me from being totally myself” (Laclau & Mouffe, 2014, p. 111). 
Norval’s main argument is that antagonism or drawing the political frontiers is “… just one of the 
possible articulation among others rather than the essence of individuation of identity” (Norval, 
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1997, p. 73). In doing so Norval conceptually separates the constitution of difference and the 
drawing of political frontiers or antagonism that she perceives Laclau and Mouffe have conflated 
(Norval, 1997, pp. 69-70). She explicates that the complexity of identity formation cannot be 
merely reduced in the ‘we/they’ division such as in Mouffe’s antagonism by referring to Derrida’s 
deconstruction. By doing so Norval has highlighted the aspect of identity formation which cannot 
be articulated in we/they distinction but in terms of difference and not otherness. 
However, it is this that I find equally problematic among this kind of criticism and in Mouffe’s 
works. The radical contingency is not fully understood or elaborated in its dual dimensions of 
contingency and stabilization and their continuous tensions. Antagonism as defined by Laclau and 
Mouffe in the HSS cited above should be understood with regards to these dual dimensions of the 
radical contingency. The antagonist in Roskamm’s ‘antagonism as structural principle’ should be 
understood on the ontological plane. On this plane antagonism is the constant instability that makes 
articulation an attempt to suspend this instability relevant but also at the same time impossible in 
the final instance (Laclau & Mouffe, 2014, p. 99). Mouffe, and Laclau, is fully aware of this sort 
of understanding of ‘antagonism’. The main threat as well as the condition of possibility of stable 
meaning or identity is the contingency itself. The contingency marks the limits of reality that 
belongs to, using Lacanian term, the symbolic register (Laclau & Mouffe, 2014, p. 84). 
This re-examination of the underlying theoretical presuppositions in Mouffe’s agonism/agonistic 
pluralism against its critics that highlight Mouffe’s overemphasis on antagonism also partially 
counters the criticism of the impermanence of the social and political categories as such presented 
by, among others, Schaap. Examining Schaap’s portrayal on the relative deficit of Mouffe’s 
agonism, it is apparent that in Schaap’s view the deferral in Mouffe’s agonism is seen as pure 
deferral. Undecidability here is equated with democracy, at least in term of ethos. This portrayal, 
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while it is true in depicting the focus of Mouffe’s agonism on democracy as ethos, only partially 
highlights Mouffe’s agonism and the contingent nature of society. Contrasting this depiction with 
Mouffe and Laclau’s elaboration on ‘radical contingency’ immediately gives us the whole picture 
that they do not condone indecision or avoiding the moment of decision. Such a portrayal presents 
Mouffe’s agonism as an endless game of pure deference. This is exactly what Mouffe, and Laclau 
explicitly reject (Laclau, 1990, p. 43; Mouffe, 1993, pp. 37-38; 145; Laclau & Mouffe, 2014, pp- 
98-99). To put it in simpler terms, Laclau and Mouffe argue that in their ‘radical contingency’, 
total absence of decision and decision that is complete and fixed are equally impossible. The import 
of the moment of closure has been reiterated many times by Mouffe as well as Laclau in their 
various works. They again and again reiterate that they are not discussing the discourse of the 
psychotic where there is only an endless game of differences (Laclau & Mouffe, 2014, pp. 98-99; 
Laclau, 1990, p.43; Mouffe, 1993, pp.37-38; 145). However, they reiterate that this moment of 
closure, pertaining to the presupposition of the ‘radical contingency’, can never be fully closed, it 
is only a partial closure. 
The critical comments highlighting the ‘relentless impermanence’ apparently focus on the aspect 
of the dislocation and impossibility of closure in the final instance and seem to overlook, or even 
disregard, the logical consequences these concepts of dislocation and impossibility of closure in 
the final instance imply: there has to be a structure in the first place (Laclau, 1990). This structure 
is always a result of articulation which is a practice of “constituting certain nodal points which 
partially fix meaning, and the partial character of the fixation here proceeds from the openness of 
the social … of the constant overflowing of every discourse by the infinitude of the field of 
discursivity” (Laclau & Mouffe, 2014, p. 100). Thus, the impossibility of closure here should not 
be conflated into ‘no structure’ at all. Radical contingency describes a situation where there is a 
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structure, but this structure will never be able to totally hegemonize the field of discursivity in the 
final instance. 
Bearing this in mind, however, the criticism highlighting the apparent constant deferral of closure 
does have a ring to it. Wagenaar aptly summarizes it in his comments that point out the lack of 
application of Laclau and Mouffe’s theoretical framework for empirical research; the relentless 
impermanence of the social and political categories; and generalist, ineffectual ethos of the theory 
of discourse and hegemony. Though Wagenaar levels this criticism towards the general theory of 
discourse and hegemony that Mouffe develops in collaboration with Laclau, Mouffe’s 
agonism/agonistic pluralism shares these weaknesses too. Glynos and Howarth have anticipated 
the weakness of Laclau and Mouffe’s theoretical framework for empirical research which they 
describe as methodological and normative deficits (Glynos & Howarth, 2007, p. 6). They develop 
a methodology derived from Laclau and Mouffe’s theory of discourse and hegemony that 
Wagenaar sees as promising namely: The Logic of Critical Explanation (LCE). This will be further 
discussed in Chapter III Research Strategy. At this point, however, it is necessary to first define 
the main issue of the dimension of coercion in Mouffe’s agonism/agonistic pluralism based on the 
mapping of her theorization and the critical responses levelled toward it.     
3. The Challenge in Elaborating the Dimension of Coercion in Mouffe’s Agonism 
 
The initial elaboration in this chapter has highlighted and located the dimension of coercion at the 
ontological plane as Laclau aims to describe in the quotation. In the same passage, Laclau further 
elaborates that human beings do not exist at that level of ultimate ontological and epistemological 
point of view. He points out that the continuous attempt to constitute the ideal society without any 
59 
 
kind of subordination, domination, and oppression is always a normative matter. This means that 
any discourse on ideal society is always an ethical discourse and its limits are “… essentially open 
and no final closure can be granted …” The coercion signifies the rem(a)inder of these limits. In 
similar tone Mouffe gives us the hint when describing the specificity of her agonistic pluralism. 
The neologism of ‘rem(a)inder’ refers exactly to its two possible meanings. The coercion serves 
as reminder that a certain structure inevitably comes from the political origin that it tries to conceal. 
It is a reminder that there are elements subordinated and excluded in its constitution. The coercion 
also serves as the remainder of the political nature of the social, which owes its (re)production to 
the continuous stabilization of relations among its internal moments and elements amidst the ever 
present contingency and impossibility of its total eradication. Mouffe, with Laclau, encourage for 
the recognition and institutionalization of this constitutive lack of total stability instead of its 
concealment. Mouffe argues as following: 
The specificity of pluralist democracy does not reside in the absence of domination 
and violence but in the establishment of a set of institutions through which they can 
be limited and contested (Mouffe, 1993, p. 146). 
In her description, based on the elaboration above, it is easy to identify and locate where coercion 
as a structural principle already appears. It appears in “… the establishment of a set of institutions 
…” and Mouffe fully acknowledges that it is impossible to totally eradicate it due to its ontological 
status. 
The elaboration on the dimension of coercion in Mouffe’s agonism on the plane of ontological is 
challenging here because the definition of “What coercion is …” is already based on coercion as 
a structural principle. Laclau and Mouffe have elaborated this as the rem(a)inder of the 
impossibility of objective reality. What it is lacking, as Zizek highlights, is the elaboration on how 
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this constitutive lack of the structure or “the Other” should be complemented by elaboration of the 
lack of the subject and the role of social fantasy. This is the aspect that the theory of hegemony 
and discourse and Mouffe’s agonism/agonistic pluralism are both lacking. The lack on this aspect 
has broad consequences not only on the theoretical but also practical levels. Reflection on attempts 
to apply both the theory of hegemony and discourse and Mouffe’s agonism/agonistic pluralism on 
empirical cases demonstrate on the structural incompleteness; manifests in the form of “relentless 
impermanence of social and political categories” and the potentials of the ontological status of 
antagonism to justify exclusion and labelling of some elements as “enemy; which, some of them 
argue, reduce the practicability of these concepts and theories for positive application (Wagenaar, 
2011; Roskamm, 2015). 
Addressing this dimension of social fantasy is crucial because it determines whether the coercion 
as structural principle is taken as something ‘acceptable’, whether as natural law or in the name of 
order, or as oppression, no matter what the agent perceives to be what its true self is. Zizek’s 
critical response to Laclau and Mouffe theory of hegemony and discourse in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s has been taken seriously not only by Laclau and Mouffe but also the next generations 
of Post-Structuralist Discourse theorists. Yannis Stavrakakis explores and pursues further the 
investigation on the relations between affect and discourse (Stavrakakis, 2007). Jason Glynos and 
David Howarth’s Logics of Critical Explanation (LCE) through their concept of logic attempts to 
complement Laclau and Mouffe’s theory of hegemony and discourse with the dimension of social 
fantasy by adding the fantasmatic logics besides the social and political logics (Glynos & Howarth, 
2007). In the LCE, Glynos and Howarth describe the fantasmatic logics:  
to provide the means to understand why specific practices and regimes ‘grip’ 
subjects … fantasmatic logics contribute to our understanding of the resistance to 
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change of social practices (the ‘inertia’ of social practices), but also the speed and 
direction of change when it does happen (the vector of social practices) (Glynos & 
Howarth, 2007, p. 145). 
The incorporation of fantasmatic logics to complement the social and political ones enables the 
research in the dissertation to understand and explain the affective dimension and, thus, goes 
beyond the structural principle to investigate the affective dimension. 
Investigating the dimension of coercion from this perspective has two main implications that this 
dissertation also aims to address. First, it challenges the currently dominant understanding of 
coercion as empirical and objective phenomena by arguing that the phenomena of coercion are 
always ‘moralized’ ones (Wertheimer, 1987, pp. 202-241). In order to address this, Chapter II. The 
Problems with Coercion focuses on reviewing theories of coercion and how these theories are 
problematized based on the presuppositions of the theory of discourse and hegemony. Second, 
related to the first one and the ontological status of coercion, it is necessary to reiterate the distinct 
underlying ethics on Mouffe’s agonism/agonistic pluralism and the theory of hegemony and 
discourse. Both Laclau and Mouffe, in their collective and their own works, have repeatedly stated 
about the impossibility of reality as full and final objectivity; i.e. the impossibility of the social, 
the impossibility of democracy etc. Yet, it is because of the impossibility people keep pursuing 
and strive for it. The underlying ethics of this perspective is what is known as ‘the Ethics of the 
Real’ (Zupancic, 2000; Stavrakakis, 1999, pp. 127-131) that is reflected in Mouffe’s passage 
quoted above. While it is impossible to totally eliminate domination and violence, the specificity 
of pluralist democracy is determined in the establishment of a set of institutions through which this 
domination and violence are limited and contested (Mouffe, 1993, p. 146). The explicit 
acknowledgement of inevitable contestation indicates the incompleteness of the pluralist 
democracy as a structure that, based on this ethic, should be recognized due to its constitutive role 
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(Stavrakakis, 2007, p. 130). In this sense, the Ethics of the Real challenges the currently dominant 






Chapter II. THE PROBLEMS WITH COERCION 
This chapter discusses the problem of coercion on the ontological plane. The problem of the topic 
on this plane is due to its elusiveness. Coercion on the ontological plane is entwined with what 
Zizek describes as ‘the sublime object’ of ideology (Zizek, 1989) and what Mouffe describes as 
‘identification’. This topic is elaborated against the background in the current debate in social 
political theories in order to identify the research strategy required to investigate it. The elaboration 
here aims to highlight how this topic has been underdeveloped in Mouffe’s work and how this 
research contributes to its further development and the studies on the topic of coercion in general. 
As the elaboration on coercion here focuses on its operation on the ontological plane, what’s at 
stake here is, “How coercion at this plane is constitutive for the social?” Therefore, it is necessary 
to implore how coercion is embedded in the political that Mouffe and Laclau argue to be 
constitutive for the social. 
1. Introduction: The Blindspot in Understanding Coercion 
 
The elaboration is presented as a review on Mouffe’s own work with focus on how her, or lack of, 
elaboration on coercion and the coercive dimension of agonism/agonistic pluralism. Specific 
references to other scholars who discuss the sort of coercion and its operation on the ontological 
plane are made here to specify how Mouffe’s elaboration is underdeveloped, but her work is still 
too promising to be discarded altogether. Those scholars are Perry Anderson, John Hoffman, 
Jonathan Davies, Slavoj Zizek, Pierre Bourdieu, and Steven Lukes. Their works have particularly 
contributed to the study on power and coercion, especially its operation on the ontological plane.  
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Anderson, Hoffman, and Davies shared the Gramscian root with Mouffe. They all agree on the 
centrality of the concept of hegemony and the notion of hegemony as ‘constant dialectics between 
consent and coercion’ or ‘coercion that commands consent’. Mouffe also emphasizes this aspect 
especially in her earlier works before Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, though she does not 
explicitly elaborate it further in her works on agonism/agonistic pluralism, it is still there though 
rather implicit. It seems that she takes it for granted when she constantly argues that subordination 
is inevitable as any social formation is always constituted politically. It is in order to make this 
central but implicit element in Mouffe’s subsequent works on agonism/agonistic pluralism that 
reference to these two scholars is important. Reference to these two scholars is also important for 
the review to specify how Mouffe falls short in elaborating the coercive dimension in her 
agonism/agonistic pluralism.  
The review is also taken with reference to the works from Steven Lukes, Pierre Bourdieu, and 
Slavoj Zizek. Lukes’ work points to the latent dimension of power that operates in the background 
and eludes the agent’s awareness. Bourdieu points out that such operation of power takes place on 
the plane of the symbolic that constitute our reality and its domination always involves the agent’s 
complicity. These ‘agent’s complicity’ and ‘moralized aspect of coercion’, both operates latently, 
are what Zizek attempts to elaborate by arguing that the operation of such power comes at play 
through the operation of fantasmatic dimension. 
The distinction between the coercion investigated here with more commonly studied on coercion 
is best represented through Byman and Waxman’s definition of coercion, quoted in the previous 
chapter, as “… the use of threatened force, including the limited use of actual force to back up the 
threat, to induce an adversary to behave differently than it otherwise would” (Byman & Waxman, 
2000, p. 9). This definition of coercion is comparable to the situation of ‘under durees’ that 
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Wertheimer uses as starting point and then deconstructs in his study that is concluded as the more 
‘moralized theory of coercion’ (Wertheimer, 1987). In Lukes’ theory of three dimensions of power 
the coercion as Byman and Waxman define is located on the first and, to certain extent, second 
dimensions of power. It pertains on the manifest operation of power, either covert or overt, but 
does not address its latent operation. This latent operation of power has largely been unnoticed or 
perceived as the non-operation of power. To put it positive form, the latent operation of power 
manifests exactly in the constitution of what we undersantd as ‘the normal state’. In relations to 
coercion, it serves to constitute ‘the zero level of coercion’ used to define what coercion is and is-
not (Zizek, 2009, p. 2). 
Dahlian view of power, also known as the pluralist view of power, often serves as the basis for 
and echoes in most studies on coercion and violence. Starting with his seminal work, Who 
Governs, in the 1960s (Dahl, 2005). The operation of power or coercion is located and analysed in 
its exercise, such as presented in Byman and Waxman’s. However, the coercion this dissertation 
aims to research is one that constitutes ‘the normal state’ or ‘the zero level of coercion’ based 
which the coercion such portrayed in Byman and Waxman’s portrayal and the likeminded studies 
is defined. This research elaborates how the constitution of such ‘normal state’ inevitably involves 
coercion and this coercion is felt, most of the time and by the majority of those who subject to it, 
is not perceived as coercion or, if it is perceived to be so, is tolerated as something inevitable or 
natural. As this coercion constitutes our reality of coercion, coercion as commonly known, or 
coercion on the ontical plane, this coercion can be said to be ontological. 
To facilitate relating this with broader underpinning theory of discourse and hegemony, the 
ontological coercion is related to the relations of subordination and the ontical one to relations of 
oppression. This equation, however, is not straightforward. It should be understood as following: 
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It is not a matter of exhaustive categories, such as reflected in the question, “What is included as 
relations of subordination, domination, or oppression?”. The proper question is, “How is relations 
of subordination perceived as such and not as relations of domination or oppression and how are 
they always potentially perceived as such?” This is how the equations of ontological coercion to 
relations of subordination and ontical one to relations of oppression are perceived in this 
dissertation. 
There are several problems and challenges to elaborate coercion on the ontological plane that this 
chapter aims to elaborate. The, first, immediate problem in investigating the theme of coercion in 
general is similar to the problem in distinguishing and specifying antagonism as structural principle 
and antagonism as actual with substantive friend/enemy relations. The second problem is how to 
define the coercion on the ontological level as coercion apropos Mouffe’s concept of identification 
mentioned with reference to Freud, Lacan, and Zizek (Mouffe, 2005, pp. 25-29; 2014) and the 
contingency of the relations of subordination, domination, and oppression (Laclau & Mouffe, 
2014, pp. 137-138). The third problem is related to the underlying theoretical presuppositions of 
‘radical contingency’ and ‘the primacy of the political’ in applying Mouffe categories of 
antagonism and agonism on a specific empirical case in order to illustrate and portray how coercion 
operates and performs its constitutive role on the ontological plane. It just becomes one form of 
coercion among many others whose meaning or identity as coercion is contingent to its 
articulation.    
Therefore, the point this chapter aims to highlight and elaborate here is not which structure is the 
truly and objectively non- or less- coercive, but how in the constitution and reproduction of 
structure in general, including the agonistic one, coercion is constitutive and ubiquitous. As any 
structure, the agonistic structure is also a product of a hegemonic intervention. This hegemonic 
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structure operates as articulating principle that unifies, or more aptly regulates, the articulation of 
other discourses that comprise it as its internal moments (Mouffe, 2013, p. 36). Such process 
inevitably involves the subordination of these diverse ideological elements to the articulating 
principle above. This subordination of these diverse elements as internal moments of the said 
articulating principle is neither predetermined or merely imposition. Such relations of 
subordination emerge through articulation and involve ‘intellectual and moral’ leadership from the 
hegemonic discourse. The coercive dimension here, therefore, is much subtler than merely 
domination described as ‘A is coercing B’. The coercive dimension here refers to what Lukes 
describes as the ‘third dimension of power’, where it operates in latent manner (Lukes, 2005). The 
operation of coercion elaborated in this chapter is best described by Zizek in his illustration about 
the identification of America to certain products such as Marlboro cigarettes and Coca-Cola. 
Where the certain product in the advertisements, as a signifier, is elevated to the Freudian position 
of, ‘It’ or ‘Ding’, instead of merely a signifier (Zizek, 1989, p. 108). This ‘It’ is the unattainable 
object or the X, the Lacanian object cause of desire. The corresponding product becomes more 
than merely a product, or more than merely a signifier, it also refers to something also that exceeds 
it as merely a signifier or product. In Lacanian term it becomes the ‘object a’. Laclau later confirms 
that Lacan’s ‘object a’ and hegemony are not only homologous but, more than that, identical. This 
is because both “show structural effects are possible which, however, are not structurally 
determined” (Laclau, 2015, p. 103). This ‘object a’ serves to quilt the endless contingency of 
naming or the endless metonymical slides between the signifier and the signified. It is necessary 
to prevent the discursive reality slides into the discourse of the psychotic (Laclau & Mouffe, 2014, 
p. 99; Mouffe, 1993, p. 97). 
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This stance that points to the contingency and incompleteness of the structure has been the 
underlying premise that Mouffe takes as the foundations of her theoretical endeavour, even prior 
to the Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, especially to counter the tendency of the economic 
determinism and class reductionism interpretation of Marx (Mouffe, 2013). In the Hegemony and 
Socialist Strategy, Mouffe with Laclau further their anti-essentialist argument to dissolve the 
remnants of determinism still found in Gramsci’s elaboration on hegemony (Laclau & Mouffe, 
2014, pp. 75-78). The definition and description of hegemony without the ideas of any privileged 
element (on the plane of the ontological not actual) consequently gives primacy to the political 
over the social. The bounds of class become overwhelmed by other demands and identities, which, 
with the absence of any privileged element, are ontologically on equal footing (Laclau & Mouffe, 
2014, p. 77). Therefore, Laclau argues that religious fundamentalism and the most refined 
“Western” social democracy are on equal footing from a purely ontological and epistemological 
point of view (Laclau, 1990, pp. 242-243). The agent’s acceptance to the coercive demand of the 
structure is based on something that can never be fully symbolized. It belongs to something else 
beyond the symbolic order. Its presence in the symbolic order can only be presented as its absence. 
Mouffe, especially in her earlier works prior to ‘The Return of the Political’ has elaborated this 
coercive aspect. However, in her latter works, it only gains little attention and development other 
than her rather brief elaboration on the role of affect and ‘identification’ referring to Freud 
(Mouffe, 2005, pp. 25-29).The discontinuity between her works prior to and after the Hegemony 
and Socialist Strategy will be elaborated in details in the following section as an important part of 
the review, especially in relation to the coercive dimension.  
In her earlier works, especially in her elaboration on Gramsci’s hegemony and ideology, Mouffe 
emphasizes the distinction between hegemony and merely domination. She highlights the 
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dimension of ‘moral and intellectual leadership’, producing active consent, instead of merely 
domination of the ideology of the dominant group upon the dominated ones (Mouffe, 2013). 
Another critical point this review aims to foreground and highlight is the need to invoke something 
that is external to the structure to rearticulate coercion from structural principle into something 
positive or negative is the next central point this chapter aims to highlight and elaborate. In this 
sense, the explication of coercion here questions and criticizes the paradigms that see coercion as 
empirical and objective phenomenon and argue for it as a ‘moralized’ one. Central to this process 
of moralization is ‘identification’ and the constitution of subjectivity in which the affective 
dimension comes to the fore. As elaborated in the previous chapter, it is the latter that has not been 
sufficiently elaborated in Mouffe’s conceptualization of agonism/agonistic pluralism. On one 
hand, she criticizes what she calls ‘the moralization of politics’ where the propensity of labelling 
of those who hold different ideas and opinions as ‘enemy’, instead of ‘adversary’, becomes more 
prevalent (Mouffe, 2005, p. 75). On the other hand, she also argues for the central role of 
identification and the need to recognize the role of affective dimension for it if the agonistic 
pluralism is to work sustainably (Mouffe, 2005, pp. 25-29). In which between these two poles she 
does not sufficiently elaborate the impossibility of agonism/agonistic pluralism in the last instance, 
such as Roskamm highlights (Roskamm, 2015), and the ambiguous elaboration of antagonism on 
the ontological and ontical planes (Menga, 2017).   
This chapter is concluded by explicating how the elaboration on the dimension of coercion in 
Mouffe’s agonism/agonistic pluralism requires exact acknowledgement of the affect. Mouffe has 
mentioned and briefly elaborated this dimension. However, this has not been fully reflected in 
Mouffe’s further theorization of agonism and its instrumentalization as empirical research. More 
systematic elaboration on ‘affect’ is provided by psychoanalysis through the notion of fantasy that 
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is central in the mobilization of identification or consent from the agent to subject itself to the 
corresponding structure. The systematic incorporation of ‘fantasy’ into the theoretical framework 
of PDT is provided by the Logics of Critical Explanation. The concluding section of Chapter II 
serves as an introduction to the explication of the research strategy and the analytical framework 
based on the Logics of Critical Explanation-LCE discussed in Chapter III. 
2. Extricating Coercion at Work on the Ontological Plane 
 
The coercion that this research aims to investigate and elaborate is not something that can be 
straightforwardly located and identified. The term ‘coercion’ in the common usage does not refer 
to one that this research aims at. The general discourse of ‘coercion’, however, is useful to indicate 
the operation of such coercion this research aims to elaborate, that is one on the ontological plane. 
It works in the following way: the general discourse of coercion usually points to ‘the claim of 
being coerced’. In such articulation, the articulated ‘coercion’ means that “I am being forced to or 
not to do something that otherwise I would have not done if it was not for the intervention by 
external power”. Such statement presumes that the external intervention has caused a disruption 
of what the said subject perceives to be normal or the situation where there is zero level of coercion. 
The coercion that this research aims to address starts with the deconstruction of the givenness of 
the normality presumed above. Zizek describes this in his distinction between subjective and 
objective violence. The former refers to ‘the claim of being coerced’, while the latter refers to the 
‘normal’ or zero-level of coercion against which ‘coercion’ as deviance or disruption to the 
normality is measured against (Zizek, 2009, pp. 3-4). 
What is crucial at this initial stage in the problem of coercion on the ontological plane is to find 
out whether such subject and the zero level of coercion, based on which the articulation of ‘being 
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coerced’ is possible, are given or not. On this topic, Mouffe explicitly states her stance. She sees 
that both the subject and the structure that regulates its articulation are discursively constituted. 
The latter is always a product of hegemonic intervention that governs how the subject articulates 
itself and its identities, demands, and protests. The relationship between the hegemonic structure 
and the subject, however, is not something that is straightforward. Mouffe describes it as 
following: 
… (T)he intellectual and moral direction exercised by a fundamental class in a 
hegemonic system consists in providing the articulating principle of the common 
world-view, the value system to which the ideological elements coming from the 
other groups will be articulated in order to form a unified ideological system, that 
is to say, an organic ideology. This will always be a complex ensemble whose 
contents can never be determined in advance since it depends on a whole series of 
historical and national factors and also on the relations of forces existing at a 
particular moment in the struggle for hegemony. It is, therefore, by their articulation 
to a hegemonic principle that the ideological elements acquire their class character 
which is not intrinsic to them. (Mouffe, 2013, p. 36) 
In this particular work, which was first published in the 1979, Mouffe explicitly distinguishes 
between hegemony and domination in her elaboration on Gramsci’s hegemony and the attempt to 
break out from the dominant ‘class reductionism’ and ‘economic determinism’ in the interpretation 
of Marx. In this work, one concept through which she defines Gramsci’s hegemony is articulating 
principle. This articulating principle is the concept that she argues unify the diverse ideological 
elements that comprise a hegemonic bloc. The hegemonic bloc itself is, instead of being comprised 
of a single element, inevitably includes plural and diverse elements therefore an articulating 
principle is necessary to unify them and it serves its center. The articulating principle stems from 
the fundamental element, or ‘fundamental class’, in Mouffe’s work, which is actually just an 
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element like the others but managed to position itself as the universal representation of other 
elements that comprise the hegemonic bloc. An element acquires this hegemonic position neither 
predetermined or following an objective natural law but through its articulation. Through such 
elaboration, Mouffe attempts to provide non-reductionist interpretation of Gramsci’s hegemony. 
Many elements in this work re-emerge in the Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. 
What is crucial at this point, however, is that through the elaboration of the plurality of ideologies 
and the role of the fundamental ideology as the articulating principle in an hegemonic bloc, Mouffe 
demonstrates how relations of subordination is not only inevitable but constitutive to hegemony. 
The subordination here, however, cannot be reduced to merely domination. Central to her 
argument here is the distinction between hegemony and merely domination between the 
fundamental ideology and the elements that comprise the hegemonic bloc: 
A class’s hegemony is, therefore, a more complex phenomenon than simple 
political leadership: the latter, in effect, is the consequence of another aspect which 
is itself of prime importance. This is the creation of a unified coherent ideological 
discourse which will be the product of the articulation to its value system of the 
ideological elements existing within a determinate historical conjuncture of the 
society in question. These elements, which have no necessary class-belonging, 
rightly constitute for this reason the terrain of ideological struggle between the two 
classes confronting each other for hegemony. Therefore, if a class becomes 
hegemonic, it is not, as some interpretations of Gramsci would have it, because it 
has succeeded in imposing its class ideology upon society or in establishing 
mechanisms legitimising its class power. (Mouffe, 2013, p. 38) 
Mouffe presents her interpretation of Gramsci that is attempted to strike out the reductionist and 
determinism elements and by doing so describes the subtlety of the coercive elements that is more 
73 
 
than merely domination involved in the constitution of hegemony. On the same passage quoted 
above, she follows: 
This kind of interpretation completely alters the nature of Gramsci’s thought 
because it reduces his conception of ideology to the traditional Marxist conception 
of false consciousness which necessarily leads to presenting hegemony as a 
phenomenon of ideological inculcation. Now, it is precisely against this type of 
reductionism that Gramsci is rebelling when he proclaims that politics is not a 
‘“marché de dupes”’ (Gramsci 1975, vol. 3, p. 1595; Gramsci 1971, p. 164). For 
him, ideology is not the mystified-mystifying justification of an already constituted 
class power, it is the ‘terrain’ on which men acquire consciousness of themselves’, 
and hegemony cannot be reduced to a process of ideological domination.” (Mouffe, 
2013, p. 38) 
The interpretation of Gramsci’s hegemony in Mouffe’s work is marked by ‘continuous dialectics 
between consent and coercion’. Hegemony, Mouffe describes, involves the operation of ideology 
that defines the agent’s subjectivity (Mouffe, 2013, p. 30) that, on its turn, govern its articulation 
that produces the class character of the said ideology and not inherent to the ideology itself 
(Mouffe, 2013, p. 36). Through this interpretation, Mouffe elaborates how hegemony and 
ideology, for Gramsci, are more than merely epiphenomena but constitutes the agent’s subjectivity.  
In an article published in 1988, Hegemony and New Political Subjects: Toward a new concept of 
democracy, Mouffe further elaborates the role of ideology and hegemony in the constitution of the 
subject, along with its contingency and precariousness. She elaborates as the following:  
A person’s subjectivity is not constructed only on the basis of his or her position in 
the relations of production. Furthermore, each social position, each subject position, 
is itself the locus of multiple possible constructions, according to the different 
discourses that can construct that position. Thus, the subjectivity of a given social 
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agent is always precariously and provisionally fixed, or, to use the Lacanian term, 
sutured at the intersection of various discourses. (Mouffe, 2013, p. 46) 
Along the line of her attempt to shed the tendency of ‘economic reductionism’ and ‘economic 
determinism’ on the interpretation of Marx, Mouffe has argued for the ‘radical contingency’ and 
‘the primacy of the political’. The former especially comes to the fore when she argues for the 
‘non-necessary’ class character in any ideology and the subjectivity of its subject. While for the 
latter, she argues that amidst the ‘contingency’, the appearance of stability of character and identity 
are always a result of hegemonic intervention, which is political. While the terms of ‘radical 
contingency’ and ‘the primacy of the political (over the social)’ only become explicit in the 
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, the centrality of these concepts have been apparent in her 
“Hegemony: from Gramsci to ‘post-Marxism’”. She further elaborates the role of hegemony and 
ideology in the constitution of subject in “Hegemony and new political subjects: Toward a new 
concept of democracy”, first published in 1988 (2013).   
The subordination of the diverse ideologies to the fundamental ideology in a certain hegemonic 
bloc as the articulating principle has already given us the hint on the location and operation of 
coercion on the ontological plane. It is ontological because as articulating principle it enables the 
constitution of reality that belongs to the register of the symbolic. On the latter, Mouffe, with 
Laclau, elaborate further in detail in the Hegemony and Socialist Strategy on the topic of social 
formation and over determination (Laclau & Mouffe, 2014, pp. 83-91). Basing the elaboration on 
Althusser’s idea that everything in the social is overdetermined and Freud; from whom the former 
borrows the concept of over determination, Laclau and Mouffe state: 
The concept of over determination is constituted in the field of the symbolic, and 
has no meaning whatsoever outside it. Consequently, the most profound potential 
meaning of Althusser’s statement that everything existing in the social is 
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overdetermined, is the assertion that the social constitutes itself as a symbolic 
order.” (Laclau & Mouffe, 2014, p. 84) 
The problem of coercion, however, is rather implicit here. Both in the “Hegemony: from Gramsci 
to Post-Marxism” and the Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, the term ‘subordination’ is used rather 
than ‘coercion’. However, it can be clarified that it is this subordination that refers to the ‘coercion’ 
on the ontological plane that this research aims to investigate. The clarification comes through 
examination on the conditions of possibility for this subordination that is the ‘unfixity’ (Laclau & 
Mouffe, 2014, p. 76). This ‘unfixity’ as the conditions of possibility for subordination is identical 
to Laclau’s exposition quoted in the beginning of Chapter I that he follows that “… (H)uman 
beings do not exist at that ‘ultimate’ level (of ontological and epistemological point of view)” 
(Laclau, 1990, p. 243). It is this ‘unfixity’ that makes ‘fixation’ necessary, even though it will 
always ultimately fail. Fail in the sense that the fixation can never be complete and permanent. 
However, no matter how partial and transient the fixation would be it is necessary in order to 
render the life intelligible. This fixation is the hegemony that takes place through the subordination 
of some particular elements to a certain element that occupies the role as their universal 
representation.  
This subordination that necessarily involves the fixation of unfixity or hegemony is coercive. It is 
coercive in the general sense of the term as it makes things go certain ways which otherwise it 
would have not. Yet, the articulation of such coercion as coercive is not something straightforward. 
The articulation has to be carried out against something that is seen as ‘normal’ that this fixation 
presents itself as an obstruction. Mouffe elaborates this by, first, highlighting the contingency of 
subjectivity to class belonging–in her argument against class determinism–and, second, the agent 
is criss-crossed by multiple discourses and the subject position each of them entails. The 
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identification to one subject’s position as the agent’s identity or subjectivity is always over 
determination or, in other words, a result of hegemonic intervention. The articulation of certain 
fixation as ‘coercive’ takes place on condition that the corresponding agent identify itself with 
another subject position and identifies with it to become its subject and in doing so the former 
identity is perceived as an obstruction for the full realization of the latter. In such situations, the 
relations of subordination have transformed into relations of oppression. 
If the coercive dimension of fixation is rather implicit in Mouffe’s elaboration on hegemony, even 
though she is fully aware of it, it is more explicit in the works of, for example, John Hoffman 
(Hoffman, 1984) and Jonathan Davies (Davies J. , 2013). The subtlety of the coercive dimension 
of hegemony is more pronounced in those works as ‘constant dialectics between consent and 
coercion’. The latter is not totally absent from Mouffe either. She is fully aware of it and therefore 
the concept of subjectivity and the role of hegemony and ideology for its constitution are central 
in her expositions. Later, she tries to further their relations with the concept of identification and 
affect (Mouffe, 2005, pp. 26-29). In line with Mouffe’s description of Gramsci’s hegemony, 
Hoffman also argues such dialectical relations between consent and coercion and the impossibility 
of highlighting one at the expense of the other. He argues that coercion will not last without 
consent. Taking the case of Stalin’s rule in the USSR, Hoffman argues for hegemony as the 
constant dialectics between consent and coercion and his rejection of hypostatizing one over the 
other. He describes the dialectics between consent and coercion, reflecting on the case of Stalin’s 
rule that is marked by massive coercion but also widespread popularity, as following: 
There can be little doubt that the coercion during Stalin period was massive, 
macabre and at times almost appears self-destructive; yet this was a coercion which 
was political and social in character. The ‘revolution from above’ can only be 
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understood in relation to the popular enthusiasm ‘from below’. (Hoffman, 1984, p. 
191)   
With this, Hoffman criticizes the commentators on Stalin’s rule, who emphasize on either 
‘consent’ or ‘coercion’ at the expense of the other. In a less explicit manner than Mouffe does, 
Hoffman also describes how hegemony operates as an articulating principle that involves the 
subjects’ consent even in such a political moment when coercion comes to dominate the scene 
such as in Stalin’s purge. 
Davies develops his elaboration on coercion from a different angle and on a different issue, though 
he shares the Gramscian point of view with both Mouffe and Hoffman. Davies develops his 
elaboration on coercion mainly to demystify the notion of ‘network’ in the currently hegemonic 
discourse of ‘network governance’. The latter claims to offer a model of governance that is mainly 
based on ‘consent’, thus “…capable of redeeming the errors of both excessive statism and market 
liberalism and of fostering a new deliberative pluralism with the potential for an equitable, trust-
based consensus about the means and ends of social life” (Davies J. S., 2011, p. 2). Davies, 
however, argues that such claims misrepresent the nature of ‘network governance’ discourse and 
its underlying ‘neoliberal’ agenda. He argues that its claim emphasises only on ‘consent’ and does 
not cover its coercive dimension. Portraying ‘network governance’ as part of neo-liberal 
hegemonic project, Davies argues: 
Drawing from Gramsci’s theory of the integral state, the dialectical unity of state 
and civil society, it argues that coercion is the immanent condition of consent 
inherent in the condition of modernity. As long as hegemony is partial and 
precarious, hierarchy can never completely retreat to the shadows. This dialectic 
plays out in the day-to-day politics of governance networks through the clash 
between connectionist ideology and roll-forward hierarchy or 
‘governmentalization’. (Davies J. S., 2011, p. 5) 
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Here Davies makes ‘double moves’ to replace the underlying presumption of the dominant 
discourse on network governance that seems to be hypostatizing ‘consent’. The first move involves 
the disclosure of the coercive dimension that the ‘network governance’ practice has been failing 
to eradicate. He refers both to theoretical studies and empirical cases of the ‘stubborn’ 
centralization, managerialism, and exclusivism plaguing the network governance practices 
(Davies J. S., 2011, pp. 55-74). This prepares the ground for him to formulate the question and 
elaborate the answer, through Gramscian lens, on “… (W)hy why hierarchical power remains 
pervasive and cannot be displaced by network power” (Davies J. S., 2011, p. 6). Through this lens, 
Davies is able to portray the ‘network governance’ as a hegemonic project and, thus, it always 
involves continuous dialectics between consent and coercion (Davies J. S., 2011, p. 101). 
An interesting feature Davies points out is that the constitution of ‘network governance’ as a 
hegemonic discourse involves the promotion of certain particular signifiers such as the Freudian 
Thing. In this case it is the ‘network’ that, he argues, has been around for time immemorial in the 
governance process. He states: 
If governance networks are old-hat, then the rise of network governance ideology 
is significant mainly because it makes a virtue of everyday practice. (Davies J. S., 
2011, p. 57) 
This Thing, in Davies’ case the ‘network governance’, is central in the elaboration in the following 
sections, related to the specificity of coercion in operation at the ontological level, furthering 
Mouffe’s elaboration on the role of affect and identification. 
The review this far has shown strong indication that Mouffe is fully aware and understands the 
coercive dimension in the constitution of the social as a result of a hegemonic intervention. The 
subordination that she argues as inevitable in the constitution of the social has also been confirmed 
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by other scholars who share her Gramscian lens as they see the two are closely intertwined and 
impossible to extricate one at the expense of total eradication of the other. 
Focusing on Mouffe and her interpretation on Gramsci’s hegemony, her interpretation on Gramsci 
in “Hegemony: from Gramsci to ‘post-Marxism’ reappears in a more refined and comprehensive 
manner in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. This, in turn, serves as the theoretical underpinning 
for her to develop her notion of agonism/agonistic pluralism. The theory of discourse and 
hegemony that she develops with Laclau furthers the arguments of the ‘radical contingency’ and 
‘primacy of the political’, purging the smallest propensity for ‘privileging certain elements’ in 
Gramscian notion. To be specific, what is purged is not the ‘privileged position’ but the notion of 
the ‘given-ness’ and ‘permanency’ of a certain substantive particular element that happens to 
occupy it in a certain historical moment. The position itself is necessary in any discursive 
constitution of reality. Which particular element that happens to occupy it, is determined by 
political struggle instead of a pre-given objective law. Thus, Mouffe and Laclau are aware that 
subordination, the coercive dimension of the constitution of the social, is ineradicable because it 
is the one that constitutes our reality and subjectivity. Without such subordination or coercion, 
what we have is the ‘equality’ that Laclau describes as seen from the ‘pure ontological and 
epistemological view’ (Laclau, 1990, pp. 242-243). 
The ubiquity and constitutive role of subordination or coercion is confirmed in Mouffe’s works. 
Such recognition, however, is insufficient to elaborate and answer the problem and questions this 
research aims to address. More elaboration to answer the questions of “How is coercion ubiquitous 
and constitutive?” is needed. Mouffe poses the same question but she does not explore and 
elaborate it further, even though she gives some hints (Mouffe, 2005, pp. 25-27). The hints that 
Mouffe gives revolves around two central concepts, ‘hegemony as articulating principle’ and 
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‘hegemony as constitutive to subjectivity’. In Hegemony and Socialist Strategy and “Hegemony 
and the new subject” Mouffe elaborates the ubiquity and constitutive nature of subordination, as 
the potentials for antagonism and marks the limits of a certain hegemonic order. The subordination, 
however, does not necessarily present antagonism. Antagonism takes place “… when a collective 
subject … that has been constructed in a specific way, to certain existing discourses, finds its 
subjectivity negated by other discourses or practices” (Mouffe, 2013, p. 51; see also Laclau & 
Mouffe, 2014, p. 111). 
In this definition of antagonism, ‘self’ or ‘subjectivity becomes a central concept. The shift 
between relations of subordination and oppression or antagonism hinges on the certain ‘self’ with 
whom the agent identifies itself with and what obstructs its realization. Mouffe’s explication on 
the role of affect and identification in On the Political (2005, pp. 25-29) aims to further substantiate 
how such ‘self’ is constituted through identification. She attempts to elaborate in a more 
comprehensive manner the process of identification to explain why a certain structure and the 
subject position it entails become accepted by the agent through its identification or, in other 
words, what makes someone tick. As mentioned in the preceding chapter, Mouffe, however, does 
not elaborate this topic extensively. Her elaboration on the identification is mostly articulated as 
part of her exposition on the constitutive role of antagonism, the ‘we/they’ relations and the 
primacy of the political (Mouffe, 2005, pp. 27-28). In this particular elaboration, however, Mouffe 
points out the role of enjoyment in making certain discourse ticks to certain people. The enjoyment 
here belongs not to the structure but to the agent. Mouffe, however, does not further elaborate 
specifically the relations between the structure and the enjoyment at operation to constitute a 
certain kind of subject. 
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The lack of elaboration on this aspect in conjunction with the ubiquity and constitutive role of 
subordination or coercion that she argues has made her notion on agonism interpreted 
paradoxically as described in the preceding chapter. The fact that every social formation as a result 
of a hegemonic formation always involves coercion that demands or commands consent from the 
agent is only half of the story. What’s missing is elaboration on why the agent complies or not to 
that demand and what the condition that makes one does or does not is. Mouffe herself states that, 
in the case of democracy, she argues against the determinism that everyone has equal 
predisposition towards liberty and equality. In the “Hegemony and the new political subject”, she 
elaborates the conditions necessary for specific forms of subordination to produce struggles that 
seek for its abolition and argues: “As soon as the principle of equality is admitted in one domain, 
however, the eventual questioning of all possible forms of inequality is an ineluctable 
consequence” (Mouffe, 2013, pp. 50-51). 
This explanation is related to her elaboration in the hegemony and socialist strategy on the relations 
of subordination, domination, and oppression. The admission of the principle of equality in one 
domain gives the exteriority of the discourses that constitute certain relations of subordination in 
other domains, rearticulating the subordinative structure in other domains as relations of 
domination. It hails or interpelates the subjects of the said structure to identify with the new 
discourse centred on the principle of equality to identify themselves with it and perceive the 
subordinative relations they have been subjects of as oppressive. The transformation from relations 
of subordination into relations of oppression refers to the transformation of those relations into 
sites of antagonism as defined above (Laclau & Mouffe, 2014, p. 137). It is important to underline 
here that the relations of domination and oppression are not necessarily coincidental (Laclau & 
Mouffe, 2014, p. 138). Central in the transformation from relations of subordination into 
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oppression is ‘subjectivity’. Mouffe, however, does not elaborate this through the lens of ‘subject’ 
or ‘subjectivity’ either in the Hegemony and Socialist Strategy or in the ‘Hegemony and the new 
political subject’. The course of her explanation in both works takes the elaboration from the 
structural approach that define ‘subject’ and ‘subjectivity’ rather as ‘subject position’ as seen in 
the following quotation: 
It is only to the extent that the positive differential character of the subordinated 
subject position is subverted that antagonism can emerge. (Laclau & Mouffe, 2014, 
p. 138) 
In similar manner and tone, she elaborates it in the ‘Hegemony and the new political subject’ as 
following: 
An antagonism can emerge when a collective subject –of course, here I am 
interested in political antagonism at the level of the collective subject–that has been 
constructed in a specific way, to certain existing discourses, finds its subjectivity 
negated by other discourses or practices. That negation can happen in two basic 
ways. First, subjects constructed on the basis of certain rights can find themselves 
in a position in which those rights are denied by some practices of discourses. At 
that point there is a negation of subjectivity or identification which can be the basis 
for an antagonism. I am not saying that this necessarily leads to an antagonism; it 
is a necessary but not sufficient condition. The second form in which antagonism 
emerges corresponds to that expressed by feminism and the black movement. It is 
a situation in which subjects constructed in subordination by a set of discourses are, 
at the same time, interpellated as equal by other discourses. Here we have a 
contradictory interpellation. Like the first form, it is a negation of a particular 
subject position, but, unlike the first, it is the subjectivity-in-subordination that is 
negated, which opens the possibility for its deconstruction and challenging. 
(Mouffe, 2013, p. 51). 
Further, still in the case of democracy and the democratic subject, she describes: 
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People struggle for equality not because of some ontological postulate but because 
they have been constructed as subjects in a democratic tradition that puts those 
values at the centre of social life. (Mouffe, 2013, p. 52) 
What appears on such explanation on ‘subject’ and ‘subjectivity’ is that the discursive structures 
seem to merely ‘interpellate’ the agent and the agent can arbitrarily choose some over the others. 
Those options also seem to be on equal footing and the political dimension embedded in the act of 
deciding which discourse and corresponding subject position to identify with becomes less 
pronounced. The constitution of democracy as the articulating principle and the sort of 
fundamental subjectivity come at the cost of subordination of other elements and subjectivities. 
This sort of exposition has two-fold consequences for the goal this research aims to address: first, 
it obscures the complex operation of coercion and its dialectics with consent in the constitution of 
the social and its subject, including the agonistic social structure. This contributes to the two 
opposing interpretation on Mouffe’s notion of agonism/agonistic pluralism since each takes her 
notion to the extreme poles of, on one hand, ‘constant deferral on any closure ‘ as if there is no 
closure at all vs. reification of antagonism, on the other. In other words, Mouffe fails to transmit 
the message of ‘radical contingency’ and ‘the primacy of the political’, two underlying theoretical 
presuppositions for her notion of agonism/agonistic pluralism, to her audience. 
Second, the failure to transmit the message of these two underlying theoretical presuppositions 
leads to failure to grasp the specific ethic of PDT and the radical democracy project across the 
table. Mouffe’s agonism and its PDT underpinning stand for a certain ethical position that centred 
on the ineradicable and constitutive lack. Her audience become prone to either emphasizing the 
‘contingency’ or justifying ‘antagonism’ at the expense of understanding of their discursive 
constitution. The ‘contingency’ or the lack of fullness as understood symbolically only comes into 
being after the symbolic field has been traversed. It always comes into being retrospectively (Fink, 
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1995, p. 27). On the other hand, as the ‘lack’ is only presentable through the symbolic register, it 
is also potentially (mis)interpreted as condoning or normalizing coercion and violence. 
On this topic of subjectivity and the lack of its elaboration in Laclau and Mouffe’s Hegemony and 
Socialist Strategy, Zizek gives his optimistic criticism assuming that this lack is due to “… -‘a 
dizziness from too much success’, an effect of the fact that Laclau and Mouffe had progressed too 
quickly, i.e. that, with the elaboration of their concept of antagonism, they have accomplished such 
a radical breakthrough that it was not possible for them to follow it immediately with a 
corresponding concept of subject – hence the uncertainty regarding the subject in Hegemony” 
(Zizek, 1990, p. 250). Zizek argues that Laclau and Mouffe’s conclusions on social antagonism 
can be pushed further with reference to Lacan with regards to the topic of ‘subject’ that corresponds 
to a structure that is centered around the lack that is impossible to fulfil (Zizek, 1990, pp. 249-
250). 
3. Hegemony and Subjectivity: Coercion, Identification, and the Constitution of 
Subject  
 
If the previous section elaborates how Mouffe elaborates the structural over determination is 
constitutive to reality and identity. The elaboration leads to the topic of identification and the 
constitution of subjectivity. In the preceding paragraphs there have been brief elaborations on how 
this topic is relatively underdeveloped in Mouffe’s works, including the Hegemony and Socialist 
Strategy she co-authored with Laclau. However, as Zizek points out, this relative 
underdevelopment does not mean that either Mouffe or Laclau are not aware of the consequences 
of their theoretical framework on the conceptualization of subject and subjectivity. Therefore, the 
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elaboration in this section starts from what Mouffe has said on this topic and the sort of coercion 
implied in those elaborations. 
The constitution of subject here involves two simultaneous and reciprocal processes of what is 
known as ‘interpellation’ or ‘ideological hailing’ on behalf of the structure and identification from 
the agent. The following section discusses how these two simultaneous processes take place in the 
constitution of the subject and highlight the role of the fantasy to cover the constitutive lack both 
on the side of the structure and subject. The elaboration in this section aims to demonstrate to what 
extent Mouffe elaborates the ‘identification’, where she falls short, and how to further the 
elaboration on this topic in relations with the main issue of coercion on the ontological plane. 
Mouffe has mentioned the constitution of subjectivity in her earlier works, prior to the Hegemony 
and Socialist Strategy as seen in the preceding section. More comprehensive elaboration, however, 
can be found in the “Democratic Citizenship and the Political Community” published in 1992. In 
this article Mouffe attempts to configure the form of political community that she envisages the 
radical democracy project aims to constitute. She critically elaborates two major traditions of 
democratic polity and the certain kind of subjectivity that it entails; liberalism and civic 
republicanism. She tries to synthesize the two through the formula based on ‘radical contingency’ 
and ‘the primacy of the political’ that leads her to endorse societas over universitas. Mouffe 
borrows these categories from Michael Oakeshott. Societas refers to “…‘civil association’ 
designates a formal relationship in terms of rules, not a substantive relation in terms of common 
action.” On the contrary, universitas is described as “… engagement in an enterprise to pursue a 
common substantive purpose or to promote a common interest.” (Mouffe, 1993, p. 108). Mouffe 
describes ‘identification’ by referring to the citizenship in a liberal democratic regime as following:  
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What we share and what makes us fellow citizens in a liberal democratic regime is 
not a substantive idea of the good but a set of political principles specific to such a 
tradition: the principles of freedom and equality for all. Those principles constitute 
what we can call, following Wittgenstein, a ‘grammar’ of political conduct. To be 
a citizen is to recognize the authority of those principles and the rules in which they 
are embodied; to have them informing our political judgement and our actions. To 
be associated in terms of the recognition of the liberal democratic principles, this is 
the meaning of citizenship that I want to put forward. It implies seeing citizenship 
not as a legal status but as a form of identification, a type of political identity: 
something to be constructed, not empirically given. (Mouffe, 1993, pp. 65-66) 
The phrase, “… be citizen is to recognize the authority of those principles and the rules in which 
they are embodied, to have them informing our political judgement and our actions” is central in 
this elaboration on ‘identification’ in Mouffe’s works. The centrality of that phrase is evident as 
Mouffe further specifies it in the next passage in the same article ‘to recognize the authority’ and 
‘to have them (the principles and rules’) informing our political judgement and our actions’ that 
constitutes identification when she elaborates Oakeshott’s societas: 
Oakeshott insists that the participants in a societas or cives are not associated for a 
common enterprise nor with a view to facilitating the attainment of each person’s 
individual prosperity; what links them is the recognition of the authority of the 
conditions specifying their common or ‘public’ concern, a ‘practice of civility’. 
This public concern or consideration of cives Oakeshott calls respublica. It is a 
practice of civility specifying not performances, but conditions to be subscribed to 
in choosing performances. These consist in a complex of rules or rule-like 
prescriptions, which do not prescribe satisfactions to be sought or actions to be 
performed but moral considerations specifying conditions to be subscribed to in 
choosing performances’. (Mouffe, 1993, p. 67) 
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Mouffe favours the societas over the universitas due to the context of proliferation of demands 
and identities along with “the disappearance of single substantive idea of common good and makes 
room for individual liberty.” (Mouffe, 1993, p. 67)  
‘Recognition of authority’ and ‘to have them informing our political judgement and our actions’ 
imply the agent’s subscription to a certain authority. The meaning of the word ‘subscription’ may 
have evolved in the current usage. The term ‘to be subscribed to’ in the context of the passage 
above lexically implies a certain agent ‘to subscribe itself to’ what Mouffe is referring to. In the 
current usage subscription means, among other, ‘the acceptance (as of ecclesiastical articles of 
faith) attested by the signing of one's name’1. This meaning may give the impression that the parties 
involved are, more or less, on equal relations. However, a further search on the meaning of this 
word leads to its archaic or obsolete usage where the ‘subordination’ element is more explicit. In 
its obsolete usage subscription also means the act ‘to admit to being inferior or in the wrong’.2  
This aspect of ‘admission’ or active acceptance is crucial in Mouffe’s identification with the 
principles, as she distinguishes it with liberal doctrine of ‘supremacy of the law’. She underlines 
it by quoting Oakeshott: 
Civility, then, denotes an order of moral (not instrumental) considerations, and the 
so-called neutrality of civil prescriptions is a half-truth, which needs to be 
supplemented by the recognition of civil association as itself a moral and not a 
prudential condition. (Mouffe, 1993, p. 68) 
Mouffe equates Oakeshott’s ‘moral’ to her ‘ethico-principle’ as Oakeshott also argues that the 
‘moral’ in the universitas cannot be derived from general moral principles. There are two 
 
1 https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/subscription; accessed 17 June 2020; 6:19 am. 
2https://wikidiff.com/subscribe/submit#:~:text=is%20that%20submit%20is%20to,for%20a%20period%20of%20tim
e. Accessed 17 June 2020; 6:24 am. 
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consequences important to elaborate here apropos to the specific aim of extricating how 
identification takes place. First, Mouffe specifies that Oakeshott’s morality refers rather to 
Hegelian sittlich relation in contrast to Kantian morality as in the case of Rawls (Mouffe, 1993, p. 
68). Here, the demands for the agent’s subscription are not perceived as subordination by the agent, 
at least those who subscribe to it. The agent often considers itself as the embodiment of the ‘moral’ 
itself. Yet, it is the mechanism how this identification, especially the drive for the agent to 
subscribe or not to subscribe itself to the ethico-moral principle that Mouffe has not fully 
elaborated. 
In 2014, Mouffe published “By Way of a Postscript” where she attempts to highlight the dimension 
of passion in agonism/agonistic pluralism and the radical democracy project. Close examination 
will lead us to see how her definition of passion in this work can be related to the Hegelian ‘sittlich 
relation’ she uses to characterize the type of ‘moral’ in Oakeshott’s ‘moral’ (Mouffe, 2014, p. 
149;155). She describes passion as more than merely ‘emotion’. The latter is usually attached to 
individuals, parallel to Kantian morality in Rawls, while passion is better to convey both the 
collective and individual. Furthermore, she chooses the term ‘passion’ over ‘emotion’ to better 
highlight the violent aspect of it to facilitate her to highlights the dimension of conflict (Mouffe, 
2014, p. 149). 
Mouffe’s more specific elaboration on the discursive constitution of subject apropos the role of 
‘passion’ can be found in this work. Mouffe relies on Spinoza and Freud’s psychoanalysis to 
elaborate the role of passion and hegemony as struggle to mobilize passion.  She refers to Freud 
to elaborate how identification (in the collective sense) is always constituted on the power of Eros, 
power that binds the agents together as a collective and it is malleable to go to any direction it is 
the task of agonistic politics to make sure that it goes to the intended direction, in her case; toward 
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counter-hegemonic movement. To elaborate specifically how ‘passion’ operates and how 
hegemonic intervention may intervene to direct it, Mouffe takes Spinoza’s notions of affection 
(affectio) and affect (affectus). She describes it as the following: 
Like Freud, Spinoza believes that it is desire that moves human beings to act and 
he notes that what makes them act in one direction rather than in another are the 
affects. Bodies have the capacity of being affected and an affection, for him, is a 
state of a body insofar as it is subject to the action of another body. When affected 
by something exterior, the ‘conatus’ (the general striving to persevere in our being) 
will experience affects that will move it to desire something and to act accordingly. 
I find this dynamic of affectio/affectus helpful to envisage the process of production 
of common affects. And I propose to employ this dynamic to examine the modes 
of transformation of political identities, seeing ‘affections’ as the space where the 
discursive and the affective are articulated in specific practices. (Mouffe, 2014, p. 
156) 
In this passage Mouffe seems to find the direction to get further elaboration on identification at 
work. There are three aspects in her elaboration that simultaneously constitute identification, 
namely affectio, conatus, and affectus. However, Mouffe elaborates this topic rather with the 
intention to invite other scholars to contribute in further studies in this direction. In the “By Way 
of a Postscript”, this passage is located almost at the end of the article. This article is mostly 
comprised of summary and reiteration of what Mouffe has elaborated in her previous works. The 
absence of further elaboration of this dimension of affect and how it constitutes identification, 
while providing a direction, verifies the criticisms, such as from Rosskam and Menga, that there 
are aspects in Mouffe that requires further elaboration. Review on Mouffe’s work so far, 
demonstrates that this is the furthest point she ventures with regards to the notion of identification. 
Her later published book For a Left Populism (2018) only briefly touches this topic. 
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Though it is underdeveloped, Mouffe has pointed to legitimate direction. Her description of 
hegemony as articulating principle through which the agent may acquire their subjectivity, in 
return for their subscription, is political because it requires the decision on which element to 
occupy the privilege position as universal representation at the expense of other equally legitimate 
candidates but also because it requires the agent to subscribe itself to it. From the point of view of 
the agent, this is also political as it requires it to decide whether to subscribe to the symbolic order 
or not. Even though the agent may be in far than equal position before the symbolic order as the 
Other, its decision is crucial for the sustenance of the symbolic order. In order to win the agent’s 
subscription is by tapping into agent’s affective faculty. But Mouffe does not give more 
comprehension on how this exactly works. The underdevelopment of this aspect of identification 
and how it is related to affect has consequences in potential interpretations on Mouffe’s concepts 
of agonism and the primacy of the political. Mouffe specifies how power operates in hegemony, 
as the articulating principle that produces what Foucault describes as ‘regularity in dispersion’, 
emphasizing on the regularity in dispersion (in contrast to regularity on dispersion) (Laclau & 
Mouffe, 2014, pp. 91-92); and distinguishes between hegemony and domination (Mouffe, 2013, 
p. 38). She, however, does not specify how the coercion on both planes, though, they have the 
same operational mechanism, are perceived differently by the agents, leading to different 
responses. The difference hinges on the operation of this affect through identification. This is the 
point that needs to be made explicit and further developed. 
As Zizek has described, in order to have a more complete depiction on the operation of antagonism 
and, consequently, agonism and its coercive dimension, it is necessary to develop the notion of 
subjectivity that corresponds with Laclau and Mouffe’s PDT. As apparent in Mouffe’s works 
following Zizek’s response, she starts to think about this aspect more seriously (Mouffe, 2005, pp. 
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25-29; 2014) mostly by referring back to psychoanalysis from both Freud and Lacan. 
Contemporary to Mouffe, Laclau seems to venture further in his inquiry on this aspect, as apparent 
in his conversations with Glynos and Stavrakakis elaborated further by Stavrakakis in his, 
Lacanian Left (2007, pp. 66-108). This is soon followed with more systematic incorporation of the 
Lacanian elements in the PDT theoretical framework by Glynos and Howarth in the Logics of 
Critical Explanation (2007). The following section will discuss this topic. 
4. Fantasmatic Dimension 
 
Furthering what Mouffe has pointed out in the “By Way of a Postscript”, we can summarize at this 
point that the constitution of subject involves two simultaneous and reciprocal processes of what 
is known as ‘interpellation’ or ‘ideological hailing’ on the behalf of the structure and identification 
on the behalf of the agent. The following section discusses how these two simultaneous processes 
take place in the constitution of the subject and highlights the role of the fantasy to cover the 
constitutive lack both on the side of the structure and subject. The elaboration in this section 
demonstrates how the concept of fantasy is central to the discussion on the constitution of subject 
and coercion on the ontological plane yet it is largely underdeveloped by Mouffe. The discussion 
also elaborates how the incorporation of the concept of fantasy here is still in line with the notions 
of hegemony as a paradox, that manifest in its description as ‘the constant dialectics between 
consent and coercion’ or ‘coercion that commands consent’ such as in Hoffman’s and Davies’ 
elaborations, or ‘the willing consent to domination’ in Steven Lukes (2005, p. 150).  
Lukes’ three-dimensional view of power gives prominence to the moment of the constitution and 
shaping of issue even before the moment whether this issue is included or excluded into the 
political field of decision making. Thus, for Lukes, the situation where the acquiescence appears 
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becomes the indication of the very moment where the most subtle yet most powerful form of power 
is in operation (Lukes, 2005, p. 27). Here Lukes argues that even when it seems that there is a 
universal acquiescence power still operates to exactly constitute such acquiescence. In other 
words, Lukes’ third dimension of power explicates the latent manifestation of power in contrast to 
the covert and overt one elaborated in the two- and one-dimensional views of power respectively. 
He further describes: “to speak of the third dimension of such power is to speak of interests 
imputed to and unrecognized by the actors” (Lukes, 2005, p. 146). This ‘unrecognized’ aspect of 
the operation of power and its impact are also highlighted by other scholars, one of which is Pierre 
Bourdieu, who Lukes also refers to. Bourdieu’s notion that is comparable to Lukes’ third 
dimension of power is ‘symbolic domination’. He characterizes it as following: “All symbolic 
domination presupposes, on the part of those who submit to it, a form of complicity which is 
neither passive submission to external constraint nor a free adherence to values” (Bourdieu, 1991, 
pp. 50-51). The agent’s complicity and the characteristic that goes beyond external constraint or 
free adherence to values and “the interest imputed to” yet “unrecognized by the actors” are 
comparable not only to Mouffe’s explication of hegemony as articulating principle (Mouffe, 2013) 
that produces regularity in dispersion (Laclau & Mouffe, 2014) but also give hints to how to further 
specify the sort of subjectivity that Mouffe explicates comes as a result of the agent’s subscription 
into the fundamental grammar or articulating principle (Mouffe, 2013; 2013). 
Relating this with the notion of coercion, the hegemony constitutes the benchmark or the point of 
‘zero level of coercion’ as the point of departure to judge whether certain acts are coercive or not. 
On his reflection on violence, Zizek describes the former as ‘objective violence’ and the latter as 
‘subjective violence’ (Zizek, 2009, p. 3). They are all constituted on the plane of symbolic through 
what Bourdieu describe as ‘symbolic domination’ (Bourdieu, 2001, p. 37; see also Lukes, 2005, 
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pp. 140-141). This third category of domination is exactly the same as how Laclau and Mouffe 
explicate the location and mechanism of hegemony (Laclau & Mouffe, 2014, pp. 83-84). These 
works, however, despite variation in angles and approaches stop short in explaining ‘What makes 
the agent subscribes itself to the structure?” 
Bourdieu indicates, through his explication on the concept of ‘habitus’, that this process of 
identification is the subject’s complicity that contributes to constitute symbolic domination and 
this identification happens beyond the rationality of ‘choice and constraint’ that he refers to as 
‘habitus’ and describes to operate at the unconscious level (Bourdieu, 2013, p. 79; 81). The 
apparent “natural” quality of this objective structure, Bourdieu argues, is partly explained by the 
constitutive role of this structure to the subject itself. The subject owes its subjectivity to its 
subscription or submission to the corresponding structure. The other part of it is due to this 
reciprocal process between the structure and the subject that (re)produces each other. The former 
Bourdieu delineates as following: 
Genesis amnesia is also encouraged (if not entailed) by the objectivist apprehension 
which, grasping the product of history as an opus operatum, a fait accompli, can 
only invoke the mysteries of pre-established harmony or the prodigies of conscious 
orchestration to account for what, apprehended in pure synchrony, appears as 
objective meaning, whether it be the internal coherence of works or institutions 
such as myths, rites, or bodies of law, or the objective co-ordination which the 
concordant or conflicting practices of the members of the same group or class at 
once manifest and presuppose (inasmuch as they imply a community of 
dispositions) (Bourdieu, 2013, p. 79). 
 And on the same passage he also delineates the latter as: 
Each agent, wittingly or unwittingly, willy nilly, is a producer and reproducer of 
objective meaning. Because his actions and works are the product of a modus 
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operandi of which he is not the producer and has no conscious mastery, they contain 
an "objective intention", as the Scholastics put it, which always outruns his 
conscious intentions. The schemes of thought and expression he has acquired are 
the basis for the intentionless invention of regulated improvisation. Endlessly 
overtaken by his own words, with which he maintains a relation of "carry and be 
carried", as Nicolai Hartmann put it, the virtuoso finds in the opus operatum new 
triggers and new supports for the modus operandi from which they arise, so that his 
discourse continuously feeds off itself like a train bringing along its own rails 
(Bourdieu, 2013, p. 79). 
This process of naturalization of history or, in Bourdieu’s words: forgetting of history, is exactly 
the same as what Husserl refers to as ‘sedimentation’ as he also points out exactly this process of 
objectification of reality as certain subjective reality that takes up the position as the universal 
representation of other subjective realities at the expense of their possibilities to occupy the very 
same position. This sedimentation is in contrast to ‘reactivation’, which refers to attempt to 
reanimate the original contingent situation in which this objectification took place the first time 
(Glynos & Howarth, 2007, p. 116). 
This sedimentation, Bourdieu puts it, takes place at the unconscious level (Bourdieu, 2013, pp. 78-
79). The constitution of the objective reality for those who are subject to this sedimented 
disposition or habitus takes place reciprocally with the constitution of the subject through their 
subscription to it. This constitutive role of the habitus somehow stays obscure to the subject but 
they constantly adjust other practices to it and by doing so they constantly reproduce the principle 
of production of this habitus in order to make the world intelligible for the subject (Bourdieu, 2013, 
p. 80). Bourdieu comes to define ‘the choice of habitus’ as something beyond consciousness and 
constraint or, in other words, beyond consent and coercion because it is located at the plane of 
unconscious and the unconscious implies the insertion of the subject into the symbolic order 
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through which the subject owes its constitution as a subject. Prior to that, this subject was not a 
subject and could not articulate either consent or coercion.  
However, Bourdieu does not elaborate further on this topic of ‘unconscious’ and 
‘unconsciousness’. In order to further elaborate it, it is necessary to turn to Jacques Lacan who 
focuses most of his studies on this topic. The Lacanian unconscious can be briefly defined as “the 
thing you don’t know that you know” and it is structured like language (Lacan, 2005, pp. 329-330) 
as Fink describes it: “(I)t is not something one “actively”, consciously grasps, but rather something 
which is passively registered, inscribed, or counted. And this unknown knowledge is locked into 
the connection between signifiers; it consists in this very connection” (Fink, 1995, p. 23). The 
constitution of subject takes place through one’s insertion into the symbolic order, into the webs 
of connections among signifiers, or this unconscious. The unconscious, however, does not need a 
subject (Lacan, 2005; Fink, 1995). This unconscious subject needs further elaboration to delineate 
the identification, central to our discussion on coercion, and its condition of possibility. It is here 
Lacanian triad becomes useful to further pinpoint the locus of the unconscious and how the 
constitution of subject takes place within and through this domain. 
In Lacanian psychoanalysis, the concept of unconscious subject is related to other concepts of the 
imaginary, symbolic, and the real. The relation of these three is known as the “Lacanian Triad”. 
This triad explicates more on the structural dimension of the unconscious; more specifically on the 
impossibility of the fullness and the essential and constitutive nature of “lack” both on the structure 
as well as the subject it entails. Lacan further complements this conceptualization with the concepts 
of ‘drive’ and ‘jouissance’ or ‘enjoyment’ that explains the generating force for identification or 
subjectification on the behalf of the agent. Identification in the Lacanian sense denotes to the 
‘psychological process whereby the subject assimilates an aspect, property or attribute of the other 
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and is transformed, wholly or partially, after the model or the other provides. It is by a series of 
identification that the personality is constituted and specified’ (Laplanche and Pontalis quoted in 
Stavrakakis, 1999, p. 30). Lacan introduces two forms of identification namely the imaginary and 
symbolic identifications. He delineates the former through his concept of ‘mirror stage’ (Lacan, 
2005, p. 2) while the latter through one’s insertion into the symbolic order. 
Lacan defines the mirror stage as identification indicated by the tranformation that “takes place in 
the subject when he assumes an image” and the subject constituted through this assumption, the 
imago, he calls as the ‘Ideal I’ (Lacan, 2006, p. 2). This identification to a certain image gives the 
subject some sort of jubilant feeling as it provides him or her with a sense of mastery of fullness 
of the self. This sense of mastery, however, is ephemeral as the subject immediately has to 
encounter the facts that the ideal image is in contrast with the subject’s lived experienced of 
limited, fragmented, and uncoordinated real body. The image, as in the mirror, always produces 
an incongruent picture against the real body. It could be inverted or distorted. Basically, it is always 
something alien and its assumption is always alienating (Lacan, 2006, p. 3; Stavrakakis, 1999, p. 
17). Here Lacan also introduces us to the notion that the constitution of subject is always based on 
misrecognition or meconnaissance (Lacan, 2006, p. 7). Lacan also delineates how aggression 
comes out from this imaginary identification and the subsequent feeling of ambiguity and tensions. 
The assumptions of the image as one’s ego is basically narcissism and, Lacan argues, the 
subsequent ambiguity and inevitable tensions due to the unbridgeable gap between the ‘Ideal I’ of 
this ego and the lived experienced of one’s actual body (Lacan, 2006, p. 21). 
The relational nature of the subject has started to appear since this mirror stage. The constitution 
of the ego always inevitably requires an external other that is different in order to acquire the 
unified self. This unity, however, as mentioned above is inherently unstable and constantly 
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permeated by the unbridgeable gap between the ‘Ideal I’ and the actual fragmented and 
uncoordinated body of the subject (Lacan, 2006, p. 10). It is to overcome these tensions, 
fragmentations, and ambiguity, and stabilize it that the symbolic representation becomes necessary 
(Stavrakakis, 1999, pp. 20-21). One’s submission into the symbolic order, or language, makes him 
a subject in language. This subject is the subject of signifier. However, in order to constitute itself 
as a subject, one has to give up something that is the imaginary unity as it does not fully fit with 
the symbolic law under which the one has to subscribe to. In this sense, the subject is secondary 
to the signifier and the stability and unity constituted through the symbolic are constantly marked 
by lack that is the imaginary unity. 
The insertion into the symbolic here, intended to stabilize and suspend the ambiguity at the 
imaginary, turns out to be unable to fill the lack, because the symbolic is never totally closed. It is 
never able to totally represent the represented. Lacan even argues for the impossibility of total and 
immediate representation. Pushing further Saussuerean notion of sign and its two constitutive 
elements of signifier and signified, Lacan gives primacy to the signifier by arguing that the 
signified as such is impossible and the signified as we know it is constituted by chain of signifiers 
forming differential relations in specific order (Stavrakakis, 1999). All attempts to arrive at the 
signified constantly fail as the signifiers always slide metonymically over the signified. The 
symbolic order, thus, is never a totally closed order. As the subject is constituted in this register of 
the symbolic, the subject cannot be other but subject of signifier and as it seeks to find the unified 
self, marred by fragmentation and ambiguity in the imaginary, such attempt will always fail. Lacan 
refers to, and modifies, Saussurean structural linguistic by, respectively, attributing the constitution 
of meaning to the differential relations within a system of signs, or language, and giving primacy 
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to the signifier instead of the signified. These two characteristics of Lacanian symbolic order are 
those which presuppose its continuous failure to constitute itself as a total closure. 
The unconscious subject here is related to this submission into the symbolic order. The process of 
the constitution of subject as the subject of the signifier, however, requires further elaboration as 
it involves not merely submission but also identification with the desire of the symbolic order as 
the Other, with capital O. This is what Bourdieu points as the ‘agent’s complicity’ necessarily 
involved in the symbolic domination. This will be further elaborated below. But it is worthwhile 
underlining here that the elaboration up to this point has demonstrated the impossibility of the 
structure as a totally closed, final, and transparent to itself but neither is the subject. The concept 
of fantasy (of fullness through one’s insertion into the symbolic order) is central as it explains the 
grips of the symbolic order or the discourse over the agent. As the signified is something that is 
impossible to attain, it is necessary to rearticulate the signified and the access to it. Within the 
Lacanian notion, it occupies new positions in the symbolic order. Following the primacy given to 
the signifier over the signified, Lacan argues that it is the signifier that constitutes the signified. 
This is possible because there is an inherent barrier between the signifier and the signified. The 
bar is produced by the meaning produced through the interplay of differential relations among 
signifiers that produces specific meaning to a specific signifier and, thus, the illusion of the 
signified (Stavrakakis, 1999, pp. 24-25). It becomes the fantasy that covers the lack of the symbolic 
structure. The tendency to believe the symbolic order to immediately and wholly represent the 
signified, the objective reality, comes into being because we believe in its existence (Stavrakakis, 
1999, pp. 25-26). Thus, this belief marks its absence or makes its absence present as the lack that 
is constitutive for the symbolic order itself but is irreducible to it because it belongs to a different 
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register, the register that is unrepresentable neither in the register of imaginary nor symbolic, 
namely the ‘Real’. 
It is necessary to underline here that for Lacan the lack is coextensive with desire. The subject here 
is constantly characterized by a continuously insatiable desire for completeness, founded in the 
mirror stage, producing fragmentation; ambiguity; and tensions which subsequently one attempts 
to solve through its insertion into the symbolic order. The insertion into the symbolic order makes 
it possible to transform the need into demand and the ego into subject. It should be borne in mind, 
however, that these two processes of ego and subject formations, or mirror stage and insertion into 
the symbolic order respectively, are not consequential or rigidly separable in one’s life. The 
categorical distinction between the two is intended only for analysis sake. In actual life, the two 
processes are simultaneous. For example, even before one’s birth, he or she has already been 
inserted into certain symbolic order by the parents. These two processes are at many points taking 
place simultaneously as exemplified in the case of sibling rivalry where one sibling resents the 
preferential treatment the parents give to the other that involves imaginary relations, in the sense 
of assumption of other’s image as one’s own, between the siblings as well as symbolic relations 
between them and the parents as the representation of the law (Fink, 1995, pp. 85-86). 
The fullness promised by the symbolic order or ‘the Other’ is something impossible. The subject 
soon finds that ‘the Other’ is also lacking. Fantasy serves to support the symbolic order or ‘the 
Other’ by covering its lack. Fantasy here gives the ‘substitute satisfaction’ that is the displacement 
of lack from the subject onto something else while, reciprocally, constitutes the subject as the 
symptom of the symbolic order or ‘the Other’ as Zizek describes in his illustration on relations 
between Master and bondmen (Zizek, 1990, pp. 251-254). The fullness promised by the symbolic 
order is always in the form of negativity, either as something absent due to being obstructed or 
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deferred by something else or in the making. Its realization requires the agent’s submission to or 
identification with ‘the Other’s’ demand or desire. Here, the submission into the symbolic order 
serves the purpose of making possible the symbolic representation of the lack. The lack here, 
however, should not be understood as something that the subject carries with it prior to its insertion 
into the symbolic order. On the contrary, the lack as represented in and through the symbolic order 
or ‘the Other’, is the symptom of ‘the Other’s’ lack. Since in Lacanian sense ‘lack’ is coextensive 
with ‘desire’, here the subject’s desire is ‘the Other’s’ desire (Fink, 1995, p. 59).  
It is ‘the Other’s’ desire that the subject has identified itself with what Lacan describes as the object 
a or object cause of desire for the subject. Fantasy is constituted with reference to this object a. 
Fantasy is central to our elaboration on coercion in its paradoxical relations to consent here because 
it, or rather its capacity to, covers the lack or incompleteness of the symbolic order or the structure 
determines the transformation of coercion as structural principle or subordination into coercion as 
oppression. In this sense, what becomes problematic is neither that ‘the Other’s’ (the symbolic 
order) preference and its determination on the agent’s nor its intrusiveness as it imposes its image 
or law upon the agents, both are necessary for identification at the imaginary and symbolic or; in 
other words; coercion as structural principle, but of how the fantasy gives ‘substitute enjoyment’ 
in place of the one that lost to castration (Fink, 1999, pp. 3-5). The coercion as structural principle 
becomes ‘coercion as oppression’ only when the fantasy loses its grips or its capacity to provide 
the ‘substitute enjoyment’ for the subject. 
One’s attachment to ‘the Other’s’ desire or fantasy does not follow either objective natural law or 
rational principle. On the contrary it is based on irrationality known as affect, related to one’s 
enjoyment or jouissance (Fink, 1995; 1999, pp. 3-5). Mouffe has mentioned how affect and 
identification are related to each other and should be given proper consideration in how 
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agonism/agonistic pluralism is formulated and used as an analytical tool (Mouffe, 2005, pp. 25-
29). The affective attachment to the symbolic order is known as cathexis. In Freudian terms it is 
defined as investment of libidinal drive in a person, object or idea. The drive is a force, Freudian 
‘id’ is its locus, and without the submission into the symbolic order, the drive “pursue their own 
course without any regard to what is appropriate or approved” (Fink, 1999, pp. 207-208). The 
submission of this drive into the symbolic order and the castration it entails transforms the drive 
into desire by channelling its force into the realm of representation and it works through the 
function of satisfaction instead of rationality. This affect allocates mental or emotional energy, or 
chatecs, to the symbolic order that determines the magnitudes of the symbolic order’s grip on the 
subject. Highlighting  less elaboration on this topic in the theory of hegemony and discourse and 
the broader Post Structuralist Discourse Theory-PDT, Stavrakakis brings up this topic of affect, 
putting Laclau’s discourse theory and Lacan psychoanalysis into a critical dialogue, and tries to 
traverse the outline of this affect as it represents the limits of discourse or the symbolic order yet 
necessary and even co-extensive to its operation (Stavrakakis, 2007, pp. 98-100). Stavrakakis 
demonstrates how ‘affect’ is too elusive to incorporate into their theoretical frameworks for both 
Lacan and Laclau, yet both recognize the constitutive role of it; a position that Mouffe also takes 
with regards to her conceptualization of Political Agonism (Mouffe, 2005). 
It is apparent that Lacan’s symbolic order is parallel to Bourdieu’s habitus as one’s insertion into 
it involves his/her submission to the rules that regulate and constitute it (Stavrakakis, 1999, p. 33). 
However, here Lacan gives further explanation about what prompts one to subscribe itself to the 
structure. Lacan further provides explanation on the force that animates one to attach itself and 
give up its partial enjoyment. It should be reiterated here that the loss only comes into being 
retrospectively, that is after one inserts itself into the symbolic order and undergoes the castration 
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(Fink, 1995, pp. 63-66, see also Laclau, 2015, p. 102). Lacan also delineates the drive that 
precipitates one to identify itself, both in the imaginary and symbolic registers, to something 
outside itself thus further explains the subject’s ‘complicity’ in the constitution of a symbolic order 
even though it means that he or she has to give it up as the condition of its insertion into it and also 
explicates the constitutive role of the coercion of the symbolic order in the constitution of the 
subject.  
5. The Ethics of the Real and the Problem of Subsumption 
 
There are two consequences that come to the fore from elaboration on the centrality of fantasy in 
determining the transformation of coercion from structural principle into oppression. First, all 
structure is inevitably coercive in the sense that it sets certain rules to suspend the otherwise 
unstable meanings and identities. Therefore Laclau argues that from a pure ontological and 
epistemological view, religious fundamentalism and the most refined “Western” social democracy 
are on  an equal footing (Laclau, 1990, pp. 242-243). The centrality of the notion of fantasy here 
is because after recognizing the inevitable coercive nature of any structure and identity it entails, 
we end up being in a limbo as we seek freedom and there will be no freedom in any structure. 
However, this is exactly where the fantasy’s role comes to the fore and becomes crucial because 
it puts us in the juncture.  
Second, the kind of coercion as structural principle mentioned above is ‘coercion that commands 
consent’. It enables the transformation of ego into subject and constitutes it as (symbolic) reality, 
including the reality of coercion, as long as the subject submits or subscribes itself to the structure. 
In actual situations, most of the time we find ourselves already situated and structured by certain 
structure. Even the coercion as it is discussed in this dissertation is available in and only through 
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the structure of symbolic order. So is its antonym, autonomy or liberty, the fantasmatic dimension 
that comes to the fore in the quest for liberty is a desire that belongs to the symbolic order that 
places ‘liberty’ as the master signifier. The articulation of liberty is only possible only after one’s 
subscription into the symbolic order, which is inherently coercive, and its encounter with the 
order’s lack or limits. 
Agonism itself is a structure. As a structure it is possible only through this sort of ‘coercion that 
commands consent’. It is this dimension that this dissertation aims to investigate and elaborate. 
Acknowledging this dimension enables further utilization of this frame for empirical analysis as 
the coercive dimension gives the exteriority of agonisms/agonistic pluralism and, thus, renders it 
identifiable. The disclosure of the coercive dimension also contributes to make explicit the specific 
ethics that agonism/agonistic pluralism is based upon, the so called “Ethics of the Real”. The 
‘Ethics of the Real’ is different with other ethical discourses as it is an ethic without ideal (Jacques 
Allain-Millier cited in Stavrakakis, 1999, p. 130).The ubiquity or the ontological status of coercion 
could initially cause a trauma for those who seek liberty or autonomy in its essentialist sense, on 
the plane of the impossible real. However, with more comprehensive understanding on the 
coercive dimension and its constitutive role in agonism/agonistic pluralism, this trauma can be 
overcome through identification with this specific ethical stance. Mouffe’s arguments for the 
constitutive role of antagonism and the need to sustain this antagonism in its sublimated form 
echoes the notion of continuously encircling the ‘Real’ represented in the imaginary harmony 
where all social antagonism and dislocation are resolved. Mouffe argues that this agonistic 
structure is to be constituted based on common reference not to any substantive ideal but to 
common rules based on the extent of its capacity to continuously enable as well as regulate conflict 
and antagonism (Mouffe, 1993, p. 146). The proponents of the radical democracy project do 
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identify themselves with it and its cause not because of any substantive ideal it promises but 
because it keeps the contestation over ideals open as well as regulated. The central consequence 
from this ethical stance in the elaboration of coercion here is that the disclosure of the coercive 
aspect in Mouffe’s agonism/agonistic politics should not be perceived within the lens of 
conventional ethics, where coercion is perceived as bad and liberty or freedom as good in them. 
On the contrary, disclosing the dimension of coercion in Mouffe’s agonism/agonistic pluralism is 
the rem(a)inder of its lack, the lost unity, caused by the castration necessitated by the symbolic 
order. It serves to keep desire alive and repeat the next course of encircling the ‘Real’. 
After knowing the role of the fantasmatic dimension in the operation of coercion on the ontological 
plane, there are still challenges in designing the research strategy and applying a methodological 
framework that is in-line with the theoretical presupposition underlying Mouffe’s 
agonism/agonistic pluralism. The PDT and Lacanian psychoanalysis favour ‘non-essentialist’ 
ontological and epistemological stance. Therefore, all of the social and political categories are 
always a result of articulation of difference and cannot be concretely predetermined. For example, 
from this lens, the concept of ‘antagonism’ cannot be defined based on certain concrete substantive 
or positive terms, such as class-antagonism, but always a result of articulation and their being 
always comes after and not prior to it. Therefore, it is impossible to define or label whether certain 
empirical forms of civil association are agonistic or not based on a predetermined set of criteria. 
Thus, if an empirical case is to be taken and analysed as a case of agonistic structure, it has to be 
taken involving analysis on ‘what-prevents-it-of-being-such’. With regards to the illustrative case, 
how it is treated is best describe as an answer to the question of “How the case is agonistic?” 
instead of “Whether the case is agonistic or not?” This is also in line with both the PDT and 
Lacanian psychoanalysis presuppositions of the impossibility of the full objectivity as well as 
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Roskamm’s critical response to Mouffe’s agonism/agonistic pluralism of the impossibility to 
transform antagonism into agonism in the final instance.  
For the methodological framework, there are several requirements for such framework; first, such 
framework needs to systematically incorporate the dimension of fantasy as ontological dimension 
that constitute social reality. Second, the framework has to enable this research to avoid or address 
the problem of subsumption while providing the tools to characterize the empirical phenomena 
without subsuming it under the conceptual categories as if the categories exhaust the empirical 
phenomena as universal or objective laws. The following Third Chapter discusses the research 
strategy and elaboration of the LCE as the methodological and analytical framework that meets 
the two criteria mentioned above.   
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Chapter III. RESEARCH STRATEGY 
 
1. Introduction: the Need for Methodological Framework for Empirical Analysis 
 
This chapter focuses on the elaboration of the research strategy employed for the investigation. 
Before elaborating the research strategy, it is helpful to briefly summarize the points from the 
previous chapter. In the previous chapter, it has been mentioned that for the research at hand, there 
are several requirements needed for the methodological and analytical framework. First, such 
framework needs to systematically incorporate the dimension of fantasy as ontological dimension 
that constitutes social reality. Second, the framework has to enable this research to avoid or address 
the problem of subsumption while providing the tools to characterize the empirical phenomena 
without subsuming it under conceptual categories as if the categories exhaust the empirical 
phenomena as universal or objective laws. 
The research strategy in this chapter draws mainly on the Logics of Critical Explanation - LCE 
that Glynos and Howarth develop as the instrumentalization of Laclau and Mouffe strand of PDT 
for empirical research. This is partially an attempt to respond to the critiques of methodological 
and normative deficiencies levelled toward Laclau and Mouffe’s PDT. The centrality of this 
framework is three folds. First, the LCE is a systematic attempt to further incorporate fantasmatic 
dimension in the constitution of the social as elucidated by Laclau and Mouffe’s theory of 
hegemony and discourse. As elaborated in the previous chapter, this fantasmatic dimension of 
social reality is just as crucial as the structural dimension, in Glynos and Howarth’s LCE described 
as the social and political dimensions, for the elaboration of the dimension of coercion in Mouffe’s 
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agonism/agonistic-pluralism. In the LCE, Glynos and Howarth give fantasy an ontological status 
that simultaneously comprises social reality with the social and political dimensions. 
Second, LCE addresses the challenge of the problem of subsumption that rises as a consequence 
of the specific ontological standpoint of the PDT. In LCE, Glynos and Howarth offer the concept 
and practice of articulation to understand the social reality investigated (Glynos & Howarth, 2007, 
p. 16). Elaboration in the first two chapters has demonstrated that the coercion as social reality is 
not something that is exhausted by its concept. There are many aspects of our social reality which 
are essentially constituted through coercion but not all of them are articulated as one, for example: 
the very name given to each of us by our parents and the practice of naming. Most of us acquire 
our names from our parents that, in most cases, we just take for granted. This is a blatant case of 
relations of subordination yet most of us just get along with it. Some even reify it by giving quasi-
sacrosanct status to it, based on the argument that the names given to us by our parents represent 
their best wishes to us. This example gives us a hint that in order to stay true to the ontological 
standpoint of the PDT, it is central to uphold and accommodate the presupposition that social 
reality is the result of articulation that can never be completely predetermined. This is crucial in 
determining the case taken to illustrate the theoretical points this dissertation aims to argue and 
how to proceed with the analysis. As mentioned in the final part of the previous chapter, taking 
the case of Participatory Planning Partnership (PPP) and Collaborative Governance in North 
Ayrshire, Scotland as a case of agonism/agonistic-pluralism it should not be perceived that it 
totally represents it as Mouffe elucidates it.  
Third, the LCE also highlights and reiterates the specific ethical standpoint that the PDT stands 
for. As discussed in the final part of the previous chapter, this specific ethical standpoint, known 
by the term of “the Ethics of the Real” is a crucial underpinning in justifying the relevance of this 
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study to elaborate the dimension of coercion in Mouffe’s agonism/agonistic-pluralism. The notion 
of ontological status of coercion, or coercion as structural principle, can only be justified, without 
reifying it, within the ethical standpoint of ‘the Ethics of the Real’, an ethics that continuously 
pursue the conflictual harmony between the desire and the drive (Fink, 1999, p. 211) without any 
predetermined ideal. 
This chapter is structured following the aforementioned three points. The section following this 
introduction elaborates in more details the LCEs and its three logics of social, political, and 
fantasmatic and how they are deployed as the analytical framework of the research here. There are 
two crucial points that require further elaboration from the LCE; that is the problem of subsumption 
and the Ethics of the Real. Each of these points is discussed in more detail in the next two sections. 
The final section concludes this chapter by describing and elaborating the research strategy derived 
from the methodological framework discussed in the preceding sections. This is the preliminary 
for the discussion in the fourth chapter that focuses on the justification of taking the case of 
Participatory Planning Partnership (PPP) in North Ayrshire, Scotland to represent a case of 
agonism/agonistic-pluralism.  
2. The Logics of Critical Explanation 
 
Glynos and Howarth develop the LCE as a methodological framework to make Laclau and 
Mouffe’s theory of hegemony and discourse and the broader PDT more practical for empirical 
research. Pertaining to the underlying presuppositions of Laclau and Mouffe’s theory of hegemony 
and discourse, radical contingency and the primacy of articulation, they attempt to straddle a line 
that is distinguishable from both the positivistic paradigm, believing in the existence of immediate 
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objective reality on one hand, and the nihilistic view that sees “anything goes” on the other (Glynos 
& Howarth, 2007, p. 7). Through the LCE they aim to address the critiques of methodological and 
normative deficiency levelled toward Laclau and Mouffe’s theory of hegemony and discourse and 
the broader PDT paradigm by its critiques (Glynos & Howarth, 2007, p. 6). The centrality of this 
methodological framework for the investigation on the dimension of coercion in Mouffe’s 
agonism/agonistic-pluralism here is located exactly in the aim of this framework to straddle a new 
line between those two poles of opposing paradigms. 
The elaboration on the ontological status of coercion in the previous chapter presents us with a 
new and further challenge of “How is it possible to disclose the dimension of coercion in particular 
empirical phenomena if all social reality is basically discursively constituted?”; “Is there any 
ground to justify that certain coercion is domination and oppression instead of merely 
subordination?”; and “Considering its ontological status, is there any ground to justify coercion in 
general?” The first two questions are related with the critique of methodological deficiency 
levelled toward Laclau and Mouffe’s theory of hegemony and discourse, while the last question is 
related with the critique of normative deficiency of the said theory. Glynos and Howarth’s LCE 
helps us to answer these questions as the Logics of critical explanation provides the 
methodological framework that is based on the same ontological standpoint that sees all social 
reality is essentially characterized by radical contingency and constituted through articulation. 
Glynos and Howarth describe the LCE by reiterating how they define the two elements that 
comprise it, namely the logics and the critical explanation. Glynos and Howarth describe their 
concept of logics  in three senses of the term, namely, first,  “the ways in which processes of theory 
construction and explanation are understood”; second, “… a particular approach or ‘style of 
reasoning’ in the social sciences that …, comprising the grammar or assumptions and concepts 
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that informs a particular approach to the social world”, and third, the term ‘logics’ refers to “… a 
more substantive sense to constitute the basic unit of explanation of our (LCE’s) approach” 
(Glynos & Howarth, 2007, p. 8). This conceptualization of logics is related to Glynos and 
Howarth’s definition of critical explanation, based on the PDT’s ontological presupposition of 
radical contingency and the primacy of articulation, that explains not only “… what sorts of things 
exist, but that they exist and how they exist” (Glynos & Howarth, 2007, p. 11, italic from the 
original text). The LCE argues for the inseparability between explanation and critique, between 
rationality and affect, between context of discovery and context of justification (Glynos & 
Howarth, 2007, p. 38), even though it acknowledges that they are irreducible to one another, but 
their co-implication is inevitable. 
In explaining the phenomenon of coercion, the research presented in this dissertation aims to go 
beyond the claim of the objectivity of being, in this case coercion. While, its ontological status and 
constitutive role have been elaborated in the previous chapters, the elaboration here also aims to 
avoid both the pitfall of nihilistic, anything goes, and reification of coercion kinds of explanation. 
It is in this sense that Glynos and Howarth’s LCE offers a promising alternative as this framework 
also addresses very similar challenges. On one hand, it challenges the positivistic ontological 
presupposition of the immediate accessibility of objective reality from which the ethics of 
objectivity and value free scientific enquiry entailed. On the other hand, it also challenges the 
tendency of subjectivism that, while offering strong alternative to the positivist explanation such 
as in the case of hermeneutics, leads to the ‘anything goes’ kind of ethical standpoint due to the 
problematic ontological standpoint and relatively underdeveloped conceptualization to tackle the 
complex task of explaining the political constitution of belief and social practices (Glynos & 
Howarth, 2007, p. 81).  
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In their attempt to straddle a middle way between the positivist and hermeneutic logics – logic in 
its first sense as “the ways in which processes of theory construction and explanation are 
understood” – Glynos and Howarth elaborate the mutual implication between the context of 
discovery and justification and incorporate it into the alternative logic that they advocate. In doing 
so, there are two major interventions that Glynos and Howarth propose in the LCE. First, Glynos 
and Howarth propose a new methodological approach or mode of reasoning: retroduction or 
abduction, as an alternative to the two more commonly known ‘deduction’ and ‘induction’. In 
theory construction retroductive approach sees, unlike either the deductive approach where the 
theory is always derived from laws or the inductive one; theory as summarized projections of data 
that moves to hypothesis and then to laws through three dialectical moments of problematization, 
retroductive explanation and theory construction, and persuasion and intervention (Glynos & 
Howarth, 2007, p. 26; 38).  
Glynos and Howarth dub the underpinning paradigm in LCE as “post-positivism”. The main 
contrasts between LCE and the positivist paradigm is characterized in the LCE’s projections of the 
relations between the context of discovery and the context of justification where and the extent of 
the retroductive cycle apropos the aforementioned three dialectical moments take place. The 
positivism paradigm situates the retroductive cycle to take place only in the moments of 
problematization, retroductive explanation, and theory construction that takes place in the context 
of discovery. The context of justification is only described as a moment of demonstration that the 
produced theory is subjected through a series of predictive tests based on predetermined scientific 
criteria to prove its truth/falsity. On the contrary, the post-positivism paradigm sees that the context 
of discovery and justification are not totally separated and the retroductive cycle takes place in 
both context across the three dialectical moments. The implications of such projection are three 
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folds: i), the projection of retroductive cycle across the three dialectical moments of both context 
of discovery and justification imply that the justification of a theory or an explanation can never 
be totally value free because it inevitably involves interpretive aspects upon which its ontological 
presuppositions are based. This interpretive dimension is crucial in determining the justification 
and acceptance of the new theories. It is at this point that the positivist paradigm tends to avoid 
and try to by-pass (Glynos & Howarth, 2007, p. 34). ii) The imbrication between the context of 
justification and discovery and the more extensive retroductive cycle renders the criteria of validity 
and justification of a theory or hypothesis contingent (Glynos & Howarth, 2007, p. 39). iii) the 
inevitability of interpretation transforms the moment of demonstration into moment of persuasion 
and intervention in the post-positivist view and they engage us at the ontological, political, and 
ethical levels. There is no neutral yardstick beyond interpretation (Glynos & Howarth, 2007, p. 
40). 
Second, through the LCE Glynos and Howarth proposes a new definition of explanation and 
critique based on what they call ‘the ontology of lack’. Pertaining to the expansion of the 
retroductive cycle to cover the whole three dialectical moments and the mutually implicating 
context of discovery and justification, LCE expands the explanatory and critical roles that theory 
formation has to carry. This manifests in the extensive definition of logics in the LCE. LCE 
reiterates the explanatory and critical role of a theory or theory formation by assigning the task of 
explaining, not only, “… what sorts of things exist, but that they exist and how they exist” (Glynos 
& Howarth, 2007, p. 11). Pertaining to the ‘the ontology of the lack’, LCE bases their approach 
on the presuppositions of “radical contingency and “structural incompleteness” (Glynos & 
Howarth, 2007, p. 11). By doing so, the LCE discloses and highlights the political constitution of 
social reality as it explains how its constitution always implies exclusion of other possibilities, 
113 
 
demand for the subject submission as the symptom of its lack and covering of the structural 
incompleteness. It is this disclosure of the political origin, or “reactivation” in Husserl’s term, of 
social reality that is the central critical aspect of the LCE (Glynos & Howarth, 2007, pp. 116-117). 
It should be underlined that the LCE gives primacy to the ‘political’, in line with Laclau and 
Mouffe’s PDT. The LCE, however, further specifies by, first, detaching the political from any 
particular site for the sake of analysis. The political is about making a decision in an undecidable 
situation or terrain and therefore the political is perceived as ontological category rather than an 
ontical one (Glynos & Howarth, 2007, p. 114). Simultaneously, the political is irreducible to the 
social as well as the other way around. In order to specify the distinction between the social and 
political, Glynos and Howarth define the political as following: “ … (A) demand is political to the 
extent that it publicly contest the norms of a particular practices in the name of a principle or ideal” 
(Glynos & Howarth, 2007, p. 115). This refers to Laclau and Mouffe’s characterization of political 
struggle in which they describe it as “… a type of activity whose objective is transformation of a 
social relation which construct a subject in a relationship of subordination” (Laclau & Mouffe, 
2014, p. 137).  
Based on this irreducibility and specifications of the social and the political, the second point to be 
reiterated here is that the LCE aims to provide a methodological framework that provides 
systematic analytical tools to explain the dialectical relations between the political and the social 
(Glynos & Howarth, 2007, p. 116). The social is characterized by sedimentation of a certain 
practice or set of practices whose origins are based on the exclusion of another practice or set of 
practices. This exclusion is only possible if it is situated against the background of undecidable 
terrain or the radical contingency. The political is the moment when this undecidable situation and 
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the political nature of the origin of a certain practice or regime is foregrounded, disrupting its 
stability and sedimentation.  
Third, incorporating the fantasmatic dimension in the analytical framework is intended to make 
Laclau and Mouffe’s PDT more suitable for empirical research. The LCE further elaborates the 
dialectics between the social and political by exploring further Husserl’s concepts of 
‘sedimentation’ and ‘reactivation’, leading to elaboration on the ideological dimension of social 
reality. The sedimentation of a certain practice or set of practices always involves what is called 
‘the forgetting of origin”. The origin forgotten is the incompleteness of the social (structure) 
marked by its political origin and its demands for the subject subscription to its rules. This process 
always requires the complicity of the subject to cover this structural incompleteness and this is 
where ideology plays its role. Borrowing Althusser’s conceptualization of ideology, LCE 
perceives the function of ideology involves twin operations of recognition and misrecognition. The 
former imposes the ‘obviousness as obviousness’ that no one can fail to recognize. In other words, 
it structures one to take the social reality for granted either as something natural or objective. The 
latter refers to the necessary misrecognition of social reality that is always permeated by the ever-
present gap between signifier and signified. In this sense, the LCE perceives ideology to stand also 
as an ontological category (Glynos & Howarth, 2007, pp. 117-118). 
In LCE, the discussion on the ideological is correlative to the concept of the ethical. This is because 
the ethical, in relation with the radical contingency of social relations, is understood as the subject’s 
respond to the ‘ontological lack’ of the social structure. The ‘ethical’ in LCE is irreducible to the 
concept of normative. It does not denote to specific ideal values or ‘good practice’ either. It is 
related to the subject’s mode of enjoyment where, when situated in undecidable situations, the 
subject has to make a decision. The undecidable situation is the moment when the structural 
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incompleteness comes to the fore and the subject’s decision to submit itself to it serves to cover 
this incompleteness. For the ‘castration’ of enjoyment that the agent has to undergo, the structure 
promises the fantasy of its (impossible) recovery. It is this promise and the subject’s attachment to 
it that determines the structure’s grips on the subject. The fantasy here can manifest in the forms 
of fullness, wholeness or harmony as well as threats or obstacles of its realization (Glynos & 
Howarth, 2007, pp. 119-120, 130-131; Glynos, 2008, p. 287). The fantasy is “the support that gives 
consistency to our reality” (Zizek, 1989, p. 144). The subject, in common parlance, is always a 
result of identification with something external to it. In contrast, the subject in its authentic sense 
is merely ‘the distance between the undecidable structure and the decision’ (Laclau, 1990, p. 39; 
Glynos & Howarth, 2007, p. 129).  
The discussion so far has brought forward the two senses of ‘logics’ specific to LCE: (i) as the 
mode of theory formation intended for critical explanation and (ii) the retroductive mode of 
reasoning and the ‘ontology of lack’. The following part of this section elaborates the third sense 
of the concept ‘logics’ in LCE that is as the name of its ‘unity of analysis’. The third sense of the 
term ‘logics’ in LCE refers to the three logics of social, political, and fantasmatic; the basic units 
of explanation in LCE. Related to Wagenaar’s critical response of “the relentless impermanence 
of social and political categories” in Laclau and Mouffe’s PDT, leading to the lack of its 
application on empirical cases, the LCE uses the concept of logics to enable characterization ‘of 
practices in particular social domain’ (Glynos & Howarth, 2007, p. 133). Following this, the logic 
of a practice denotes “to the rules or grammar of the practice, as well as the condition which make 
the practice both possible and vulnerable” (Glynos & Howarth, 2007, p. 134). 
In LCE, as well as in the PDT, practice or regime of practices becomes a central concept as well 
as a unit of analysis here because it enables the ontological presuppositions elaborated above to 
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re-describe ontical entities. The practice here is understood in the sense as ‘meaning production’ 
or social practice, or in other words articulatory one. Glynos and Howarth illustrate that “practice 
can be understood in terms of the way different dimensions of social relations – comprising the 
social, political, ideological, and ethical dimensions – are foregrounded or backgrounded, how 
they are articulated, and so on” (Glynos & Howarth, 2007, p. 120). The concept of ‘logics’ is useful 
to characterize the practice or regime of practices investigated by its grammar and the dimensions 
of social relations they put into the foreground or background. It is noteworthy that the terms 
‘logics’ does not refer to any substantive meaning or practice but only to which ontological 
dimension(s) is foregrounded or backgrounded (Glynos & Howarth, 2007, pp. 120-121). Through 
the concept of ‘logics’, the LCE aims to identify and characterize empirical practice or set of 
practices without subsuming them into a certain exhaustive category. The relations between 
‘logics’, in general, is defined as ‘rules’ or ‘grammar’, whereby the practice or set of practices are 
non-exhaustive (Glynos & Howarth, 2007, pp. 139-140). 
LCE is an innovative analytical framework for Post-Structuralist Discourse Theory and useful for 
this research. It facilitates not only the application of Laclau and Mouffe’s PDT on empirical 
research but it also enables this research to, first, systematically incorporate and elaborate the 
dimension of (social) fantasy. The introduction of ‘fantasmatic logics’ as one of the basic units of 
explanation in LCE answers this challenge. As it will shortly be further elaborated in the next part 
of this section, the category of ‘fantasmatic logics’ in LCE is a central basic unit of explanation 
besides the ‘social’ and ‘political’ logics. The dimension of social fantasy here is more explicitly 
stated and systematically incorporated as ontological dimension that, simultaneously with the 
social and political dimensions, comprise social reality, including antagonism; agonism; and 
coercion.   
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Second, LCE enables the research to address the problem of subsumption through the concept of 
‘logic’. The concept of ‘logic’ and its relations to practice, as the generalization of empirical 
phenomenon, as non-exhaustive enables the identification and characterization of those 
phenomena whose elusiveness have been elaborated in the previous two chapters. These logics as 
the basic units of explanation in the LCE are important to identify and characterize the investigated 
practices while at the same time to stay true to the underlying theoretical presuppositions of Laclau 
and Mouffe’s PDT where all social reality is set against the background of radical contingency and 
discursively constituted through establishing differential relations. This enables us to characterize 
the empirical cases of not only the stabilization of radical contingency through articulation but also 
the potential and actual dissolution. For the sake of this research, for example, it helps to 
characterize how certain relations of subordination; as a structural principle of stabilizing the 
contingency, is transformed into relations of domination or oppression.     
The LCE ontological standpoint presupposes that social reality is comprised of four ontological 
dimensions of social, political, ideological, and ethical. The LCE operationalizes this 
presupposition, through the concept of ‘logics’, into three basic units of explanation of political, 
social, and fantasmatic logics. As a basic unit of explanation, the social logics are mainly related 
to characterization of certain rules and ‘rule following’ a dimension of the certain practice or set 
of practices investigated and the conditions of possibility for such practice or set of practices 
(Glynos & Howarth, 2007, pp. 139-140). 
When speaking about political logics, it basically focuses on the dimension of exclusion/inclusion 
necessary in the practice or set of practices investigated as signifying practice and how they are 
being contested and/or transformed (Glynos & Howarth, 2007, p. 141). When we speak of 
agonism/agonistic-pluralism, it is described, among others, as the opposite of other formulas of 
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political relations which either deny the constitutive role of antagonism or reify antagonism as if 
it is a ‘battle between good vs. evil’ (Mouffe, 2005, p. 75). Agonism acquires its specificity through 
the differential relations to these formulas. The differential relations themselves are constituted 
through articulation and not predetermined. The political logics provide the means to locate the 
dislocations or the limits of the social reality of agonism/agonistic-pluralism. Here it becomes 
obvious that the articulation of the elements characterized as logic of ‘agonism/agonistic-
pluralism’ described as social reality requires its individuation by drawing the frontiers or limits 
that distinguish it from what it-is-not (Glynos & Howarth, 2007, pp. 143-144). 
The political logics in LCE are based on Laclau and Mouffe’s signifying logics of equivalence and 
difference (Glynos & Howarth, 2007, p. 143;144). The ‘regularity in dispersion’ of the social 
logics is only possible as a functioning system if there are logics that produce effects of totality 
that is capable of constructing the limits and constituting the formation (Laclau & Mouffe, 2014, 
p. 130). Laclau and Mouffe aptly describes: “… (I)t is on the basis of its own limits that a formation 
is shaped as a totality” (Laclau & Mouffe, 2014, p. 129). The relations between the social and 
political logics can be illustrated as the relations between syntagmatic and paradigmatic poles. The 
construction of limits here operates through the suspension of the elements articulated as internal 
moments of a certain formation and their articulation as a totality, as a chain of equivalence against 
something that it-is-not. Mouffe’s articulation of agonism/agonistic-pluralism as distinct to other 
formulas of political relations suspend the differential relations through which its internal moments 
acquire their specific meanings and present them as a totality toward what it-is-not. 
The discursive nature of this chain of equivalence indicates that this chain of equivalence is 
permeated by the ineradicable contingency and thus can always be potentially dissolved. Its 
dissolution operates through the logics of difference where the suspended or backgrounded 
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difference in the operation of the logics of equivalence is foregrounded. For example, one of the 
critical responses toward Mouffe’s agonism/agonistic-pluralism comes from Eva Erman, who 
argues that Mouffe misunderstands and misrepresents the notions of conflict and antagonism by 
highlighting the ambiguity of those notions, either as descriptive or normative, in Mouffe’s 
conceptualization (Erman, 2009, p. 1045). It is possible to debate upon the validity of Erman’s 
criticism but the point here is that Erman dissolves the logic of equivalence Mouffe articulates by 
introducing new differences, by specifying the distinction between antagonism as descriptive 
category and as a normative one thus dissolving the limits, hence the totalizing effect of Mouffe’s 
logic of agonism/agonistic-pluralism. 
The political logics enables us to explain and elaborate how a practice or regime of practices, 
characterized through the lens of social logics, are instituted, contested, or transformed. Besides, 
this LCE adds another basic unit of explanation that is the fantasmatic logics. Following Laclau, 
Glynos and Howarth describe “… fantasmatic logics as the force behind those (political logics as 
signifying operations) process” (Glynos & Howarth, 2007, p. 145). If the political logics concern 
with how a certain practice or regime of practices are constituted, transformed, or modified, the 
fantasmatic logics concern with the inertia, pace and vector of the transformation of a practice or 
regime of practices. The function of this basic unit of explanation is to systematically provide the 
means of how the constitutive lack on both the structure and the agent is covered. It explains why, 
though punctuated by contingencies, a practice or set of practices are still accepted as normal and 
part of everyday life or why a practice or set of practices previously seen to be unproblematic are 
suddenly questioned and become a target for transformation or modification. In relation to both 
the social and political practices, the fantasy operates to conceal the radical contingency that, in 
fact, the condition of the possibility of those practices themselves. 
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Initially, it may seem that the fantasmatic logics is more related to the social logics as something 
related to the resistance or inertia of a certain practice or set of practices toward change or, in other 
words, suppressing the political dimension of a practice. The fantasmatic logics, however, is also 
related to the political practices. The demand to defend or change a certain practice or set of 
practices is always articulated as social antagonism. It is always articulated that the defence or 
change of a certain practice or regime of practices would lead to the attainment of the 
lost/impossible enjoyment. In Glynos and Howarth’s words:  
If the function of fantasy in social practices is implicitly to reinforce the natural 
character of their elements or to actively prevent the emergence of political dimension, 
then we could say that the function of fantasy in political practices is to give them 
direction and energy … (Glynos & Howarth, 2007, p. 147) 
Enjoyment is a central element in LCE’s fantasmatic logics. The discourse’s grip on the subject is 
determined by the mode of enjoyment it provides. It is necessary to underline here that the 
enjoyment is impossible in the final instance. Thus, the term ‘enjoyment’ here should be perceived 
as ‘promised recovery of lost enjoyment’. The impossibility of enjoyment here, however, needs to 
be represented but since it is unrepresentable, it can only be represented as something that is lost. 
It is through this process, the fantasy that belongs to the structure; the register of the symbolic, 
structures the subject’s mode of enjoyment as it defines what is lost and how to recover it. Glynos 
and Howarth elaborate this explicitly by stating: 
(I)n concealing – suturing or closing off – the contingency of social relations, fantasy 
structures the subject’s mode of enjoyment in a particular way: let us call it an 
‘enjoyment of closure’. Thus, ethics is directly linked to the logic of fantasy because, 
whatever its ontical instantiation, the latter has closure as its principle of intelligibility, 
whereas ethics is related to the ‘traversal’ of fantasy in the name of openness to 
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contingency corresponding to an ‘enjoyment of openness’ (Glynos & Howarth, 2007, 
p. 151). 
The explication of the ontological status of fantasy in LCE is central to the elaboration on the 
dimension of coercion in Mouffe’s agonism/agonistic-pluralism. It is central to the argument this 
dissertation aims to elaborate that the oscillation of coercion apropos relations of subordination, 
oppression; domination, as the function of identification that revolves around the lost enjoyment 
through fantasy and identification.  
Before moving to the next section, it is important to briefly reiterate here that the logics described 
above are ontological framework. They are irreducible to specific empirical or ontical phenomena. 
Therefore, Glynos and Howarth describe that in their utilization to specific ontical phenomena, 
these basic units of explanation do not subsume in exhaustive manner the phenomena investigated 
but to characterize their operation, emergence, transformation, modification, and the force that 
drives it. For that reason, it is necessary to flesh out how as an analytical framework which is 
explicitly stated to operate at the ontological plane, the LCE is utilized to analyze Mouffe’s 
agonism/agonistic-pluralism. Their relations and the status of Mouffe’s agonism/agonistic-
pluralism needs to be ascertained, especially considering that it is analyzed in relations to specific 
empirical phenomena of PPP in North Ayrshire, Scotland. 
3. Addressing the Problem of Subsumption: Agonism/agonistic-pluralism as a logic 
 
The elaboration on LCE in the previous section demonstrates how as an analytical framework it 
still operates on the plane of the ontological. How it is utilized as an analytical framework on 
Mouffe’s agonism/agonistic-pluralism and the empirical case of PPP in North Ayrshire, Scotland 
needs to be fleshed out here. This section focuses specifically on elaboration of Mouffe’s 
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agonism/agonistic-pluralism as a specific logic through the elaboration of its ontological 
dimensions. The elaboration here is carried utilizing the LCE’s three basic units of explanation, 
namely the social, political, and fantasmatic logics. The elaboration of agonism/agonistic-
pluralism as a specific logic here also aims to foreground two things. First, it aims to identify its 
dimension of coercion on the ontological plane to further verify the elaboration in Chapter II. The 
elaboration of ontological dimensions of the logic of agonism points to specify how those 
dimensions simultaneously constitute ‘agonism/agonistic-pluralism as a reality. Utilizing the 
LCE’s basic units of explanation also makes it possible to elaborate the emergence, sustenance, 
transformation, and modification of its manifestations on the ontical plane. This is made possible 
as the LCE systematically incorporates the dimension of social fantasy as ontological category into 
its basic units of explanation.  
Second, the elaboration of agonism/agonistic-pluralism as a specific logic also aims to explicate 
how the problem of subsumption is addressed in this research. LCE emphasis on articulation as 
the only relation that relates between a logic and certain practice or logic enables this research to 
address this problem of subsumption. The centrality of this concept of articulation is further 
foregrounded in the elaboration on how as logic or rules, the logic of agonism/agonistic-pluralism 
here does not and never will exhaust the practices on the ontical plane. On this plane, 
agonism/agonistic-pluralism always interacts with other logics in informing the actual practice or 
regime investigated. This understanding enables this research to address potential challenges such 
as, “Whether the empirical practice or regime of practices taken truly represents the conceptualized 
agonism/agonistic-pluralism or not?” or “How do you justify that the case taken is the genuine 
representation of the agonism/agonistic-pluralism as Mouffe conceptualizes it?” Such questions 
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are beyond the underlying presuppositions of the LCE. The question should be, “How is and to 
what extent the empirical case investigated agonistic?” 
Identifying Mouffe’s agonism/agonistic-pluralism as a particular logic can be justified here. First, 
it is, basically a discourse and logic is synonymous to discourse (Glynos & Howarth, 2007, p. 135). 
Laclau characterizes a social logic as “ … a rarefied system of objects, as a “grammar” or cluster 
of rules which make some combinations and substitutions possible and exclude others” (Laclau, 
2015, p. 76; see also Mouffe, 1993, p. 108). Second, this rule or grammar characterize, through 
articulation, a certain practice or regime of practices. For example, in her articulation to produce 
this discourse of agonism, Mouffe characterizes practices and regime by (re)articulating them to 
follow her concept of agonism as a certain grammar. She characterizes how democracy is basically 
constituted as an agonistic system, she (re)describes democracy as a regime of practices that 
follows certain rules that demand constant regulation and guarantee that undecidable moments 
come to the fore, manifest in the moments of election and other democratic fora, and promote 
these moments as the very conditions of its legitimacy (Mouffe, 1993, p. 108; Mouffe, 2000; 
Mouffe, 2018, pp. 56-57). After putting Mouffe’s agonism/agonistic-pluralism as logic of 
antagonism/agonistic-pluralism, then it is possible to characterize its ontological dimensions of 
social, political, ideological and ethical through the LCE’s basic units of explanation. The 
ontological status of coercion can be highlighted through explanation resulted from analysis on 
the ontological dimensions of the logic of agonism/agonistic-pluralism. 
Contextualizing the logic of agonism in a specific empirical case helps to illustrate the theoretical 
point this research aims to foreground. The emergence of the logic of agonism/agonistic-pluralism 
is always situated in the myriad of contending logics or discourses. Mouffe specifically articulates 
her notion of agonism on the field of theory of democracy, in which she specifies her notion of 
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agonism in relations to other theories. On the theoretical plane this situation has been elaborated 
in rather more detail by Mouffe, and many other scholars. However, on the empirical plane such 
elaborations are less prevalent. The lack of elaboration of this logic of agonism/agonistic-pluralism 
on empirical plane partially contributes to its application in a rather subsumptive manner, such as 
in cases of planning presented by Schaap (Schaap, 2006) or critical responses such as presented 
by Roskamm (Roskamm, 2015) and Yamamoto (Yamamoto, 2018). As a logic or discourse, it is 
necessary that the analysis on this logic of agonism/agonistic-pluralism to include analysis on 
what-prevent-it-from-being-fully-itself, not only on the theoretical plane but also on the empirical 
one in order to produce critical explanation on it.  
Elaboration on the theoretical plane focuses on defining the theoretical specificity of the theory 
endorsed. The specificity is constituted through juxtaposition and comparison with other theories. 
At some points, it may base its premise on a certain empirical problem or problematization. In the 
end, however, it always refers back to the particular theoretical framework that informs the referred 
empirical investigated. While this may serve the purpose to construct the specificity of the theory 
endorsed, especially for PDT that grounds its ontological presupposition on difference and the 
constitution of difference, it may obscure the fact that these ‘other theories’ are the conditions of 
possibility for the theory endorsed. The misportrayal of Mouffe’s agonism as an approach that 
continuously attempts to defer closure mentioned in the first chapter is just one example of this 
problem (Schaap, 2006). This misunderstanding reflects how Mouffe’s agonism/agonistic-
pluralism is perceived as a single logic that totally exhausts the practices and it exists in and for 
itself. 
Taking this theory onto the empirical plane, as a logic that characterizes a certain practice that 
inevitably interacts in conjuncture with other logics can serve to further foreground the 
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impossibility of this logic to exhaust the empirical plane. For example, the logic of 
agonism/agonistic-pluralism envisions political relations in which differences and adversarial 
interests in the society are acknowledged, regulated, and sustained. This logic partially installs the 
actual governance practices or regime. In the case of governance, the practices or regime installed 
by this logic of agonism are not merely one among many other practices prescribed as rules and 
mechanisms. They occupy central position as they determine whether the policies produced from 
the process are legitimate or not. This is homologous to the practice of election in democracy 
where, in order to acquire legitimacy, the stability of the ruling power has to emerge from the 
moment of an undecidable situation. Such a regime ensures that this undecidable moment is not 
only regulated but also determines its legitimacy. 
However, the empirical practice or regime also shows that this logic is not the only logic that 
informs it. Other logics also informed the governance practices, such as the logic of administration 
that requires a higher degree of stability which on many points checks the dynamic and contingent 
nature of the practices characterized by the logic of agonism. Here, the logic of technocracy can 
be added. It installs practices or a regime that gives primacy to expertise; scientific soundness; and 
rationality to judge and regulate the governance relations and processes. These other logics may 
and always potentially subvert the empty space the logic of agonism provides and hegemonize it. 
As later shown in the following chapters, such moments may occur even without altering the 
practices that the logic of agonism installed. In such cases, the institutionalized agonistic practices 
could serve only to rubber stamp the decisions produced.   
At this point, however, the relevant aspect to discuss is how such mode of analysis may address 
the problem of subsumption. When it is said that the case of governance regime represents a case 
of agonism/agonistic-pluralism, it should be perceived that it does not mean that this logic exhausts 
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the whole practices or regime. It simultaneously informs the practices or regime with other logics. 
Parallel to the theoretical plane, this coexistence sets the limits of the logic of agonism and is its 
condition of possibility as well as its impossibility. Pertaining to the presupposition of the radical 
contingency, it is impossible to find an empirical case that is totally congruent with theoretical 
description, including agonism/agonistic-pluralism. If one logic seems to become the universal 
representation of the practices or regime, it is always a result of hegemonic intervention. However, 
it is important to bear in mind that the links that connect both the theoretical frameworks and the 
logics, either in relation to difference or equivalence, are neither given nor predetermined. This is 
based on the presupposition that “… all that elements and relations are ultimately contingent and 
partial, and that their meaning and function is relative to the singular explanatory chain within 
which they are linked” (Glynos & Howarth, 2007, pp. 180-181; Laclau & Mouffe, 2014, p. 93). 
Therefore, besides the concept of ‘logic’, the LCE also gives primacy to the concept of 
‘articulation’ in order to explain the relations between theoretical concepts and empirical analysis. 
The concept of articulation here refers to its definition by Laclau and Mouffe (Laclau & Mouffe, 
2014, p. 100). With this concept of articulation, it becomes possible to construct relations not only 
between theoretical categories and empirical analysis, but also among theoretical elements and 
among empirical elements as well (Glynos & Howarth, 2007, p. 180). The relations between logic 
of agonism and the governance practice or regime and other logics that simultaneously inform the 
practice or regime investigated are not necessary or predetermined by certain law prior to its 
articulation but are constituted through that articulation.    
One instance where Mouffe articulates the specificity of her logic of agonism through reference to 
actual practice or regime is when Mouffe critically describes the rise of Tony Blair with his ‘New-
Labour’ and its ‘Public Private Partnership-PPP’ policy as merely continuation of the ‘neo-liberal 
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hegemony’ initiated during Thatcher’s era (Mouffe, 2005, pp. 60-63). In that instance, Mouffe sets 
the limits of what is agonism and what-it-is-not. The point is here is not the substance of what the 
‘New-Labour’ advocates, but that and how it, through its policy, reifies the fantasy of 
Neoliberalism as the only possible alternative and delegitimizes most articulations the dislocations 
cause. Retrospectively, it can be rearticulated as following: the logic of Neoliberalism that the 
‘New-Labour’ advocated is what the logic of agonism should have been able to subordinate as its 
internal moment and not the other way around. In this sense, the logic of agonism, just like any 
other logics, in order to hegemonize certain practice or regime needs to subordinate the other 
assemblages of logics by articulating them as its internal moments or to push them beyond the 
limits set by the equivalential chain through which the logic of agonism, as any other logic, 
hegemonize and articulate other logics as its internal moments. The constitution of the limits of 
the logic of agonism above reflects the basic function of political logics, the logic of 
difference/equivalence. The subordination is embedded in the very function of this logic as it gives 
only two options: either the other logics are subordinated or pushed-out beyond its limits. This 
explains why the dimension of coercion is congruent to the limits of an entity and why it has 
ontological status because the limits define the very being of the entity discussed. On this point, 
Rosskam is right by saying that agonism owes its existence to its impossibility in the final instance 
as not all antagonism can be transformed into agonism (Roskamm, 2015).  
However, the LCE provides further systematic critical explanation on this dimension by explaining 
how this coercion as structural principle can be transformed into coercion in subjective sense or 
from relations of subordination into relations of domination or oppression. The LCE’s basic units 
of explanation that systematically incorporates the fantasmatic dimension as ontological category 
in the constitution of social reality makes this possible. Mouffe’s critique of Tony Blair’s New-
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Labour, once again, can be a useful illustration. Through the lens of LCE it can be explained as 
the following. Mouffe uses agonism, and its ontological presuppositions of the primacy of the 
political, as a yardstick to decenter Tony Blair’s policy and its theoretical underpinning that is 
based on the fantasy of ‘The End of Ideology’ as concealing its political dimension (Mouffe, 2005, 
pp. 59-60). Here, Mouffe foregrounds the political dimension by reactivating the undecidable 
situation that precedes and becomes the condition of possibility for Tony Blair’s policy to make 
the decision through exclusion of other possible alternatives. In doing so, Mouffe also encourages 
the audience to relinquish the fantasy of fullness expected from the Neoliberal regime and to 
displace the libidinal investment or cathexis to other points. The displacement of cathexis 
decenters the subject and foregrounds its split nature. If through cathexis the subject previously 
perceives its subjectivity as a whole through its insertion into or identification with the 
corresponding logic or regime, the displacement of the cathectic point prompts the subject to start 
to question the rules that the logic installs and when the cathectic point is totally displaced to other 
nodal points, indicating identification with other logic or regime, the more the relations of 
subordination in the previous logic is transformed into relations of oppression. This is the situation 
that Laclau and Mouffe describe as the discursive exterior that interrupt the relations of 
subordination constituted by the dominant logic and the regime it installs (Laclau & Mouffe, 2014, 
p. 138).  
The fantasmatic dimension is crucial here as this transformation is informed by the dynamics of 
the social agent’s identification. The fantasy gives a logic or discourse its grips on the subjects by 
harnessing the subject’s drive for enjoyment through its transformation into desire. As it is already 
mentioned, the desire is structured by the symbolic order or the discourse by promising the 
impossible recovery of the enjoyment the subject loses during its insertion into the symbolic order. 
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The insertion into the symbolic order, while castrates the subject of its partial enjoyment, also 
enables it to articulate or express it symbolically, though only in the form of its loss or absence. 
The element invested with this desire for fullness is the invested object or, in Lacanian term, the 
‘object of desire’ or ‘object a’. Laclau equates his ‘hegemony’ to Lacan ‘object a’ as he argues 
that “According to Lacan, sublimation is to elevate an object to the dignity of the Thing (of the 
Freudian Thing, of course). This means that a certain partial object ceases to be a partiality within 
a totality – which would reduce it to mere moment within a global structure – and becomes 
partiality which is the totality” (Laclau, 2015, p. 103). 
The pursuit for this object of desire, on its turn, gives the subject itself a ‘substitute satisfaction’ 
(Fink, 1999, p. 3). Crisis emerges when the ‘substitute satisfaction’ as the symptom of the Master, 
the dominant logic, gives diminished satisfaction to the subject (Fink, 1999, p. 9). For example, 
the fantasy that supports the hegemony of the neoliberal regime have somehow been diluted by a 
series of crises– such as ‘Global War on Terror’ followed with the European Crisis since 2008. 
More and more people have been voicing their disenchantment to the currently hegemonic and 
dominant neoliberal regime. Among others, this disenchantment is often articulated in the 
discourse that portrays neoliberalism as an oppressive regime. This is despite the fact that less than 
two decades before, its advent has been hailed as liberator. This does not mean, however, that those 
who face the crises are suddenly ready to accept another ‘substitute enjoyment’. Most of them 
rather want the regime to restore the satisfaction to the previous level (Fink, 1999, p. 9). 
The elaboration on this section has demonstrated how the LCE enables the research to address the 
problem of subsumption through the concepts of ‘logic’ and ‘articulation’. In doing so, it has also 
elaborated the central role of the ‘fantasmatic logics’ in critically explaining the dimension of 
coercion in Mouffe’s agonism. However, there is another critical point to elaborate before moving 
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to elaborating the research strategy. This critical point is the ‘cathexis’ or ‘cathectic point’. It is 
mentioned above that the displacement of cathexis is central in the transformation of ‘coercion 
from structural principle’ into ‘subjective coercion’. Mouffe’s agonism, while still acknowledging 
the constitutive role of the ‘cathexis’; thus, the ontological status of fantasmatic dimension; aims 
toward a different sort of cathectic point, that is the point that is impossible to symbolically 
represent, with the emphasis on the ‘impossibility’ and not on its symbolic representation. This is 
related to the ethical standpoint that both the LCE and Mouffe’s agonism share, known as ‘The 
Ethics of the Real’. The next section discusses this topic in more detail.      
4. The Ethics of the Real 
 
As elaborated in the previous chapter, the dimension of fantasy is central in the subject’s 
identification to the structure. The instance when a structure becomes more liberating or more 
oppressive for someone is determined by one’s identification or dis-identification to the said 
structure. It is necessary to bear in mind that the distinction is not black-and-white. There is a broad 
range of spectrum between these two extreme poles, sometimes known as passive consent or 
passive resistance to contrast them with their corresponding active counterparts. Along these 
variations, however, subjective identification is central to determine one’s position and response 
toward the structure it faces. 
The LCE formulates identification in relation to the concept of fantasy, desire, and the constitution 
of subject. In line with the elaboration in Chapter II, the subject is constituted through one’s 
submission into the symbolic order, during which one has to give up its partial enjoyment that 
causes the subject to experience a loss of enjoyment. In return, the structure promises the 
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(impossible) recovery of this loss enjoyment. However, it is noteworthy that ‘what its enjoyment 
is’ is unrepresentable to the agent itself prior to its insertion into the symbolic order. Thus, its 
insertion into the symbolic order enables it, as a symbolic subject, to articulate what its enjoyment 
is, though only in its negative form that is its absence or loss. It is necessary to reiterate here that 
the symbolic works through the function of difference among signifiers or elements, the 
representation of the loss-enjoyment is no exception. The enjoyment as the signified is impossible 
to be reached symbolically. Thus, one’s attachment to the enjoyment, now symbolically 
representable as something that is lost or absent, cannot be grounded on the specificity of certain 
symbols because their meanings are not inherent to them but ascribed through their differential 
relations. It must come from somewhere else that is from the libidinal drive the subject invests to 
certain symbol – cathexis that represents its loss enjoyment. Thus, though the force that gives the 
structure or discourse its grips on the subject does not come from it itself, it creates the horizon 
that makes the enjoyment possible to be represented, even though only as a loss or absence. But 
this is how fantasy is constituted because this representation animates, not only constitutes, the 
desiring subject (Glynos & Howarth, 2007, p. 147). Therefore, Glynos and Howarth argue that the 
fantasy structures the subject’s mode of enjoyment (Glynos & Howarth, 2007, p. 151). The 
ontological status of fantasy and fantasmatic dimension means that no social reality escapes it. 
Fantasy here does not refer to illusion that obscures the authentic, yet it should be understood as 
something that suppresses the political dimension or radical contingency of social reality (Glynos 
& Howarth, 2007, p. 147). However, this does not mean that the fantasmatic logics operate only 
in the social practices. It also operates in the political practices.  
As it has been elaborated above that based on the ‘ontology of lack’, the structure that informs 
practice or regime is never complete. It always lacks-of something. In order to support it a 
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fantasmatic support is required. Zizek defines fantasy as “the support that gives consistency to 
what we call “reality”” (Zizek, 1989, p. 44). However, this fantasy is not perfect either in 
supporting the ‘reality’. There are still moments of dislocation. Dislocation here refers to the 
‘moment when the subject’s mode of being is experienced as disrupted.’ In other words, it is the 
moment when the subject is situated in the moment when the contingency of its social reality 
comes to the fore. Two possible responses may come from this dislocation, the ideological and the 
ethical. As mentioned above, the former refers to a response that conceals and denies the 
underlying contingency while the latter refers to a response that is attentive to it (Glynos & 
Howarth, 2007, pp. 110-111). LCE endorses the former over the later based on its ontological 
presuppositions of radical contingency and the impossibility of the social. Consequently, it 
endorses identification that revolves around the ‘mode of enjoyment’ grounded on the ineradicable 
but constitutive lack of ground. 
This does not mean that the LCE favors the ‘anything goes’ paradigm. As mentioned above, 
fantasy is only possible through the structure or the symbolic order, without it there is neither 
desire nor desiring subject (Lacan, 2005, p. 782; 826; Fink, 1999, pp. 66-67) but merely, in 
Lacanian term, acephalous or headless subject. Fink describes it as “a sort of non-subject, when 
thought of in traditional philosophical or psychological terms” (Fink, 1999, p. 208)) which pursues 
satisfaction. This is similar in the elaboration of ‘radical contingency’ in the first chapter, where it 
does not mean the total absence of fixation or closure but the impossibility to become full and 
permanent and, in fact, the fixation also has constitutive role and ontological status such as 
instantiated by the political practices. 
Mouffe’s agonism/agonistic-pluralism and LCE share the same ontological presuppositions, the 
attentiveness to the ineradicable and constitutive lack and the corresponding ethical standpoint of 
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‘the Ethics of the Real’ (Zizek, 1991, p. 272). This ethical standpoint is based on traumatic 
experiences of how traditional ethics have promised us ‘the good’ and always ultimately ends in 
failure due to their inabilities to master the constitutive lack around which human experience is 
organized. The answer to these ultimate failures is not identification to new conception of good 
but to identify with the dislocation of these conceptions itself (Stavrakakis, 1999, pp. 129-131). 
This does not mean that attachment to ‘the good’ as defined by the traditional ethics should be 
avoided at all but this attachment is subjected to its status as ‘already dislocated’. In other words, 
as Zupancic describes, “It is not that the pleasure is forbidden to the ethical subject but rather, that 
it loses its attractive power for such a subject; it is available and accessible, just no longer 
desirable” (Zupancic, 2000, p. 8). 
The imports of the elaboration of this ethical standpoint are two folds: first, it serves to address the 
potential misunderstanding as if this research, whether deliberately or not, reify or justify coercion. 
The elaboration on the dimension of coercion in Mouffe’s agonism/agonistic-pluralism and its 
ontological status demonstrates the legitimacy and justifies the ‘ontology of lack’ and the ‘ethics 
of the real’ as ontological and ethical standpoints respectively because it demonstrates that any 
entity can only come into being if it is able to determine its limits and the coercion is the mark of 
those limits. Agonistic entity is no exception in this case. The dimension of coercion in its 
constitution indicates that, as any other social realities or relations, it is marked by dislocations. 
Second, it further fleshes out the ethical aim and standpoint of the critical paradigm embedded in 
the PDT that both the LCE and Mouffe’s agonism/agonistic-pluralism shares that in turn helps for 
further characterization of actual agonistic practice. One of the central arguments in Mouffe’s 
agonism/agonistic-pluralism is her articulation that democracy is characterized and informed by 
logic of agonism (Mouffe, 1993; Mouffe, 2000; Mouffe, 2005). Mouffe exemplifies this with the 
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institution of election, the foregrounding of contingency of who will occupy the centre of the site 
of power, and the split of the summit manifest in the division between the ruling and opposition 
parties found in many democratic regimes. For the ‘emptiness of the centre’ character of 
democracy Mouffe refers to Claude Lefort (Mouffe, 1993, p. 105), while for the ‘splitting of the 
summit’ she refers to Niklas Luhmann (Mouffe, 2005, p. 120). 
The Ethics of the Real is an ethic that sees the impossibility of closure as the ideal. No matter how 
fancy a logic may sound, it keeps looking for its impossibility in the final instance. Mouffe 
elaborates this extensively in her articulation of democracy as a regime informed by the logic of 
agonism. Central in this characterization of democracy as practice or regime informed by the logic 
of agonism is the centrality of veto and recall institutionalized as foundational rules. This is 
reflected in the mechanisms that characterize democracy such as the institutionalization of the 
principle of division of power, exemplify by Montesquieu’s Trias Politica and election. In the 
institution of election, the idea is even more radical as it institutionalizes the reciprocal veto among 
the democratic subjects but it renders all of the subjects on equal footing in exercising their vetoes. 
This manifests in the principle of one man one vote. The exercise of these practices is basically the 
moment of foregrounding the radical contingency that continuously permeated any social relations 
as it constitutes the undecidable situation, the condition of possibility for decision or closure and 
democracy assigns to these rules and regimes, thus the undecidable moment they foreground, the 
status of ground. Democracy is constituted based on the recognition on the constitutive role of 
dislocation and, thus, the need to regulate and institutionalize it. However, the disruption itself is 
only possible against the background of a sedimented practice or regime (Stavrakakis, 2011). This 
implies the impossibility of agonism in the final instance that Rosskam highlights because the 
sedimented discourse or (articulatory) practice is the condition of possibility for agonism 
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(Roskamm, 2015). However, the ‘empty space’ at the center, to use Lefort’s term, is always 
potentially hegemonized by a particular content. In the case of Mouffe’s criticism to Tony Blair, 
it is less the Neoliberal substance that she resents rather than the hegemonic status that this 
particular substance enjoys and its strong grips on most of the subjects who still cling to ‘the Ethic 
of Harmony’. Her notion of ‘agonism/agonistic-pluralism’ is basically a call to shift from the 
‘Ethic of Harmony’ to the ‘Ethic of the Real’. 
At this point, it is easy to imagine how easy this call transforms into demand and from demand 
into command, in which the coercive nature comes to the fore. However, this should not be 
perceived as something negative. On the contrary, as a logic, agonism/agonistic-pluralism, is 
basically a set of rules and as rules it always prohibits, it always castrates. However, through the 
castration subjectivity becomes possible. Also, it serves as rem(a)inder of the impossibility of total 
objectivity that, on its turn, serves to prompts us further to embrace this ‘Ethic of the Real’. 
5. The Research Strategy 
 
There are two central points from the elaboration of the points on the problem of subsumption and 
the Ethics of the Real for the strategy in this research. First, the elaboration on the problem of 
subsumption specifies ‘articulation’ as the unit of analysis. The research here does not rely on the 
‘exhaustiveness’ of a theoretical concept to explain the phenomena or case investigated. On the 
contrary, it can be said here that it is the ‘inexhaustiveness’ that demonstrates the main topic this 
research aims to address, that is coercion. As coercion is congruent with the limits of the being of 
social reality, discursively produced through articulation, the inexhaustiveness of a concept to 
explain the phenomena or case investigated implies the limits on which the coercive dimension 
136 
 
comes to the fore. If Laclau and Mouffe define articulation as ‘the constitution of certain nodal 
points which partially fix meaning’ (Laclau & Mouffe, 2014, p. 100) through which social reality 
is constituted as an objective totality points to one side of the ‘coin of social reality’, they also 
point to its other side when they define that this totality is defined on the basis of its own limits 
(Laclau & Mouffe, 2014, p. 129). Through the concept of articulation, it becomes possible to 
foreground the dimension of coercion and its ontological status because articulation is mainly 
concerned with constitution of certain nodal points and defining limits to stabilize the overflow of 
meanings. LCE’s three basic units of explanation help to characterize the logic investigated and 
its conjunction with other logics to characterize certain empirical phenomena. The systematic 
incorporation of the fantasmatic dimension in this methodological framework also provides the 
means to critically explain the transformation of coercion from ‘structural principle’ into 
‘subjective coercion’ or from ‘relations of subordination’ into ‘relations of oppression’.  
Second, elaboration on the ‘Ethics of the Real’ gives further guidance for this research and how it 
should be conducted. The dimension of coercion is congruent with the limits that are the basis of 
the objective totality of social reality; ‘the Ethics of the Real’ foregrounds the constitutive lack, 
both on the structure and the agent, that points to ‘what prevents it (the phenomena or case 
investigated) from (totally) being itself’. It is this point that this research should search and 
investigate in the said phenomena or case. Thus, for example, it is still possible to take the case of 
‘collaborative governance’ to exemplify the logic of agonism even though in her works Mouffe 
explicitly criticizes it as what ‘agonism-is-not’. However, it is this articulation that relates 
‘collaborative governance’ and ‘agonism’ – as a logic or discourse; it becomes possible to 
foreground the constitution of the limits of agonism and, thus, its being.  
137 
 
Another way the Ethic of the Real points to the direction this research should take to characterize 
certain practice or regime as agonistic is that if social reality and identity is to have essence then 
‘its essence is the lack of essence’. Mouffe’s exemplifies this with her articulation on how 
democracy is basically a set or regime of practices that puts the institutionalization of the ‘lack of 
essence’ at its core. In line with this articulation, it is justifiable to say that the case of ‘collaborative 
governance’ is further intensification and expansion of the same logic on the field of social 
practices. The always partial nature of the characterization of certain practices or regime by a 
certain logic is in-line with the underlying premise of Laclau and Mouffe’s PDT that all social 
reality and identity are basically results of hegemonic intervention. The partiality and temporality 
of the characterization are the manifestation of the ever-present overflows of meanings which 
makes hegemony, and articulation that produces it, possible as well as impossible as a totality in 
the final instance (Laclau & Mouffe, 2014, p. 93).       
Based on the elaboration on the LCE and the Ethics of the Real as the specific ethical standpoint 
that LCE and Mouffe’s agonism/agonistic advocate, there are some central measures and steps to 
be taken to analyze the dimension of coercion and its role in Mouffe’s agonism. First, in order to 
specify how the agonism/agonistic-pluralism as a logic is or is not characterizing the practice or 
regime investigated, it is necessary to elaborate how the practice or regime said locates, identifies, 
articulates, and institutionalizes potential or actual impasse. In the case taken for investigation, that 
is collaborative governance, it may, initially, seem ‘too obvious’ that the logic of agonism 
characterizes it. This is because this regime owes its hegemonic position to the rhetoric of 
democratic recognition of growing plurality and diversity of demands and identities of the 
(post)modern society. However, over time, there has been mounting criticisms toward these 
practices or regimes regarding the shift of the balance toward certain logics that focus more on 
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stability at the expense of recognition over the constitutive role of antagonism (Inch, 2015; Dean, 
2018).  
The growing criticisms both on the theoretical and practical plane towards ‘collaborative 
governance’ facilitate the second step. This step involves critical explanation on 
agonism/agonistic-pluralism as a logic and its dimension of coercion through its interactions with 
other logics in characterizing the regime investigated. It will highlight how the logic of 
agonism/agonistic-pluralism engages politically in an attempt to subordinate or exclude other 
logics in order to characterize the investigated practices and how, in the process, it involves 
demands on the agents to ‘identify’ with specific kinds of ideals which basically serve as its 
fantasmatic support. This analysis carried in this step discloses the dimension of coercion both on 
the ontological and ontical plane. On the former, it discloses how the constitution of logic of 
agonism as an objective reality requires subordination and exclusion in order to define its limits. 
On the latter, it manifests in concrete governance a situation where its constitution involves 
practices of constant deconstruction of concrete logics or discourses that aim to cover the lack on 
the structure through ideological fantasies. This includes investigation on how the subjects of the 
practice or regime identify themselves with the structure’s cause and how they respond to those 
who hold different views.  
The third step is locating and identifying the potential moments where the contingency becomes 
most apparent. In governance and public policy studies such a moment has been a relatively 
common object of studies, usually under the heading of wicked problem and clumsy solution. 
Wicked problem is a problem that is basically impossible to solve (Rittel & Webber, 1973). Any 
solution to address this problem always seems to be partial and transient, therefore the adjective 
clumsy. The legitimation of governance regime and its collaborative derivation today have, most 
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of the time, been articulated as a solution to  these sort of problems that have been becoming more 
prevalent in the (post)modern society (Koliba, Meek, & Zia, 2010, p. 120). The discourse of 
collaborative governance, as elaborated in more detail in the following chapter, has been 
constituted basically around this notion of wicked problem. Even, implied in studies such as 
Kingdon’s, it is not an exaggeration to describe that the practice of governance, to a large extent, 
is constituted that all problems are always, more or less, wicked and all of their solutions are clumsy 
(Kingdon, 2011).  
In this research the data are acquired through review on literature, media, and policy documents. 
Data is also collected through several interviews and observation on community meetings. The 
reviews on the relevant literature and policy documents provide the data mostly for analysis on the 
theoretical plane though some of them also provide data on the empirical case used to illustrate the 
theoretical points. The media and policy review, interview, and observation provide data almost 
exclusively on the empirical case investigated. The observation and interview were conducted in 
the period between February-June 2018. The source persons for the interview were municipal 
officials and community organizers involved in formulating and implementing the PPP framework 
in North Ayrshire. 
It is important to underline here that this research strategy is an attempt to line the research with 
what Mouffe, with Laclau, aim to achieve through their Radical democracy project and Mouffe’s 
campaign in endorsing her agonism/agonistic-pluralism to broaden and deepen democracy into 
more aspects of social life. In that situation, as a logic, agonism/agonistic-pluralism co-exists and 
enmeshed in complex networks with other logics that simultaneously attempt to characterize the 
actual practices or regimes with the aim to hegemonize them. But beyond that, Laclau and Mouffe 
are fully aware of the impossibility of the society and democracy in the final instance as objective 
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beings and they owe their very beings to the incompleteness that constantly permeates their 




Chapter IV. GOVERNANCE AS AGONISTIC STRUCTURE 
 
The previous chapter has elaborated how in this research agonism/agonistic pluralism is perceived 
and treated as a concrete logic or discourse that attempts to characterize a certain practice or 
regime. In order to highlight its coercive dimension, the ontological status of this dimension, and 
the role of fantasmatic dimension to support it, it is considered better to demonstrate its 
manifestation in a concrete case. For that purpose, the case taken here is ‘collaborative governance’ 
in the region of North Ayrshire, Scotland. However, before focusing onto the specific case said, 
this chapter elaborates ‘how the discourse of collaborative governance is agonistic.’ The 
characterization here, as elaborated in the previous chapter, can never be complete and final. In 
characterizing the governance practice or regime, the logic of agonism has been undergoing ups 
and downs as it competes with other logics to hegemonize governance as a field of discursivity. 
However, as seen in the discussion below, one point that is important to reiterate in the case of the 
emergence of governance as a hegemonic regime is that this has been taking place in a situation 
where the contingency of social reality and relations become more obvious and prevalent. The 
elaboration of governance as an agonistic structure covers its conception and rise into its current 
hegemonic position since the 1980s; how it has been evolving across that period, and how along 
these evolutions it has developed new norms, values, and practices to serve the purpose of 
maintaining its hegemonic position by continuously playing the political game of equivalence and 




1. Introduction: Governance and the Logic of Agonism 
 
There are two crucial points elaborated in this chapter: first, the identification of the two irreducible 
yet constitutive values or principles that underpin the idea of governance, namely authentic 
democratic governance and effectiveness and efficiency (see also Bäcklund & Mäntysalo, 2010, 
p. 342). In many ways, these two values or principles conflict with each other. However, second, 
their conflict and its continuation are constitutive for the hegemonic position of governance 
discourse. The irreducibility and continuous conflict between these two core values of the 
discourse of governance are the condition of possibility for the constitution of the ‘fantasy of the 
coming unity’ in which public matters can be solved in genuinely democratic ways as well as 
producing effective impacts. As the next section will demonstrate, the irreducibility of these two 
core values or principles of governance manifest in the absence of a single definition of what it 
means; the continuous transformations of its practices; and different focuses of its practices in 
across time and spaces.   
The elaboration on its coercive dimension dives down on how these new norms, values, and 
practices involve subordinations and exclusions of other possible norms, values, and practices. 
These subordinations and exclusions in themselves, as mentioned in the previous chapters, do not 
necessarily articulate as coercion. Their articulation as coercion is related to the continuous 
interplay between the ever-present potential of perceived ‘lost unity’ caused by the imposition of 
certain norms, values, and practices under the regime of governance and the grips of the fantasy 
of unity the regime promises. The elaboration of this point covers the exclusion/inclusion process 
involved in the constitution of the hegemony of governance discourse, the symptoms of its lack in 
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its several main manifestations, and how this regime addresses those symptoms by continuously 
reconfiguring the fantasy of unity to its subjects. 
Elaboration on these points leads to discussion on currently three strands of discourses on 
governance. The first one is the discourse that constitutes governance in a relatively much more 
positive way as the only possible game in town and how governance is synonymous with 
democracy, especially in its liberal interpretation. This is in-contrast to the second one that sees 
governance as just a façade of the emerging new forms of domination. Underneath the jargons 
such as participatory and inclusivity lurk more subtle forms of hierarchical relations manifested in 
the forms of technocratization and proceduralism in policy processes (Davies J. S., 2011). The 
third discourse shares the optimism of the first one. Yet it holds on to the presupposition that 
governance is neither democratic nor effective in itself (Torfing, Peters, Pierre, & Sorensen, 2012). 
This third discourse holds the assumption that whether governance is and will be positively or 
negatively correlated with democracy and policy effectiveness is contingent to its articulation 
(Torfing & Sorensen, 2012). 
The portrayal of empirical practice or regime of governance from the point of view of theory of 
agonism/agonistic-pluralism is rather different. It sees the practice or regime analysed as a field of 
discursivity whose meaning is constantly contested and, simultaneously, any certain logic that may 
hegemonize it on certain moment cannot totally and permanently close the contestation. Section 5 
of this chapter discusses this by juxtaposing this view and approach with review on similar studies 
carried out by Pia Backlund and Raine Mantysalo (Bäcklund & Mäntysalo, 2010) and Karen T. 
Frick (Frick, 2018).         
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2. Genealogy of Governance: Constant Tension among Irreducible Elements and 
Their Transformation into Agonistic Relations   
 
This section elaborates the constitution of ‘governance’ as an agonistic structure that transforms 
the antagonistic relations of its two core values or principles into agonistic ones. The elaboration 
here starts with brief genealogy of the discourse of governance and its ascendancy into its current 
hegemonic position. This brief genealogy here focuses on, first, how the constitution and 
ascendancy of the governance discourse as hegemony is marked by contradictions and 
antagonisms among elements that comprise it. At some points culminating in the form of crises 
which reveal its political character. Second, the structure is never fully fixed and complete and 
continuously faces the potential of its dissolution due to its structurality that inevitably entails 
exclusion and dislocation. This incompleteness manifests in the contradictory and conflicting core 
elements that comprise this discourse and continuously competing for the position of nodal point 
in the discourse. This ‘lack of center’ makes the meaning of ‘governance’ contingent and elusive 
for any definitive, commonly agreed definition. Paradoxically, it is also this contingent nature that 
becomes the condition of possibility of its constitution as a hegemony (Offe, 2009, p. 556). Third, 
by identifying this constant lack of center, it becomes possible to identify and then elaborate the 
fantasy that covers this lack and maintains the grip of this discourse upon its subject. The fact that 
despite various critiques that have been leveled against it and cases of its failures, the discourse of 
governance is still hegemonic both conceptually and practically. This indicates that there is a 
certain fantasmatic dimension that supports it. Clauss Offe aptly describes it when he states that 
governance discourse projects the fantasmatic unity between the governor and the governed (Offe, 
2009, p. 550), indicating it to serve the purpose of covering the ‘lack of center’ mentioned above.  
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The discussion here starts with identifying the most defining characteristic of governance. This 
initial phase is already tricky since this concept is elusive to any strict definition and, thus, what 
we have is a variety of definitions that are sometimes contradictory to each other. There is, 
however, a commonality among these definitions. All of them try to define governance in its 
contrast to ‘government’ (Offe, 2009, p. 551; Bevir, 2012, pp. 2-5). This is not a coincidence as 
the concept and practice of ‘governance’ emerges as a critical response and alternative to 
government (Pierre & Pieters, 2000, pp. 2-3; Bevir, 2012, pp. 4-5). More specifically, the main 
distinctive feature between governance and government here refers to the scope and mechanisms 
of governing process. The former refers to all governing processes which are not always 
consciously hierarchical as in the latter (Bevir, 2012, pp. 2-3). As a critical response to government, 
the discourse of governance offers an alternative to what is portrayed as ineffective, inefficient, 
paternalistic, centralized, hierarchical and a top-down mode of governing. The discourse of 
‘government’ had been enjoying a hegemonic position since the period following the end of the 
World War II up to the end of the Cold War in the late 80s and early 90s. Following that period, 
the discourse of governance has been taking its place as the hegemonic discourse. This rupture 
between what otherwise would have been the normal concept and practice of governing and the 
new one, is the point of departure of our elaboration in this section.  
Focusing on this rupture is important to guide the discussion here because the governance 
discourse did not start when the term started to emerge in a much broader circle. The wider use of 
the term ‘governance’ as we understand it today started in the early 1990s. The development of 
concepts and practices that comprise it, however, can be traced back to the 1960s and 1970s. 
During this period many parts of the globe experienced what can be called multifaceted crises. 
Amidst the raging Cold War, this period also saw various political, economic, social and 
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environmental crises which on their turns prompted the emergence of various movements ranging 
from nationalist to environmentalist ones. Thus, it is not a surprise that this period saw the 
multiplication of demands and identities following the broadening awareness of crises and 
movements that emerged as responses to those crises. These crises also highlight the limits of the 
then hegemonic logic of government and regime of practices it installs, characterized by the state’s 
central position and role as, in many countries, the respective regime became overwhelmed by 
these crises and multiplying demands and identities (Pierre & Pieters, 2000, pp. 52-67). 
The concepts and practices of governing in the period prior to the 1960s and 1970s were dominated 
by the logic that positioned the state, especially the central government, at the center of public life. 
The state occupies not only a central position but also a hegemonic position as it stands outside 
and above the other particular elements in the society. The Keynesian model of economy was a 
vital element in this discourse of government. This model positions the state as the main guarantor 
for balancing between wealth production and distribution and, thus, justifies its intervention into 
the market. This is supposedly conducted through centralized, rational, and objective policy 
processes, implemented by equally rational, objective, and professional bureaucracy, based on the 
Weberian model. These are the building blocks of the welfare-state model that was dominant 
across the globe, especially in Western Europe during the post-war period. 
This seemingly neat arrangement, however, started to find its limitations around the 1960s. Under 
the constantly looming threat of Cold War turning hot, the decade of the 1960s was marked with 
the financial crisis in the late 1960s and the 1970s; especially in the UK and US, exacerbated by 
the Oil Crisis (or Oil Boom for oil producing countries), indicated the symptoms of the growing 
scepticism and criticism toward the conventional mode of governing. The UK and US were 
specifically mentioned above, because some of the central elements of the governance discourse 
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gained its initial prominence as concepts and practices in the Anglo-American world, culminating 
in the Thatcherism and Reaganomics in the UK and US respectively in the 1980s. 
The structural limits of this regime of ‘government’ were also further disclosed by criticisms 
levelled towards ‘Modernity’. Post-modernism started to gain its grips on the public mind as more 
and more people echoed the doubts on the validity of the claims of human as ‘fully-rational-being’, 
‘the objectiveness of objective truth’, and many other values the modernity project aims to install 
in the society. The ‘government’ discourse owes its hegemony, partially, to its ability to associate 
and identify itself with ‘Modernity’. At that time, the ‘state’, perceived to be interchangeable with 
‘the government’, presented itself and was perceived by most of the public as the very 
manifestation of this ‘modernity’ project. The deconstruction of its ideological fantasmatic support 
served further to deconstruct its hegemony.  
It is noteworthy here that the studies on the genealogy of the governance discourse vary on their 
points of departure. Some studies set concepts and practices central to governance discourse, such 
as New Public Management (NPM), apart from ‘governance’ while some others put them as part 
and parcel of governance discourse (Klijn, 2012, p. 202). The distinction may be important for the 
sake of analysis for some of those studies, such as Klijn’s. However, here NPM and ‘governance’ 
are bracketed into one discourse as both share many common elements articulated in the logic of 
governance. This is for the sake of highlighting how the governance discourse is actually 
comprised of diverse, even sometimes conflicting, elements as its internal moments and it owes 
its hegemonic position to its capability to balance these contending elements. 
The diversity of the comprising elements of governance is also reflected by the absence of a 
commonly agreed definition of what governance is. Most people agree that governance, in contrast 
to government, is characterized by the structure of power relations that operate through 
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mechanisms other than command, control, obedience, and relies more on consent through much-
less hierarchical ways. Here governance is perceived to refer to both a specific kind of structure of 
power relations and process (Offe, 2009, p. 550). Sometimes, governance is also used as a 
superordinate broader category for all processes of governing (Bevir, 2012, p. 5), in which the 
conventional mode of governing of ‘government’ is considered merely as one of its sub-categories 
(Offe, 2009, p. 521). The important point here is that any definition of what governance is always 
refers to its contrast to what-it-is-not and, in this case, it is the ‘government’ in the conventional 
sense, either as in relations of contradiction or superordinate-subordinate.  
The discourse to roll-back the state’s broad role, seen to be the source of its ineffectiveness; 
inefficiency; and lack-of-freedom for the public, came under several different names such as 
public-choice-theory in the US (Klijn, 2012) and the conceptual framework developed by experts 
in the Institute for Economic Affairs headed by Friedrich A. Hayek in the UK. These criticisms 
mainly focus on the nature of the state’s intervention in broad aspects of socio-economic life which 
are perceived as a major impediment to the freedom of choice and economic growth. Later, these 
criticisms became inspiration for the public administration reforms in the US and UK that Ronald 
Reagan and Margaret Thatcher carried out respectively. They believed that market mechanism is 
the best instrument to address public matters. The economic crisis that characterized the late 60s 
and 70s eras further heightened the criticism toward the hegemony of government discourse, to 
which the state central owed its central and determining roles in public policy and services process. 
It was during this time that people such as Thatcher and Reagan started to question, not only the 
efficacy of the so-called ‘Post-War’ consensus, but also its sustainability. It was also during this 
time that people like Thatcher and Reagan and their supporters started to articulate the state-centric 
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mode of governance, central in the welfare-state regime at that time, as part, if not the cause, of 
the crises at that time.    
This is not the only criticism against the traditional state-centric mode of governing that stems 
from the tumultuous era of the 1960s and 1970s. Criticism also came from those who see the 
government carries their role as the guarantor of public welfare in heartless mechanistic way. This 
criticism is associated with various problems perceived to characterize this regime such as 
bureaucratization, irresponsiveness, and insensitivity to more profound social problems. This kind 
of criticism came around the 1960s. In the US especially, this strand of notion is usually known as 
‘New Public Administration’. Its focus is on putting humans at the center of public management. 
The social context of society that was rampant with discrimination, injustice, and other dislocations 
sets this strand apart from not only classical and neo-classical public administration but also public 
choice theory (Gruening, 2001, pp. 7-9). The element of this strand did not gain prominence as 
NPM had at some points. However, its elements would return and gave its color on the governance 
discourse such as in Tony Blair’s regime in the late 90s UK. This discourse gives prominence to 
the organizational capacity to enable its members to fully develop and maximize their potential. 
This would become part and parcel of the collaborative governance discourse such as adopted in 
the UK under Blair’s administration onward. 
The return on this element of wealth redistribution, though with modified meaning, as internal 
moment in the governance discourse are caused by multiple factors. First, it has been found that 
the market is just as fragmented as the state (Bevir, 2012; Bevir, 2007). The reliance on the market 
mechanism as the main instrument to tackle public issues poses the problem of uncertainty since 
it is prone to crisis and the presumed perfect market situation can never be fully reached. The 
market actors can never conduct the voluntary-exchange in, the presumed equal footage (Stone, 
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1997). Second, the broader paradigmatic shift from government to governance took place almost 
immediately after the end of Cold War that produces the liberal democracy discourse as the victor. 
This meant there was need to reconfigure and reconsolidate the dispersed elements previously 
attached to the two big opposing camps where each element had a different starting point. This 
partially explains why this particular discourse of governance is closely associated with the image 
of ‘Third Way’ in the sense of middle way, not only between the state and the market but among 
state, market, and society (Offe, 2009, p. 555). 
The elaboration above has demonstrated the wide variety of elements that comprise the concept of 
‘governance’, its elusiveness and, simultaneously, its fluidity and flexibility in different context. 
This elusiveness and fluidity stay up to this day as even in its most common understanding and 
usage. Its fluidity of meaning is still visible such as shown in its redefinition under Blair’s 
administration. This fluidity indicates the continuously changing configuration of governance as a 
symbolic order and how in every instance of configuration change it also involves a process of 
redefining its borders or limits (Offe, 2009; Sullivan, Williams, Marchington, & Knight, 2013).   
The dynamics in the discourse of governance so far seems to evolve around two opposing poles 
of internal moments in the discourse governance. Those two poles are effectiveness/efficiency in 
producing wealth and wealth redistribution and ‘social justice’. Interestingly, these two elements 
represented two antagonistic ideals that took the center stage of cold war in the preceding era. The 
articulation of governance, especially in its collaborative governance variant, rearticulate those 
elements into its internal moments that takes over not only their meanings but also the potential 
and actual tensions between them. The tensions between them still exist and most likely will stay 
but it has been transformed into agonistic relations. This partially explains the capacity of the 
governance discourse to hegemonize public affairs as a field of discursivity. There are, however, 
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other aspects that require further investigation and elaboration. First, there is a need to elaborate 
and deconstruct the claimed ‘non-hierarchical’ mode of relations among the involved parties. 
Some scholars, such as Jonathan Davies, have made critical elaboration on this topic by exposing 
the hierarchical mechanism that underpins the operation of this discourse, thus deconstructing its 
‘non-hierarchical’ and ‘consensus based’ claims (Davies J. S., 2011; 2013). The elaboration of its 
genealogy above also shows how this discourse achieves and sustains its hegemonic position not 
merely by accommodating broad diverse elements as its internal moments but also by 
simultaneously modifying their meanings, such as the meaning of social justice in the ‘New-
Labour’ discourse. This re-articulation that modifies meanings is political in nature as it involves 
the logic of equivalence/difference leading to dual process of inclusion/exclusion. 
Second, the elaboration above focuses mainly on the structural aspect of the governance discourse 
and its dynamics. Besides the structural aspect, there is a need to elaborate the aspect of the agency 
that simultaneously constitute governance as social reality. In this sense, there is a need to elaborate 
the fantasy that sustains the subject’s attachment to this discourse despite crises and failures that 
indicate its instability. Elaboration on this aspect is also crucial to supplement further explanation 
on the persistence of the discourse’s grips upon its proponents despite the fact that some scholars 
have deconstructed it and been critical toward its ‘non-hierarchical’ and ‘consensus-based’ claims. 
In this sense, elaboration on the structural aspect alone is not sufficient. 
The following section elaborates the agency aspect as the other side of this coin of governance 
discourse by focusing on the fantasy that, not only supporting this discourse as hegemony by 





3. Contestation and the Fantasy of Unity between the Governor and Governed 
 
Offe, interestingly, highlights and argues that the discourse of governance owes its hegemonic 
position exactly to its elusiveness to attempts to specify its meaning. He argues that in such 
position, it becomes an arena of contending interpretations. He makes his analysis on specific 
context of two contending interpretations of ‘what governance is’ to the roles of the state as 
designer and guarantor of social order, with substitution on one hand and extension on the other 
(Offe, 2009, p. 556). This has been taking place without cancelling out the specificity of 
‘governance’ constituted through the articulation of its differential relations to ‘government’. This 
is a further indication of how the discourse of governance is constituted and gains its legitimacy. 
It promises to be more participatory and inclusive to diverse social demands and identities in its 
process. Such claim has been heard long before in the 1970s when Thatcher made her claim that 
her proposal of market-based public management would address the people’s demand for freedom 
(of choice) better than the then dominant welfare-state regime. 
The interesting point to highlight is that in these articulations there is no specification of the 
substance of ‘what this freedom of choice is’. Neither are the substance of ‘what substitution is’ 
or ‘what extension is’. The absence of specific substance on those issues is replaced by proposal 
of framework for process, characterized by recognition and institutionalization of the centrality of 
difference and contestation. This was a very appealing proposal for those who lived in that 
particular time period, characterized by social and political upheavals, especially the younger 
generations. The social and political upheavals, exacerbated by the oil crisis in the 1970s up to the 
1980s, amplified and broadened the discontent and anxiety in many Western countries and 
overwhelmed the corresponding government, including the UK. The specificity in Thatcher’s 
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discourse is that her discourse advocates the beliefs that market mechanism is the most reliable 
framework for recognizing and institutionalizing the absence of a specific substance of what is 
known as ‘public goods’. 
The discourse she advocated harnesses the force of various new demands and identities which 
deconstruct the traditional and conventional power structures as well as the corresponding regimes 
of truth. It is noteworthy that though this period has been romanticized as ‘the period of rebellion’ 
against establishment, the latter is more associated with industrial capitalism; broader perspective 
will present a rather different picture. This ‘period of rebellion’ was not exclusive in Western 
countries that adopted a liberal model of democracy such as France, UK, or Germany. Rebellious 
moments also took place in communist bloc countries. Prague Spring in, then, Czechoslovakia and 
Cultural Revolution in China took place around the same period. In the latter case, the 
establishment manifested in the form of the Communist Party of China and its bureaucracy. 
Despite the dominant narrative portray that the revolution was directed against the reminiscence 
of feudalism, ‘capitalist roader’, and many other negative labels, a closer look will show that this 
movement was more motivated by the spirit of anti-establishment and anti-hierarchy. 
Unmistakably, the rise of the discourse of governance, Thatcherism included; in which 
‘decentering the state’ has been its central moment, also tapped into the force from this anti-
establishment sentiment. In its place, it proposed a market with values and practices such as 
competitive individualism, self-interest, and anti-statism – besides the traditional conservative 
values such as family, nation, duty, authority, traditionalism – as the alternative. Mouffe, following 
Stuart Hall, argues that Thatcherism owed its ascendancy into hegemonic position because it was 
able to articulate those elements under an equivalential chain as a response toward the raging crises 
of welfare-state at that time (Mouffe, 2018, p. 30). 
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The rolling back of the welfare-state, in the UK as well as in many other countries, manifested in 
the forms of the privatization, in various degree, of many public sectors. However, it turns out that 
this does not necessarily mean that the state is ‘withering away’. On the contrary, while the width 
of its authority may decrease, its depth, on the contrary, has considerably increased. The state and 
its government serve the role as market regulator and in order to carry this role it requires authority 
to regulate how the public conduct themselves as market actors. Normatively, the increase of state 
and government’s authority to regulate the conduct of the market actors is intended to ensure the 
presumed ‘ideal market situation’. However, different points of view present different pictures. It 
indicates the lack of the market structure as it requires its subjects to submit themselves to its rules 
and mechanisms. This submission cannot be guaranteed by the market alone, therefore there is a 
need for a state and government role as guarantor. It is not surprising that in some instances, this 
regime presents itself in its coercive face. 
The main point here is that Thatcherism is a logic in which the market is expected to provide the 
framework to deal with and address the proliferation of demands and identities. In dealing with 
these demands and identities, the logic of market is, presumably, able to regulate not only the 
diversity but also the potential and actual conflict among those demands and identities, as 
exemplified in the case of ‘Green Economy’. This regime is intended as a ‘middle way’ to reduce 
the tensions and reconcile the demands for ‘economic development’ on one hand and demands for 
‘ecological conservation’ on the other. The latter had been gaining stronger grips on the public as 
a discourse since the 1960s if not earlier. In the late 1970s and 1980s, it posed a serious challenge 
against the then dominant paradigm of economic development which was accused of producing 
wealth for the present generation through capricious consumption on nature and pushed it near to 
its limits of carrying capacity and, thus, compromising the rights of the future generations. This 
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ideological battle led to the emergence of the discourse of ‘Sustainable Development’ in the mid-
1980s that since then has been integrated as a crucial internal moment in the discourse of economic 
development at least normatively. 
Experience of many countries demonstrates that the presumption of an ‘ideal market situation’ did 
not materialize when economic liberalization was put into practice. It might work for some time 
to ease the tension on the state budget and stimulated the economy. However, the impacts of market 
mechanism soon appeared, such as the widening gap between the haves and have nots, 
transformation of the identity of citizen into market actor or consumer, and the apparent socio-
political inequality that inequality in the relations among market actors entails. Those negative 
impacts disclosed the limits of market logic in ensuring the provision and delivery of public 
services. This also happened in the UK, when Thatcher started to implement her economic 
liberalization program. However, despite the apparent negative impacts, most of the public still 
persisted on their reliance on the logic of market to address the issues of public service provision 
and delivery. The end of the Cold War further presented a situation whereby the public had no 
other choice. In the UK, this manifested in the persistence of Thatcherism as a hegemonic 
discourse, regardless of the fact that she had to step down as Prime Minister in 1990 and the 
Conservative Party had to concede power to the Labour Party in the 1997. As described by many 
scholars and observers, Tony Blair’s administration and his ‘New-Labour’ did not make any 
significant change to Thatcherism. In fact, it further intensifies the penetration of the logic of 
market in some public sectors, such as Higher Education. Thatcher herself acknowledged that 
Tony Blair’s ‘New-Labour’ is her biggest achievement (Mouffe, 2018, p. 32). 
The New-Labour under Tony Blair administration introduced what is known as ‘Third Way’, a 
form of politics beyond Left and Right. ‘Collaboration’ replaced ‘competition’ as the catchword. 
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Yet, the main difference with Thatcherism was the abandonment of some conservative elements 
in Thatcherism while retaining its neoliberal ones, thus further entrenching the hegemony of 
neoliberal discourse (Giddens, 1998, pp. 99-100). This regime establishes its hegemonic position 
by addressing the growing demands and identities that evolve and are based on the idea of 
autonomy leading to the development of a Post-Fordist network economy that the regime 
transforms into new forms of control. Through such strategy, this regime has been relatively able 
to co-opt and neutralize various demands and identities (Mouffe, 2018, pp. 33-34). 
It is governance as New-Labour defines and conceptualizes it that, to large extent, defines our 
understanding of ‘what governance is’ today. As mentioned above, it has been characterized by 
the use of ‘collaboration’ as its catchword. This regime prides itself for its initiative to ‘take the 
citizens involved in decision making process.’ This term of ‘collaboration’ is a response toward 
the problematization that this discourse formulates as ‘project politics’ and the ‘politics of 
presence’. The former refers to “how to engage citizens in helping solve particular or local policy 
problems” while the latter is “how to enable citizens to voice their interests, experiences and 
identities in the deliberative process” (Newman, Sullivan, Barnes, & Knops, 2004, pp. 204-205, 
italic from the original text). This problematization is derived from a broader framework of 
‘problem of representation’ which is perceived to be rooted in the domination of top-down, 
hierarchical, and bureaucratic approaches in policy process. These approaches obstruct genuine 
public democratic active participation in the policy process and contribute to make the democratic 
process focuses more on abstract problems and hardly touches public’s immediate concerns.  
Collaborative governance aims to solve these obstructions by transforming the relations in the 
governance process to be less-hierarchical, more inclusive, giving primacy to a bottom-up 
approach and, therefore, giving primacy to community involvement and empowerment (Blair, 
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1999; Giddens, 1998, pp. 79-89; 104-11). Anticipating the high likelihood that such a process will 
disclose discord and conflict among interests and demands, the ‘collaborative governance’ 
discourse proposes public deliberation as a mechanism to regulate them. Thus, it is not surprising 
that this regime is full of various public fora intended for consensus building through deliberation 
as well as what is known as ‘co-production’ of public goods among government agencies and the 
citizens themselves. The hierarchical structure is also replaced with networks that cut across the 
public, private, and voluntary sectors. 
While it acknowledges and, to some extent, institutionalizes discordance and antagonism, there 
has been criticism levelled toward this regime of collaborative governance. Mouffe especially, 
points out that this regime presents agonism without antagonism. This is because this regime is 
based on the very notion that the ‘we/they’ division is obsolete and, by placing neoliberal 
arrangement as the only viable alternative, it aims to reduce the occurring social, economic, and 
political problems as merely technical problems. Disruptions that emerge and disclose the 
ideological antagonism on which this regime constitutes are perceived merely as slight regressions 
that will eventually be solved once the parties involved adopt the liberal democracy and neoliberal 
arrangement wholeheartedly (Mouffe, 2018; see also Davies, 2013, pp. 22-23). 
Mouffe’s criticism is echoed by other scholars who pointed to different aspects of the limits of the 
collaborative governance. Newman et al. highlight how literature on collaborative governance has 
not addressed the issues of difference, conflict, and dissent which are central to the practice of 
collaborative governance (Newman, Sullivan, Barnes, & Knops, 2004, p. 221). In this research, 
the ‘collaborative governance’ regime discloses its limits when the engagements were 
encountering issues or problems that could be categorized as wicked problems due to various 
factors. These factors range from the unclear division of authority on the policy and policy sectors 
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in which the deliberation was taking place; the grouping of categorization of the social elements; 
to the paradigm and grammar that inform the deliberation process and its results. 
More ardent critiques come from scholars who highlight the coercive dimension of this regime of 
‘collaborative governance’. Jonathan Davies discloses the coercive dimension that is embedded in 
the practice and regime of ‘network governance’ (Davies J. S., 2013). ‘Networks’ becomes an 
alternative concept to ‘hierarchy’ to describe, delineate, as well as prescribe the structural relations 
of actors involved in the governance process. This form of relation is often described to be less 
hierarchical, putting the actors involved in relatively much more equal positions to each other, and, 
thus, more democratic. More than a merely neutral description, this image of relations that the 
regime of collaborative governance constitutes has also been an image that serves as prescription 
for others to follow. No less than global institutions such as the IMF and World Bank have adopted 
and endorsed it for countries around the globe to adopt. 
Davies’ critiques toward the dominant discourse of ‘network governance’ as part of the broader 
discourse of ‘collaborative governance’ provides crucial hints for the research presented here. 
Perceiving the discourse of ‘network governance’ as a hegemony, in the Gramscian sense it is 
characterized by continuous dialectics between consent and coercion, Davies aims to disclose the 
coercive dimension that is necessary in every hegemonic formation, yet it is obscured by the 
foregrounded concept of ‘network’. In this study, he points out that the coercive dimension comes 
to the fore when the ‘network governance’, as a regime, is unable to gain trust from its subjects 
and, thus, has to rely on its coercive means and apparatus (Davies J. S., 2013, p. 4; 8; 11; 13). The 
concept of trust here is crucial because it has imbrication to the concept of identification. Davies 
points out that this required trust, he uses the term: homophily, cannot be total and fixed. He 
presents examples of how network governance often works in situation where trust is low and, in 
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such situations, it relies on something else to maintain its cohesion: namely coercion. In the end, 
Davies concludes that coercion is ubiquitous and network governance cannot fully escape from it 
either (Davies J. S., 2013, p. 31).   
It is in the transformation of ‘network’ from merely description into prescription that the dimension 
of coercion comes to the fore. The emergence of governance was initially based on claims of its 
recognition of the growing diversity of demands and identities that characterize the late-capitalist 
society and the absence of any single objective concept of ‘social goods’. It is also based on this 
argument, the discourse of governance and its family come to hegemonize the sphere of public 
administration. However, once it becomes hegemonic, it also suddenly meets its limits as it can 
never fully hegemonize the field of discursivity. The so-called ‘openness to difference’ almost 
immediately cannot be merely a game of ‘pure difference’. ‘Governance’, even in its 
‘collaborative’ or ‘network’ forms, always requires rules and in defining these rules there are 
inevitably ‘decisions’ or ‘closures’, no matter how incomplete or transient it might be. In the 
current regime of collaborative or network governance, however, the way these differences are 
articulated and regulated has been fixated around the logic of market through various hegemonic 
strategies. One of these is the reduction of the subject into merely a ‘rational being’ that Mouffe 
and many other scholars heavily criticize. 
In this case, the logic of agonism is articulated merely as subordinate internal moment in the 
discourse of collaborative or network governance. While it has been recognized as the condition 
of possibility for the articulation of ‘collaborative governance’, the impossibility of its total 
solution is covered up by confining the possible alternative solutions within the logic of market 
and, part and parcel to this, rational deliberation. The configuration of the governance discourse 
has never been the same since its ascendancy into a hegemonic position in the late 1970s and early 
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1980s, it has been changing overtime since Thatcherism with its New Public Management 
underpinning to ‘Collaborative Governance’ and ‘Network Governance’ under New-Labour and 
the subsequent Tory administration. These changes, however, have been evolving around the logic 
of market and dictated from above as described by Davies as ‘passive revolution’ (Davies J. S., 
2013). These passive revolutions mark the crises that the governance regime faced and its attempt 
to maintain its hegemonic position. 
The fact that passive revolution has been working so far indicates the strength of the fantasmatic 
dimension that supports the regime. One central image of the subject of the governance regime, 
especially in collaborative governance, is the collaborating subject. Such subject projects the 
image of an actively engaging subject that pursues to make the governor and the governed 
congruent. As mentioned above, the constitution of the governance regime is partially based on 
critiques that the establishment under the welfare-state regime has not been able to represent the 
day-to-day interest and concerns of the public. The governance regime, with its non-hierarchical 
arrangement promises to ensure that the voice of the common public and their concerns are given 
priority by the government and the government will not make any decision without their consent. 
Such image, however, is never fully realized. Yet, such fantasy still has strong grips on the 
subjects, despite the crises that the regime has been facing. 
The term of ‘fully realized’ is used because, there are structural changes that partially fulfill the 
fantasy of the congruency between the governor and the governed. In the case of UK that has been 
emulated in many other countries, one of the main structural changes is the political devolution. 
Through this policy, the sub-national government acquires broader authorities to manage their own 
affairs. This policy plays a crucial role in maintaining the fantasmatic support of the governance 
regime as it enables local governments and, through the governance regime, local actors to manage 
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and make decisions on their own affairs. It is also noteworthy that this policy serves not only to 
strengthen the fantasy of congruency between the governor and the governed but also a fantasy 
inspired by nationalist imaginary, such as the case of devolution in regions such as Northern 
Ireland, Wales, and Scotland. Especially under the ‘New-Labour’, ‘devolution’ has been a central 
internal moment in the discourse of collaborative governance, alongside other moments such as 
community and participation. To some extent, the collaborative governance regime offers the 
fantasy of self-autonomy where devolution articulates and goes beyond administrative channels to 
reach directly to the community, referring to the fantasy of the congruency between the governor 
and the governed. 
While Davies’ discussion demonstrates coercion as a structural necessity for the continuation of a 
regime’s hegemony, in this case ‘governance’. It does not further elaborate how the fantasmatic 
dimension operates either to background or foreground the dimension of coercion. Davies 
elaborates the role of ‘trust’ in the constitution of ‘network governance’ as a hegemonic regime in 
dialectical relations with coercion. However, he focuses more on the ubiquity of coercion in any 
hegemonic formation or, in other words, the coercion as a structural necessity and does not 
elaborate further the role of trust in the foregrounding or backgrounding of the dimension of 
coercion. The discussion will return on this point in the next section. 
The point that this section aims to reiterate is that the logic of agonism is a crucial moment in the 
discourse of governance and becomes more important as it has transformed into ‘collaborative 
governance’. It owes its constitution as a hegemonic discourse due to its claim of recognition of 
the constitutive role of difference and conflict. Yet, once it was able to occupy the hegemonic 
position, it continuously attempts to foreclose the undecidability through the confines of consensus 
building through rational deliberation evolving around the logic of market. This foreclosure 
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manifests in various forms such as administrative domination, technocratism, to networks closure 
(Davies J. , 2012). This description and elaboration highlights that the logic of agonism does not 
exhaust governance as the field of discursivity but in conjunction with other logics simultaneously 
engages in a continuous game of hegemony whose stability is always contingent and transient.  
The empirical cases elaborated in Davies’ work shows that the dimension of coercion of the 
discourse of ‘networks’ is foregrounded when logic of agonism is subordinated to other logic(s). 
However, if coercion is ubiquitous, this dimension is equally inevitable if the logic of agonism 
occupies the position as nodal point that subordinates or excludes other logics. It is in this sense 
that it is possible and justifiable to use the case of ‘collaborative governance’ to disclose the 
ontological status of coercion. However, before elaborating the specific empirical case to illustrate 
this point, there is another issue that needs further discussion in this chapter that is the issue of 
trust that is related to the fantasmatic support of a certain regime that determines the transformation 
of ‘coercion’ as an ontological condition into subjective coercion. Davies’ work does not discuss 
this distinction because it does not discuss the topic of ‘trust’ from the lens of Lacanian ‘fantasy’. 
The next section discusses this topic. 
4. Mobilizing Obedience through Non-hierarchical Relations: Affect and Identification 
 
The previous section has elaborated how the term ‘governance’ has multiple meanings. It is 
constituted through the cross-cutting of various logics whose relations depend on their contingent 
articulations. When it is chased to the very end, the specific meaning of governance can only be 
found through the articulation of its differential relations to ‘government’. While this demonstrates 
‘the lack of essence’ of governance as social reality, it should not be perceived that this concept is 
ineffective in shaping the practice or regime that govern social reality. The fact that this regime is 
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still dominant despite the numerous criticisms and crises it has faced demonstrates its inertia. 
Davies’ work may have demonstrated the ubiquity of the dimension of coercion in the relations 
that this regime constitutes, but it does not further elaborate why, despite this coercive dimension, 
its subjects are still relatively attached to this regime. 
Davies does provide us with some hints when he mentions that “network governance theories focus 
disproportionately on the technologies of enrollment and consensus building” (Davies J. , 2012, p. 
2698). While in this work Davies focuses the foregrounding of the dimension of coercion in the 
form of administrative domination, which in itself has multiple modalities, this section aims to 
rearticulate Davies’ statement of the focus of the network governance theories on the technologies 
of enrollment and consensus building to focus on different aspects of this dimension of coercion 
where the subjects are complicit. This shift of focus is crucial here to address the puzzle of ‘Why 
is not all coercion problematized as coercion?” that follows from the statement on the ‘ubiquity of 
coercion’ and, more importantly, ‘the ontological status of coercion’. 
In doing so, it is necessary to add the fantasmatic dimension as an analytical category in the 
elaboration on the ‘collaborative governance’ regime. This is what Davies does not do in his works. 
Incorporating the fantasmatic dimension as an analytical category, the elaboration on the 
dimension of coercion can go further than merely elaborating what Davies describes as the 
‘administrative domination’ but also the situation that Bevir describes as “…, the process of 
governing need not be consciously undertaken by a hierarchically organized set of actors.” (Bevir, 
2012, pp. 2-3) 
Klaus Offe elaborates this ‘unconscious’ aspect of the governing process when he argues that 
successful policy implementation is more related to the cooperative action of individual citizens 
than corporate or representative bodies. Further, they respond much less to government’s 
164 
 
authoritative command or material incentives than to “political signals in the form of 
recommendations, information that has implications for behavior, programs with the purpose of 
consciousness creation, role models, alerts, disapproval, shaming, encouragement, appeals for 
prudent and responsible behavior, hints, moral campaigns and other “soft” forms of political 
communication between policy makers and citizens3” (Offe, 2009, p. 559). In this sense, Offe 
describes the political signals as similar to Althusser’s interpellation. This political signal 
addresses the individual as a subject of a certain collectively desirable pattern of conduct. Thus, 
besides acting the mode of governance through informal, voluntaristic, and network-like relations, 
the governance process also operates by activating the subject’s desire or cognitive and moral 
power in Offe’s term, as its resource to mobilize the subject’s cooperation and consent (Offe, 2009, 
pp. 559-560). 
Here it is possible to relate Offe’s ‘political signaling’ with Mouffe’s ‘ethico-political’. The 
‘ethico-political’ is the value or principle around which other signifiers are arranged in differential 
relations to produce meanings through articulation. The centrality of this value or principle is not 
given but is a result of hegemonic struggle, hence the term ‘ethico-political’ (Mouffe, 2000, pp. 
103-104). This implies that there are individuals who subject themselves to this structure (of 
signification) and identify themselves with the said value or principle. This identification is based 
on more than merely rational calculation but, most importantly, involves libidinal investment. It is 
this libidinal investment that the political signaling appeals to. The point of investment, the 
 
3 Interestingly, Javanese political philosophy the varieties of forms of command and the subject to whom the 
commands are addressed to are formulated in a maxim, “Semu bupati; esem mantri; dupak bujang or kuli”. It 
means the rulers should only demonstrate certain gesture to indicate their commands, government officials need 
only to smile, while the coolies need to be kicked on their backs to understand one.”  
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particular value or principle that serves as the nodal point, is overdetermined. Its installation as the 
nodal point happens at the expense of exclusion of other possible values or principles. 
In the case of collaborative governance, the value of “recognition of differences for better public 
service” becomes the nodal point for most of its subjects. This is often said in one breath and in 
doing so many tend to forget that the correlations between ‘recognition of difference’ and ‘more 
effective public service’ are neither given or determined by any objective law prior to their 
articulation and the resulted correlation through articulation is always contingent and transient. 
This leads to the tendency of overlooking or covering-up the potential and actual antagonism 
between the two. The over determination on this value as the nodal points appear when, first, it 
becomes visible that their constitution as nodal points implies exclusion of other possible values 
and principles. This is apparent in the case of the constitution of governance and its other related 
concepts such as ‘collaborative governance’ that its relatively more stable meaning can only be 
gained by contrasting it to what-it-is-not such as ‘government’.  
Second, the overdetermined nature also becomes visible during moments of the fixation of their 
meanings, implying the exclusion of other possible alternatives. Such a moment reveals what 
‘recognition of differences’ and ‘better public service’ exactly mean and can be interpreted in 
various different ways. Yet they become meaningful when the polysemy is stabilized or closed. 
The reliance on the ‘logic of market’ to address both values of ‘recognizing differences’ and ‘better 
public service’, that persists despite modification through the New-Labour’s collaborative 
governance is an example of such a moment of fixation. 
However, this is only possible to take place if the subject identifies themselves, not only rationally 
but also affectively, with those values and principles. As mentioned above, the constitution of 
‘governance’ as a hegemony was preceded by growing sentiments and demands of recognition of 
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differences that was contrasted to their repression under hierarchical regimes of ‘modern state’ and 
‘welfare state’. The ‘governance’ discourse harness these growing sentiments and demands and 
makes it possible to articulate them by providing the required signifiers; in this case ‘market 
mechanism’ and ‘deliberation’, which become the point of investment for its subjects. This 
explains the subject’s complicity or obedience despite the dimension of coercion that Davies 
describes. This may mean the subjects are unaware of the coercive dimension or, even if they are 
aware of it, the structure’s fantasmatic support operates to normalize it. 
The operation of power on this plane manifests in the form of inertia that is latent in nature, that is 
related to Luke’s third dimension of power (Lukes, 2005). The subordination of the logic of 
agonism by the logic of deliberation or ethics of the real by the ethics of harmony occurs and has 
been reproduced by the operation of power in this dimension. It provides the subjects not only with 
a means to cope with dislocations that the hegemonic structure causes but also displaces and 
positivizes it. The latter is especially common among those who assume the role as activist or 
ideolog where they find the encounters with obstructions as part of ‘struggle’. In such situations, 
the fantasmatic dimension produces not only obedience but active consent, in contrast to the 
passive one in the Gramscian sense. 
5. Governance and the Logic of Agonism 
 
Elaboration on these points lead to discussion on currently three strands of discourses on 
governance. The first one is the discourse that constitutes governance in a relatively much more 
positive way as the only possible game in town and how governance is synonymous with 
democracy, especially in its liberal interpretation. This is in-contrast to the second one that sees 
governance as just a façade of the emerging new forms of domination. Underneath the jargon such 
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as participatory and inclusiveness lurk more subtle forms of hierarchical relations which manifest 
in various forms such as technocratization, formal-proceduralism, and rationalism in policy 
processes (Davies J. S., 2011). The third discourse shares the optimism of the first one. Yet it holds 
on the presupposition that governance is neither democratic nor effective in itself (Torfing, Peters, 
Pierre, & Sorensen, 2012). This third discourse holds to the assumption that whether governance 
is and will be positively or negatively correlated with democracy and policy effectiveness depends 
on how it is articulated (Torfing & Sorensen, 2012). 
Thatcher’s NPM and Blair’s ‘Collaborative Governance’ represent the first strand. Those 
discourses constitute governance as hegemony by, not only associating but also, identifying 
governance with democracy itself. They further acquired legitimacy due to the end of the Cold 
War where the liberal democracy came out as the victor. As mentioned in many literatures, this 
moment gives the impression to many that ‘liberal democracy’ and associated mode of 
‘governance’ have become the only game in town. Many people on the left spectrum of politics 
perceive that they need to modify their positioning by moving toward and closer to what is known 
as ‘the center’ as happened with Tony Blair’s ‘New-Labour’. While to a certain extent Thatcherism 
and Collaborative Governance have been viewed positively, especially with regards to the 
inclusions of broader non-state elements in governing as well as the decision and policy making 
processes, there have been mounting criticisms, especially against its claim as the only legitimate 
representation of democratic values and principles. 
The elaboration in the previous section demonstrates how such critiques are launched by Newman 
et al. and Davies. Newman et al. describe that the collaborative governance’s ‘inclusiveness’ is not 
without limit. Davies further elaborates these limits, criticizing the hegemony of the concept of 
‘networks’ and its non or less-hierarchical claim, by disclosing the hierarchical and the dimension 
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of coercion that mark these limits of the collaborative governance. Both, implicitly or explicitly, 
echo critiques from other scholars who view ‘governance’ as merely a façade for the hegemony of 
the logic of market (Pierre & Pieters, 2000, p. 54). The government, as one of the subjects involved 
in the governance regime, also readily embraces it as it serves as the public face of spending cuts 
(Stokker, 1998, p. 39). In the view of these critics, the adoption of this governance framework by 
the governments in many countries is seen as the state-sponsored unburdening of the government 
from its public responsibility to deal with public matters (Davies & Pill, 2012). 
Yet, there is another strand that is also critical of the discourse or regime of ‘governance’. This 
kind of critique shares some of the views of the hegemony of the logic of market; technocratism; 
and the government’s covert aim to unburden itself of its responsibility to address public matters 
in the governance regime. They, however, retain the argument the democratic potentials of 
governance because there is no necessary links between ‘governance’ and ‘democracy’ and their 
relations are contingent to their articulations (Sorensen & Torfing, 2007, pp. 236-239; Torfing & 
Sorensen, 2012).  
The previous sections have elaborated how the practice and regime of governance is characterized 
by various logics, where the logic of agonism/agonistic pluralism is only one of them. In 
characterizing the practice and regime of governance it engages the other logics in continuous 
hegemonic game. The ability to win this game requires it to be able to manage the paradox of 
emptying itself from its particular meaning in order to be able to incorporate other logics as its 
internal moments on one hand and define its limits from what-is-not in order to constitute itself as 
an objective reality on the other. These two simultaneous processes imply that the constitution of 
hegemony of the logic of agonism necessitates subordination and exclusion. The elaboration above 
also demonstrates how the ‘forgetting of the origin’, referring to the sedimentation of a discourse 
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and the practices it installs that obscures its political origin, is determined by the identification of 
its subject. This identification hinges on the efficacy of the fantasy that supports it. 
The facts show that there are moments when the logic of agonism is subordinated to other logics. 
However, it is necessary to underline that in such moments this logic is not necessarily excluded 
from the rules and mechanism of this hegemonic game. Thus, it is necessary to reiterate here that 
if the hegemony of logics of market and technocratism are seen as the root problem of dislocations 
and antagonisms and the logic of agonism is presented as their alternative, it does not mean that 
once it replaces them all dislocations and antagonisms would be immediately and automatically 
solved. The articulation of the logic of agonism in such case is mainly intended to deconstruct the 
fixations, disclose their incompleteness and political origin, and precipitate the circuitous 
oscillating movements between fixation-deconstruction. It is the principle and practice that the 
logic of agonism seeks to install into the governance regime in order to make it more democratic. 
Of course, as any other logic, it requires the constitution of certain subjectivity, implying that the 
agents’ identification with the logic of agonism that involves not only rational calculation but also 
affective investment. Karen T. Frick describes the operation of governance regime and 
foregrounding its agonistic dimensions in three concrete cases of sustainable infrastructure in the 
US. She describes the operation of agonistic ethos as a situation where there is no permanent 
friends and permanent enemies (Frick, 2018, p. 12). 
Frick foreground that the operation of agonism/agonistic-pluralism as a logic is characterized by 
the emergence of such logic that highlights the political dimension of any decisions and the 
underpinning values or principles. It implies its emergence as a moment that will pass to reemerge 
in some other time. It is this portrayal of how certain practice or regime of governance becomes or 
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does not become agonistic that is taken in this dissertation. This is somehow different to Backlund 
and Mantysalo’s position (Bäcklund & Mäntysalo, 2010).  
Backlund and Mantysalo conducted a research on the application of four theoretical frameworks 
on governance, they assume to be sequentially further development of the previous one-agonism 
being one of them as the most recent one-, on urban governance regimes in five cities in Finland. 
In this research they conclude that “At the level of planning practice it might, then, merely provide 
a further source of institutional ambiguity by offering new ideas for shallow practical reforms that, 
without further consideration, are imposed on top of existing institutional structures” (Bäcklund & 
Mäntysalo, 2010, p. 348). They draw such conclusion since from the beginning they assume that 
the development and adoption of a new theory of governance will replace the old one and, thus, 
they see the coexistent of different theories and competition among theories becomes a source 
ambiguity in practice and widen the gap between theory and practice (Bäcklund & Mäntysalo, 
2010, pp. 333, 338, 348). 
Backlund and Mantysalo correctly describe the relations between the development of theories of 
governance and its empirical practices by saying, “The empirical study reveals that while each 
paradigm shift in theory purports to replace the former theory with a new one, in practice the new 
theory emerges as a new addition to the palette of coexisting theoretical sources, to be drawn upon 
as a source of guidance and inspiration in organizing participatory planning” (Bäcklund & 
Mäntysalo, 2010, p. 338). But instead of lamenting this situation, this research investigates further 
this competition among various logics or theories of governance, focusing on how when the logic 
of agonism comes to the fore to inform and characterize the investigated practice or regime of 
governance it always necessitates coercion alongside consent.     
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The point here is that it is justifiable and legitimate to take the case of ‘governance’ to highlight 
and foreground the logic of agonism that installs some aspects of the regime and to highlight its 
dimension of coercion. It has also been elaborated above the role of fantasmatic dimension that 
supports the ‘governance’ regime, either by covering or normalizing its dimension of coercion. 
While this chapter has demonstrated in a rather general manner how the logic of agonism partially 
characterizes the regime of governance and continuously engages with other logics in hegemonic 
game over it as a field of discursivity, the next two chapters aim to elaborate how the logic of 
agonism engages in this hegemonic game in more specific and concrete cases of the Community 




Chapter V. NORTH AYRSHIRE COMMUNITY PLANNING 
PARTNERSHIP-NACPP 
 
This chapter focuses its discussion on critically describing the case of the Community Planning 
Partnership (CPP) in North Ayrshire (NA), Scotland. This case is taken considering the fact that 
North Ayrshire has been one of the pioneers and recognized as best practices in terms of 
public/private working initiative in Scotland (APSE, 2018, p. 5; 14). This is despite that this area 
has been struggling socially and economically to overcome the multiple deprivations it faces. The 
elaboration covers description of the NA area and how they have been putting the collaborative or 
participatory governance into practice since late 1990s. 
The empirical data are taken and collected through policy document review, interview, and 
observation. The policy documents reviewed include the Scottish Parliament Act on Community 
Empowerment; Community Planning Partnership Reports; and third-party reviews. The interviews 
are conducted with five interviewees, comprised of two county government staffs, two community 
organizers, and one member of the locality partnership. From these interviews, one was conducted 
in May 2018 and four in July 2018. The observation was conducted earlier in March. The event 
observed was a meeting for the promotion of the concept of “Kind Society” and its potentials for 
application in NACPP scheme. 
1. Introduction: Collaborative Participatory Planning in North Ayrshire, Scotland 
 
The CPP regime is rooted in the idea of collaborative governance that revolves around the principle 
of community inclusion and empowerment for better public services. NA has been experimenting 
with multiple formulations of public/private partnership and participatory or collaborative 
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governance long before they arrived in the CPP framework. The CPP framework intends to drive 
the public/private partnership based on the public needs expressed and channelled through the 
CPP. This has become its model and has won NA the award mentioned above (APSE, 2018, p. 
14). 
The emergence of CPP and its ‘Collaborative Governance’ root is often articulated as an attempt 
to address the historical change marked by the cut of public spending and the need to devolve 
government’s authority on one hand and the demands for more active public engagement in 
dealing with public matters on the other (Services C. o., 2011, p. vi; ix). The former becomes a 
crucial issue to address as currently NA, as well as Scotland and the UK in general, has to address 
the impacts of the austerity measures, taken as a response toward the Euro crisis. It has often been 
depicted as burden sharing among the stakeholders across the public, private, and voluntary 
sectors. Differing and conflicting interests, needs, and demands are the first things that are likely 
to emerge in such situations, therefore the CPP aims to operate as a framework to harness the 
energy these engagements produced while regulating them to prevent their potential negative 
impacts. In doing so, CPP operates simultaneously with the Scottish Government’s framework that 
aims to align the projected Local Outcome with the National Outcome. The CPP has a broad role 
ranging from participating in the planning, delivery and oversight aspects of the Local Outcome 
plan as well as its alignment with the National Outcome plan. 
This discourse of CPP as the ‘middle way’ has been the dominant, even hegemonic, discourse. 
However, there have been critiques toward this discourse. Some of the most crucial critiques 
question and problematize the real aim of collaborative governance. The question is “Whether 
collaborative governance is a strategy of community empowerment or abandonment?” (Davies & 
Pill, 2012). This question can also be addressed to CPP. In this regard the community and its 
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engagement in governance becomes a floating signifier. The trajectory is uncertain because it 
could be articulated for more democratic governance or for further entrenching the neoliberal’s 
logic of market. 
As elaborated in the previous chapters, the uncertainty of this trajectory is inevitable and cannot 
be completely eradicated. Recognition and institutionalization of the necessity, ineradicability, 
and, more importantly, the constitutive role of this uncertainty are the marks of how the logic of 
agonism characterizes the CPP regime. However, it has also been elaborated that a practice or 
regime can never be fully hegemonized completely and permanently by any single logic. CPP is 
not an exception here. As briefly described above, as a regime CPP is also informed by other logics 
which are intended to stabilize the uncertainty, such as the Single Outcome-Local Outcome 
framework, the audit regime and many others. The uncertainty or the status of community 
engagement and collaborative governance as a floating signifier has been highlighted by Rachel 
Haydecker. She elaborates how collaborative governance and the Scottish devolution policy have 
been used to demonstrate the Scottish distinctiveness relative to Westminster, especially in sectors 
such as health, higher education, and local government. Yet, despite this actual divergence, 
Haydecker predicts that convergence is more likely to happen in the future, including and because 
of the UK-wide welfare scheme where Scotland is still part of and the potential pressure that may 
come from the broader UK public if  Westminster allows this divergence to persist (Haydecker, 
2010, pp. 3-4).  
The logic of agonism comes to the fore when public consultation and engagement are continuously 
institutionalized and conducted. Yet, it is always simultaneously checked by other logics that 
inform how the consultation and engagement are conducted and which ones are legitimate. The 
structure of the CPP is centered on these two paradoxical poles. Yet, this structural feature requires 
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fantasmatic support to maintain its cohesiveness. Therefore, interpellations are common in many 
public and policy documents related to this CPP, encouraging the public or ‘the community’, the 
commonly used term, to take an active role in the governance process through the CPP. 
In this view, the CPP is crucial because it becomes the arena where the community engagement 
and the structure that makes it possible as well as prevents it from becoming an objective reality 
meet. While community engagement in various documents and formal and informal conversations 
is almost always given the highest priority, ‘the needs to regulate’ the said community engagement 
always follows it, such as in the Commission on the Future Delivery of Public Services Report’s 
recommendation (Services C. o., 2011, p. ix). The structure, as rules, can never fully exhaust the 
practice. In addition, the stated objective cannot always be stated positively such as in the socio-
economic state of North Ayrshire that the CPP aims to improve. These two factors indicate the 
always present likelihood to challenge the structure or rules that govern the CPP as a regime. 
However, as elaborated in more detail later in this chapter, there have been no significant critiques 
or counter-discourse emerging toward this regime. Most of the critiques are rather partial, focusing 
on specific aspects of the regime.  
In order to critically elaborate this phenomenon, it is necessary to put it in its specific context. The 
persistence of the themes of pressure on state budget leading to budget cuts and devolution in the 
discourse of collaborative governance in Scotland indicates their importance (Services C. o., 2011, 
p. vii). Therefore, after a brief general overview of North Ayrshire, one section of this chapter 
focuses the discussion of the CPP against these two themes as its context. North Ayrshire’s long 
experience with various participatory or collaborative frameworks is briefly discussed. The next 
section’s main focus, however, is the CPP from around 2015 to 2019. 
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The elaboration on CPP discusses its structure, the dynamics that have taken place and some 
reports and comments on its efficacy. This elaboration includes the problematizations of CPP. 
Interviews with several senior officers and community organizers reveal two prominent 
problematizations of encouraging and maintaining public participation and encouraging and 
institutionalizing collaboration among the stakeholders. Review on literature and policy 
documents sheds further light on these issues, revealing that the most crucial aspect besides the 
formal structural arrangement is the eagerness to actively engage in the governance process from 
the stakeholders. The latter is determined more by affective dimension than the formal structural 
arrangement. They are correlated but irreducible one to another. The fourth section discusses this 
topic. 
The fifth section concludes this chapter by discussing and reiterating the findings for analysis in 
the next chapter. The identification of the findings is based on LCE’s the three units of explanation 
of social, political, and fantasmatic logics. One important finding is how the Commission on Future 
Delivery of Public Services Report or Christie’s Report has drawn the boundaries or limits 
presenting the constitution of a new logic in public service which CPP is a part of. It is also 
important to highlight the new set of regulations and practices that comprise a new regime and the 
new fantasy that supports it. As the new logic that this report has produced heavily characterized 
the CPP regime in North Ayrshire, it is important to see how its fantasmatic dimension works to 
address the structural and subjective lacks that comes to the fore over time and in various moments. 
Such structural lacks come to the fore when the efficacy of CPP turns out to be not as expected, 
for example in the 2018 North Ayrshire Economic Review (Institute, 2018) and 2019 Inspection 
on Healthcare (Inspectorate & Scotland, 2019) for adults in North Ayrshire or when the public are 
reluctant to actively engage in the CPP fora.   
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1. Overview of North Ayrshire 
 
Before proceeding with description and elaboration of CPP in North Ayrshire, this section provides 
a brief overview of the geographical, economical, and socio-political aspects of this region. North 
Ayrshire is one out of 32 council areas in Scotland. It is located in the Southwest part of Scotland. 
It borders with Inverclyde, East Ayrshire, and South Ayrshire to its North, East and South 
respectively. The North Ayrshire council area is comprised of 6 localities of Arran, Garnock 
Valley, Irvine, Kilwinning, North Coast, and Three Towns. Irvine is the administrative center of 
this Council Area. Arran or the Isle of Arran is an island that comprises of more than 50% of North 
Ayrshire territory but inhabited by around 4% of its total population.  
Demographically, based on the 2017 estimation, North Ayrshire is estimated to have around 
135,800 population. Based on the 2016 estimation, Arran has 4,562 population; Garnock Valley: 
20,128; Irvine: 39,517; Kilwinning: 16,181; North Coast: 22,827; Three Towns: 32,915. The Joint 
Inspection (Adults) report in 2016 states that out of this population, there are 85,535 working age 
population (16-64 years) or 60.5% of the total population. Among the 39.5% of the population out 
of working age, 17.2% were children and young people (0 – 15 years) and 22.3% older people 
(65+). (Inspectorate & Scotland, 2019, p. 5). This report also describes the negative trend of 
population growth in North Ayrshire and anticipates the emergence of ‘greying population’ 
Currently North Ayrshire engages in a broad program of regional regeneration after the decline of 
its industrial sector that started in around 1980s.  Up to 2019, North Ayrshire, alongside with 
Ayrshire in general, are still struggling with the regeneration program. This is due to the relatively 
smaller share of the finance, communication, and professional sectors in comparison with the rest 
of Scotland. This has been mentioned as a factor of the differential economic growth (in terms of 
178 
 
GVA) between North Ayrshire and the rest of Scotland, where North Ayrshire along with the rest 
of Ayrshire are below the Scottish average (Institute, 2018, p. 8). Another factor is the relatively 
high unemployment rate in North Ayrshire that reached 6.4% in 2017/2018. While this is more 
than half of its highest peak of 14% in 2012/2013, it is still higher than the Scottish average of 4% 
(Institute, 2018, p. 10).  
Currently, the socio-economic situation in North Ayrshire is challenging. It has been described as 
a place of ‘sharp inequalities’ (Inspectorate & Scotland, 2019, p. 6). The 2016 dataset of the 
Scottish Index of Multiple Deprivation (SIMD) shows concentrations of some of the 5% most 
deprived of Scottish population in towns such as Kilwinning, Irvine, Adrossan, Saltcoats, and 
Stevenston (Government, 2019). The economic review of this area in November reveals that North 
Ayrshire is the 5th most deprived area in Scotland and is also facing the problem of child poverty 
where it is ranked the 2nd worst 
(Institute, 2018, p. 2). 
The North Ayrshire Council is a hung 
council. There are 11 Labour 
councillors, 11 SNP, 7 Conservative, 
and 4 Independent councillors. Since 4 
May 2017 the government is run by a 
Labour Party minority government. 
In terms of public finance, there have 
been relatively huge cuts in public 
spending. In some sectors, such as 
healthcare, the demands and needs exceed the available budget (Inspectorate & Scotland, 2019). 
Figure 1. Map of North Ayrshire 
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This is partially caused by the ‘ageing community’ process that has been taking place in North 
Ayrshire that leads to the increase in demands for healthcare service. 
      
2. CPP in the Context of Scottish Devolution and the Paradigm Shift in the UK 
 
The emergence of CPP in North Ayrshire is part of the Scotland wide policy to devolve power 
beyond the local authority down to the community. The intention is to ensure that the community 
receives public services based on their needs through their active engagement in the governance 
process (Parliament, 2015). This measure is also expected to make the public sector more efficient 
as the service delivered would be better-targeted and based on the consent of the recipients. 
Achieving efficiency while enhancing the quality of the services have been stated as something 
paradoxical yet managing this paradox is exactly the desired goals of the public service reform in 
Scotland. This has been stated in the Christie’s report (Services C. o., 2011), which serves as the 
major reference in the formulation of the public service reform in Scotland since then. This report 
mentions the new situation of cuts in public spending, due to austerity measures under the impetus 
of the European financial crisis in 2008, yet this also occurs simultaneously with growing demand 
from the public that the local government has to address. This kind of challenging situation is often 
described as “to do more with less”. In order to cope with this new situation, there has to be a 
change in how the public sector deals with public matters (Services C. o., 2011, pp. viii-x). 
The Scottish Government has decided to take ‘community planning partnership’ to address the 
said paradoxical situations. The Scottish Parliament decreed the Community Empowerment 
(Scotland) Act in 2015. The main aim of this Act is to enhance the performance of its public 
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services through broader involvement of the community. This act requires the Scottish Ministers 
to determine National Outcomes which in turn inform the local outcomes and the local planning 
to achieve them (Parliament, 2015: Part 1 section 1 subsection 1; Part 2 section 4 subsection 1 and 
4). The set ‘outcomes’, both national and local, serve as guidance as well as a benchmark to ensure 
the positive performance of the public services. This Act gives emphasis to the local level and 
local authority because  the Act explicitly states: “The purpose is improvement in the achievement 
of outcomes resulting from, or contributed to by, the provision of services delivered by or on behalf 
of the local authority or the persons listed in schedule 1” (Parliament, 2015, p. Part 2 section 4 
subsection 2). Parallel provision is not found on the part on ‘National Outcomes’. 
This Act requires the local authority to carry this role through community planning and for that 
purpose it requires the local authority to establish ‘community planning partnership’ (Parliament, 
2015: Part 2 section 4 subsection 5). The Act also further requires the local authority, in carrying 
the community planning, to divide its area into smaller areas that are known as localities. The 
localities engage in the community planning through their respective locality partnership 
(Parliament, 2015, p. Part 2 section 9 subsection 1 and 2). This Act also provides that the 
community planning partnership must prepare locality plans in relations to the respective local 
outcomes. 
This Act does not specify the substance of the ‘outcomes’, both at national and local levels. It does 
not specify the general strategic sectors upon which the local outcomes should prioritize. In 
general, this Act focuses on how, and not what, the ‘outcomes’ should be determined and achieved. 
It does provide the National Outcomes as general reference and how they are determined but it 
does not specify what the National Outcomes are. In this framework, the local authority, through 
community planning, seems to have broad autonomy in determining their local outcomes and the 
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strategic sectors. The Act in general only provides that the local outcomes have to be in line with 
the National outcomes and should be periodically reviewed and amended when necessary. 
The Act provides that the Community Planning Partnership is comprised of the local authorities 
and the persons listed in Schedule 1 of the Act. In this framework, each of them is referred to as 
Community Planning Partner (Parliament, 2015, p. Part 2 section 4 subsection 5).4 The CPP then 
determines the community bodies that are likely to contribute in the community planning 
especially considering those that represent those who experience inequalities of outcome due to 
 
4 Following is the list of the persons in Scheduled 1 of The Community Empowerment (Scotland) Act of 
2015: 
 The board of management of a regional college designated by order under section 7A of 
 the Further and Higher Education (Scotland) Act 2005 which is situated in the area of the local 
authority (remove the bullet point from this line – not required) 
 The chief constable of the Police Service of Scotland 
 The Health Board constituted under section 2(1)(a) of the National Health Service  
 (Scotland) Act 1978 whose area includes, or is the same as, the area of the local authority  (remove 
the bullet point from this line – not required)  
 Highlands and Islands Enterprise where the area within which, or in relation to which, it exercises 
functions in accordance with section 21(1) of the Enterprise and New Towns (Scotland) Act 1990 
includes the whole or part of the area of the local authority  
 Historic Environment Scotland 
 Any integration joint board established by virtue of section 9 of the Public Bodies (Joint Working) 
(Scotland) Act 2014 to which functions of the local authority and the Health Board are delegated  
 A National Park authority, established by virtue of a designation order under section 6 of the 
National Parks (Scotland) Act 2000, for a Park whose area includes the whole or part of the area of 
the local authority  
 A regional strategic body specified in schedule 2A of the Further and Higher Education 
 (Scotland) Act 2005 which is situated in the area of the local authority  (remove the bullet point from 
this line – not required) 
 Scottish Enterprise 
 The Scottish Environment Protection Agency 
 The Scottish Fire and Rescue Service 
 Scottish Natural Heritage 
 The Scottish Sports Council 
 The Skills Development Scotland Co. Limited 
 A regional Transport Partnership established by virtue of section 1(1)(b) of the Transport (Scotland) 
Act 2005 whose region includes, or is the same as, the area of the local authority 
 Visit Scotland 
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social disadvantage. The reduction of the latter is specifically provided in the Act as the main 
governing principle for the community planning (Parliament, 2015, p. Part 2 Section 5). 
The locality partnership is the further breakdown of this framework, intended to deepen the reach 
of the collaborative process. It is through the division of the local authority area into smaller areas 
the CPP makes comparisons among the areas to determine the strategic sectors. The comparison 
is framed based on identification of those who experience significant inequalities of outcomes 
relative to other persons who live in other areas within the area of the local authority and other 
persons who live in Scotland (Parliament, 2015, p. Part 2 section 9 subsection 3).  
In North Ayrshire, at the locality level there are locality partnerships. The locality partnerships 
serve the main purpose, in general, to “develop, review, and implement the priorities of the 
Locality Plan for its area …” This includes to collaboratively develop the locality plan in 
conjunction with the Single Outcome Agreement and the plans of the Community Planning 
Partners, monitor and review the progress of the Locality Plan, as well as to engage in the effort 
to influence and improve the delivery of public services to align with the locality plan (Council, 
n.a., pp. 5-6). With such function, the CPP draws its members from a broad array of backgrounds. 
Its membership is comprised of the council members who represent locality and other 
representatives of partner organizations, chairs of community councils or representatives of 
properly constituted community organizations (Council, n.a., p. 2). 
According to the NACPP Terms of Reference (TOR), the membership of the locality partnerships 
comprises:  
 all North Ayrshire Council Members who represent the locality; 
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 a Senior Lead Officer appointed by the North Ayrshire Community Planning Partnership, 
who will act as chief advisor to the Locality Partnership 
 An officer representative from each of the following Community Planning Partnership 
organisations, namely: 
o North Ayrshire Council 
o Health and Social Care Partnership 
o Police Scotland 
o Scottish Fire and Rescue  
o Third Sector Interface 
 An officer representative from each of the following Community Planning Partnership 
organisations; expected to attend where relevant to their work or expertise: 
o Scottish Enterprise 
o Skills Development Scotland 
o Strathclyde Partnership for Transport 
o Job Center Plus 
o Scottish Government 
o Irvine Bay Regeneration Company 
o Third Sector Interface 
o Ayrshire College 
o KA Leisure 
 The Chair of Community Council within the locality (Council, n.a.) 
The TOR also provide that the number of the community representatives in the Locality 
Partnerships are equal to the number of the elected member of North Ayrshire representing the 
184 
 
locality. They are appointed by the Locality Partnership, where prior to the appointment there is 
public process to invite expressions of interest for such membership. The TOR also state that all 
reasonable endeavours should be made in this process to ensure that such community 
representations include, at least, one young representative. 
  
The North Ayrshire Community Planning Partnership (NACPP) is comprised of various elements 
ranging from locality partnerships, the strategic management team, community planning board, 
and ‘Fair for All’ advisory panel (see Figure 2).  
Figure 2. Diagram of North Ayrshire Community Planning Partnership-NACPP Structure 
Source: http://www.northayrshire.community/ accessed 16 July 2019 
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In the Scottish context, the discourse of the public service reform has often been articulated as part 
and parcel of devolution. The discourse of Scottish devolution received relatively broader support 
among the public as it was articulated as an indispensable condition for the public service reform, 
in the sense that the need to make the state less-bulky and more efficient by devolving the political 
power and decentering the administrative power to the sub-national authorities. Scottish 
devolution as an ongoing process has been marked by continuous attempt to devolve and 
deconcentrate power to the local level (Lloyd & Peel, 2006). This tendency also appears in the 
design of the CPP in the Act and even stronger in the NACPP framework. As mentioned above, 
the former gives primacy to the local level as it becomes the nerve-center of the overall CPP 
framework. The NACPP implement this Act and further devolve the power to the locality level on 
the assumption that the closer the decision-making process the better the participation quality and, 
thus, the decision made. 
As part of the broader discourse of devolution, the design of the CPP framework can be seen to be 
heavily influenced by the notion of Third Way which emerged and further transformed about the 
same period of the initiation of the Scottish Devolution. This notion of Third Way heavily 
influenced the Tony Blair administration, especially on the public sector, reflected in his 
administration’s white paper on Modernising Government (1999). In this paper, the concept of 
modernizing government refers to the introduction of corporate management logics and practices 
into the public sector, partnership with private agencies in the public service provision and 
delivery, and the inclusion of the public as service users in the policy process to give them better 
options on what kind, to what quality, and access to public services. This paper also argues that 
devolution is a vital part of achieving those goals (Blair, 1999, pp. 11-12). The term ‘devolution’ 
here refers not only to the devolution of power from London to Edinburgh by the establishment of 
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Scottish Parliament or even town halls, but further down to local areas (Lloyd & Peel, 2006, p. 
836). This is based on the argument that further devolution is inseparable in modernizing the state 
as it will maximize the front line in serving the needs of the communities (Minister, 2004, p. 13). 
Allan Campbell traced the development of the concept of Community Planning in the Scotland 
context. He shows that in 1998, around the moment of the initiation of Tony Blair’s administration 
and the power devolution in Scotland, Scottish Office (abolished soon and replaced by the Scottish 
parliament the next year) and COSLA published Scottish Office/COSLA Community Planning 
Working Group’s Report and followed with the setting of five Pathfinder Community Planning 
projects, where the pathfinders were asked to formulate community plans and to discuss the 
experience and lessons they drew (Campbell, 2015, p. 2).  
Looking on those official papers and policies may give us the impression that CPP as the 
manifestation of collaborative governance comes into being as a linear continuation of the 
devolution policy in Scotland in the late 1990s. However, deeper elaboration may demonstrate that 
its development is not as linear as it seems to be. Neill McGarvey elaborates how the ‘central-local 
relations’ is a dynamic issue in Scotland and how the devolution in 1997 did not always lead to 
further devolution to local authorities as some expected it to be. For example the Scottish Executive 
from 1999-2007 was perceived to be centralistic. Central-local tensions also manifest in various 
forms of “guidelines, targets, audits, regulations and the like coming from the Scottish Executive.” 
(McGarvey, 2012, p. 160). Kim McKee’s study on more specific policy sector of public housing 
in Glasgow during the same era also shows a similar tone of central-local tension (McKee, 2008). 
The current configuration of the Scottish ‘central-local’ relations is partly due to political 
agreement between the Scottish National Party (SNP) and the Convention of Scottish Local 
Authorities (COSLA) (McGarvey, 2012). In this agreement the SNP promises to devolve more 
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power to the local authorities in return for political support for the implementation of its priority 
agenda across the Scottish local authorities (McGarvey, 2012). 
In relation to the paradigm shift from ‘government to governance’ that preceded the program of 
‘Modernising the State’ under Blair’s administration, McGarvey also argues that the ‘central-local’ 
issue in Scotland also evolved around it. He argues that the discourse of Scottish Devolution was 
aimed to counter the dismantling of the welfare-state carried under this paradigm shift of governing 
initiated by Margaret Thatcher in the late 1970s (McGarvey, 2012, p. 158). The discourse of 
political devolution that goes down to the local authorities was part of this broad counter discourse 
against the agenda of the dismantling of welfare-state imposed from London (McGarvey, 2012, p. 
161). 
It is in such context of continuous tensions around the issues of central-local relations; both 
between UK-Scotland and between Edinburgh-local authorities, and efficiency vs. participatory 
objectives the CPP comes into being. It is noteworthy that these processes of devolution and 
transformation of governing logic are continuous ones. In the case of power devolution, the 
Scotland Act 1998 has been amended twice through the Scotland Act 2012 and Scotland Act 2016 
where more power is devolved to Scottish Parliament. The latter secures the permanence of power 
devolution to Scotland.  
In the case of transformation of governing logic, in 2015, the community participation is formally 
provided and regulated through the Community Empowerment (Scotland) Act 2015. This act 
further secures the role of the community in the policy process and provides the statutory basis for 
CPP. This does not mean that before the promulgation of this act there was no arrangement to 
include the community in the policy process. Before 2015, it has the statutory basis from the Local 
Government in Scotland Act 2003. As pointed out in McKee’s work, such arrangement has already 
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been in place before 2015 in the sector of public housing (McKee, 2008). Also, North Ayrshire 
Council Area developed the CPP before 2015. In 2013, the CPP in this area  formulated a document 
“Single Outcome Agreement” that maps out the intended outcomes, indicators, and challenges that 
they want to achieve through the CPP, based on the guidelines provided by the Scottish 
Government and COSLA in 2012 (CPP, 2013). The Community Empowerment Act 2015 
specifically gives statutory purpose (Parliament, 2015, Part 2, Section 5). 
The further devolution to the community that takes place in Scotland is sometimes dubbed as 
‘double devolution’ (Mulgan & Fran Burry, 2006). The term ‘double’ here refers to two kinds of 
devolution that takes place simultaneously, namely, devolution from the national to sub-national 
governments and devolution from the state to civil society. This is apparent in the NACPP 
framework, because besides the emphasis on the local authority as mandated by the Act, the 
NACPP framework adds another emphasis on devolution to the community level through the 
locality partnership. 
The focus on the locality here is intended to enhance the efficacy and efficiency of the resource 
allocated on public services. The framework is designed to give priority to areas with significant 
deprivation, identified through the SIMD. Further, referring to the Christie Commission’s report, 
the community engagement is intended not only to identify what public services they need and 
want firsthand but also to encourage further engagement in co-production or co-creation of those 
public services (Sutton, 2017). In the end, it is expected that the communities are able to run these 
services by themselves and the government resources can be allocated to other areas (CH, 2018). 
NACPP comes with bold initiatives with regards to the issue of inequality by adopting the Fair for 
All Strategy as an overarching strategy for its partnership projects. Not many CPPs have adopted 
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such strategy (EY, 2018; Partnership, 2016). Structurally, a Fair for All Advisory Board has been 
installed in the overall NACPP framework (see Figure 2). 
3. Encouraging Collaboration and Participation: the Challenge of Mobilizing the 
Communal Sense 
 
The NACPP demonstrates many innovations in pursuing the goals of reforming public services 
through collaborative governance. Those efforts have not gone unnoticed. The multiple awards 
North Ayrshire Council (NAC) has won; ranging from creating economic growth and employment, 
waste management, efficiency in service delivery, environmental services (APSE, 2017), to Best 
Public/Private Working Initiative in Scotland (APSE, 2018); are some of the recognition it earns 
for its endeavours on participatory planning. This, however, does not mean that the NACPP 
framework is not without its shortcomings or defects. Besides the more apparent shortcomings 
such as structural deficiency; the problem of coordination; and other problems commonly 
recurring in public policy and the governance process, there is also a persistent challenge with 
regards to raising the communal sense. The latter becomes central because it is one of the main 
factors that maintains the cohesiveness of the community and its members’ willingness to 
collaborate as a community. 
The CPP framework both as provided in the Community Empowerment (Scotland) Act 2015 and 
the NACPP framework tend to be perceived from the paradigm that gives primacy to consensus. 
However, further investigation through interviews as well as literature and policy documents 
review reveal that this consensus, as a complete and fixed totality, is absent. The absence of the 
consensus manifests in various forms. One of its persistent manifestations, as it has been recurring 
in the interviews as well as literature and document reviews, is the perceived lack of communal 
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sense among the communities. This ‘lack of communal sense’ is not uniform either among the 
communities in North Ayrshire. One officer told us that ‘communal sense’ is stronger in places 
such as small islands within the North Ayrshire Council’s area. On the contrary, it is more 
fragmented in bigger island such as in Arran (CH, 2018). The same interviewee also expressed his 
belief that not even all of the councillors agree with the three priorities of the NACPP. Another 
interviewee also acknowledges that this ‘lack of communal sense’ also manifests in the relations 
between the community representatives and the community they are supposed to represent. The 
situation was even worse in some areas that had a bad experience with ‘community council’ in the 
past. (SM, 2018). 
Our interviewees  roles are related to liaising among the stakeholders, especially between the 
partners and the communities as well as among them; they express that the challenge of getting 
the community together is more challenging than ensuring the alignment of the locality plan with 
the local and national outcomes (SM, 2018). To a certain extent, the interviewee mentioned that 
these parameters facilitate the coordination and mobilization of the communities and their diverse 
needs and demands. While they are addressing the challenge to raise the ‘communal sense’ at the 
community level and across communities within the locality, all of the interviewees are aware that 
they also need to address the challenge to rise the ‘communal sense’ across ‘North Ayrshire’ area. 
In the interview, one of the interviewees mentioned that this has been carried out by projecting the 
communal view outward in order to raise the sense of interdependency among the communities 
within the locality and across the localities across North Ayrshire.   
In order to address the potential and actual impacts of disagreement with regards to the priorities, 
one of the interviewees refers to the formally adopted ‘evidence based’ approach (Sutton, 2017, p. 
10) to identify, determine, and justify the decided priorities to neutralize the disagreements. Tools 
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such as the SMID provide the ‘objective’ evidence that such approach requires. The interviewee, 
however, acknowledges that such ‘objective’ justification is still contingent to the policy 
performance and the potential backlash if the policies taken do not perform as expected (CH, 
2018). 
As mentioned above, another strategy to address the fragmentations among the stakeholders is by 
recognizing the potential and actual differences and the potential and actual impacts they entail. 
Such strategy is deployed simultaneously with conditioning the stakeholders to identify 
themselves with the partnership project and consider themselves as well as other community 
planning partners and locality partners as commonly belonging to the same place. One of the 
interviewees reiterated this in the sentence of “We are working together” intended to “make 
change” (SM, 2018). CPP has been articulated as ‘place making’ through ‘space opening’ for the 
broader public (Sutton, 2017). This articulation refers to the attempts to make public services to 
be the place for the broader public to engage with preceded with opening it as a space which 
previously the public had limited access to. ‘Working together’, These sentences of ‘Make 
change’, ‘Place making’, ‘Space Opening’ do not have any given specific meaning of their own, 
the practice in the field, the interviewee mentioned to us, means that they have to be creative to 
articulate the specific demands of the communities with the set locality plans. The position of such 
locality partnership coordinators is exactly located in the middle between ‘the policy demands’ 
and ‘the community demands’ and it is their assigned function to bridge them. 
However, the attempts to combine these two goals of partnership and community involvement 
through the framework of collaborative-governance, is not as smooth as it may seem. A glance at 
the continuous attempts prior to the enactment of the statutory basis for CPP through the 
Community Empowerment Act 2015 show ruptures and antinomies that CPP, as well as any 
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collaborative arrangement, has to tackle. The report of the Pathfinder Project for Community 
Planning by COSLA in the late 1990s comes with conclusions that the ambition to combine these 
two ideals of partnership and community involvement lead to several paradoxes that such a 
framework has to tackle. This study lists these following tensions and irreducibility between the 
ideals of ‘partnership’ and ‘community involvement’: 
 The tension between visioning and strategic thinking and then making the vision an 
operational reality 
 The tension between a focus on partnership and a focus on community involvement. 
 The tension between an emphasis on partnership, and especially the development of a 
strategic partnership process, and the emphasis on the development of a council’s role as a 
community leader.  
 The tension between providing leadership for partners and leadership for the 
community.  
 The tension between a focus on process and strategy and on outcome and action. 
(COSLA, 1999, p. 8) 
This report also mentions the emergence of shared visions and leadership as central concepts, 
especially to deal with those paradoxes. Shared vision and leadership later would be adopted and 
formalized as part of the official framework as the Single Outcome Agreement (SOA) that served 
as the common reference for the stakeholders involved in the CPP to orient their engagement in 
policy process. In the Community Empowerment Act 2015 a similar concept also appears under 
the heading of Local Outcomes, through which the policy process at the local level is calibrated 
with one at the national level manifests in the National Outcome. The centrality of shared vision 
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and leadership in this report becomes one distinctive feature of collaborative governance that gives 
the primacy on consensus among the involved parties, in contrast with adversarial and managerial 
models (Ansell & Gash, 2011). 
In these endeavors the managers and coordinators recourse to a strategy of reaching into the 
public’s affective dimension. The managers and coordinators whom we met during the interviews 
often demonstrated optimism, despite the challenges they were facing in conducting the CPP and 
Locality Partnership. They seemed to have strong beliefs that they work differently with any other 
previous or current collaborative engagement in other areas and what they are doing will lead to 
positive results. This strong belief seems to be based on the conviction that ‘it is up to them to 
determine whether there will be change or not’. Since ‘the space’ is now open for them to make 
their voice heard and actively engage in the public services sectors where they expect to make 
change, they have the chance that they have been waiting for. It is this sort of optimism and 
conviction that the managers, coordinators, and other committed agents aim to propagate among 
the broader public. 
During the field work from February to July 2018, there was initiative to insert the concept of 
‘kindness’ into the NACPP framework. The NACPP was collaborating with the Carnegie UK 
Trust from January to March 2018 on this initiative. This initiative aims “to encourage kindness 
in organisations and communities, to improve wellbeing and support empowerment as part of our 
Fair for All strategy.  The partnership aims to work across public, private and third sectors and 
with individuals and communities to actively apply the learning from the first phase of the Trust’s 
kindness project within the context of existing collaborations to tackle poverty and create equity” 
(Partnership, 2018). Two interviewees explicitly mentioned that this initiative is intended to reach 
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into the affective dimension of the community members (CH, 2018; SM, 2018), whom one of the 
interviewees described as ‘being too self-centred’ (CH, 2018). 
It is interesting to see that ‘the kindness’, perceived as relational kindness, is on one hand intended 
to bridge the gap between the formal organisations and communities, on which its overlap is argued 
to be the site of the intended wellbeing and empowerment, but also, on the other hand, have 
disruptive potentials. The act of kindness, this initiative argues, sometimes requires going beyond 
the formally stated rules in order to build connections across differences. In organizational context, 
this sometimes means transgressing the guidelines, rules, or regulations for the sake of ‘doing the 
right thing’ (Ferguson & Thurman, 2019, p. 3). The latter is confirmed by our interviewees, 
especially those who have the role of collaboration and engagement managers and coordinators. 
They often have to recourse to ‘informal ways’ in order to reach out to the diverse communities in 
their areas (CP, 2018; SM, 2018). The report of this initiative in 2019 explicitly states the import 
of the ‘informal aspects’ of the collaboration that previously had been perceived rather as an 
obstacle for the proper functioning of the organizations. It argues that the acts of kindness often 
take place in this ‘informal domain’ and, though often denied, has constitutive role for the overall 
functioning of the related organization. Therefore, the Kindness initiative argues for institutional 
and organizational change in order to incorporate the ‘informal aspect’ and embed it in the 
organization as organizational culture (Ferguson & Thurman, 2019, p. 3; 9). 
The Kindness Initiative is a more explicit articulation of recognition of the inevitable lack in the 
structure and its contingency, its constitutive role, and the institutionalization of its recognition. 
The report also reiterates how the act of kindness is defined by its voluntary nature. At first glance 
it seems paradoxical to embed it into the organization whose nature is defined rather by its 
hierarchical and compulsory principles. This explains why the Kindness Initiative has its focus on 
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the informal aspects of organization. The Kindness initiative complements the existing formal 
arrangements intended to address the always present contingency through obligatory review on 
the National Outcomes, Local Outcomes, and Locality Plans provided by The Act.      
4. Conclusions 
 
The previous section has elaborated CPP in the context of devolution and participatory policy 
making in Scotland and the UK. The elaboration finds out that both contexts are in continuous 
dynamic. The devolution does not end merely with the enactment of the Scottish Devolution Act 
1998 but it is continuously evolving, reflected in two amendments, so far, in 2012 and 2016. This 
is also the case with the participatory policy making framework, in the form of CPP that started to 
emerge as early as mid-1990s, about the same time as the referendum for Scottish devolution and 
the beginning of the devolution era for Scotland, and continuously altered up to the enactment of 
the Community Empowerment Act in 2015.  
One of the main strengths and advantages of the CPP framework in North Ayrshire and Scotland 
in general is that it has been built upon a rich accumulated stock of knowledge. As pointed out in 
Campbell’s working paper, its development started in the late 1990s. In that span of 20 years, there 
have been multiple researches, studies, and pilot projects taken, from which various lessons and 
experience are drawn and challenges anticipated. Therefore, it has more knowledge and legitimacy 
to articulate that it is different with other, previous and current, collaborative and participatory 
governance arrangements. North Ayrshire has produced the SoE in 2013 and experimented with 
Community Participatory Planning for years since then. It won the Association of Public Service 
Excellence-APSE’s ‘Council of the Year Award’ in 2017, after being nominated for four 
consecutive years. This award is achieved through innovations in collaborative-governance in 
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various sectors of public services, ranging from creating economic growth and employment, waste 
management, efficiency in service delivery, environmental services (APSE, 2017), to Best 
Public/Private Working Initiative in Scotland (APSE, 2018). 
The current NACPP framework distinguishes itself from CPP in other areas through its initiative 
to give primacy to the communities through its Locality Partnership framework and the adoption 
of a ‘Fair for All Strategy’. The adoptions of these measures draw the boundaries that outline the 
NACPP in contrast with CPP in other areas or previous collaborative arrangements. This has 
served to make the NACPP stand out, indicated by multiple awards it has won. The main challenge, 
however, is how to maintain this achievement. Previously, it has been mentioned that collaborative 
governance is based on the paradox of how to achieve two irreducible goals, of partnership and 
community involvement, simultaneously. The success of CPP as a form of collaborative 
governance is defined by the ability of the stakeholders to continuously maintain the delicate 
balance which is continuously changing from time to time. CPP in North-Ayrshire describes this 
continuous attempt as its dimensions of ‘designing how we work together’ and ‘agreeing on our 
priorities’ (Sutton, Engaging communities to co-produce Locality Partnership: Scottish First, 
2017). For example, despite its achievement in the Public/Partnership initiative, the Economic 
Review and Join Inspection on Health and Social Care give a description of challenging situations 
that NACPP still has to tackle in the future. This situation may make some people question the 
efficacy of the overall NACPP strategy or to foreground the fragmentations and disagreements 
previously backgrounded in the attempt to pursue the stated goals and priorities of NACPP.     
Continuously drawing inputs; manifested in various forms, ranging from gossips and grumbles in 
coffee shops or tea houses to formal petitions and policy recommendations; is one way to 
continuously sense the dynamic situation and to respond accordingly in order to maintain the 
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delicate balance. This is central because this delicate balance greatly affects the shared vision and 
leadership upon which the collaborative governance is based as it binds together the diverse 
stakeholders with diverse interests and identity to stay and actively engage in the collaboration 
process. 
The delicateness of this balance is due to the nature that setting priorities always imply exclusion 
of some alternatives. These alternatives in actual policy process mean fellow stakeholders’ interest 
and demands. Without careful measures, these inevitable exclusions may lead to the dissolution of 
the shared vision and the failure of the collaborative framework. Kingdon elaborates the 
complexity of this process of agenda or priority setting, that involves more than merely 
technocratic procedures and evidence but also takes into account the political moods of the 
stakeholders involved (Kingdon, 2011).  
In order to maintain this delicate balance, it is noteworthy that CPP rely on informal channels to 
engage with the communities besides the formal ones in CPP conventions and meetings. 
McGarvey describes that, in contrast to the UK society, Scottish society still retains its informal 
relations horizontally and vertically. This aspect, he argues, has not been explored adequately 
(McGarvey, 2012, p. 161). Such approach may serve various functions and goals at once, such as: 
identifying and reaching ‘hard to reach groups’; which would also make the otherwise unheard 
input heard and considered in the policy process and maintaining flexibility and responsiveness of 
the CPP and prevent it from turning into another stiff and bulky bureaucracy. It is not surprising 
that the NACPP collaborates with the Carnegie UK Trust in the Kindness Initiative Network. As 
elaborated above, this initiative aims to reach the affective dimension to support the operations of 
the formal organizational structure. 
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The elaboration above has demonstrated how NACPP is simultaneously characterized 
simultaneously by multiple logics. The logic of technocratism still appears, especially in the 
articulation of the priorities for North Ayrshire that should include regeneration in terms of 
economic development as part of the regeneration project. However, its position seems to be not 
as dominant as in the previous years as the NACPP explicitly states its emphasis on ‘community 
engagement’ in co-design and a co-production framework (Sutton, 2017). The elaboration has also 
revealed that the NACPP framework is not immune to fragmentations and various strategies to 
address these fragmentations. 
The strategies that reach out into the affective dimension become some of the most prominent ones 
in dealing with the potential and actual fragmentations. Besides the available formal arrangements 
such as periodic review and framework for revision, amendment, and reformulation of the 
priorities and how to achieve them, the strategies that reach out into the affective dimension 
provide more means to deal with the ever-present contingency. The ‘Kindness Initiative’ is a 
distinctive strategy among other strategies that aims to reach out to the stakeholders’ affective 
dimension. It owes its distinction to its underlying premise that foregrounds the ‘informal aspects’ 
as the site where ‘kindness’ takes place and its constitutive role for the operations and durability 
of the related organization’s formal structure. It also discloses and recognizes the disruptive 
potentials of ‘kindness’ because sometimes it necessitates transgressions of the existing formal 
rules, regulations, or guidelines. 
By giving the emphasis of the CPP framework on the community empowerment through 
engagement in and through the Locality Partnership, the NACPP seems to have decided to engage 
with the contingency head-on. The logic of agonism seems to become more dominant in this sense 
and subordinating other logics. In doing so, the managers and coordinators have become aware of 
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the role of the affective or fantasmatic dimension that had been often excluded under the guise of 
‘informality’. The hegemony of logic of agonism, however, does not mean that subordination is 
totally eradicated and the hegemony can be fixed once and for all. The next chapter focuses the 
discussion on the ‘dimension of coercion’ in the operation of the logic of agonism in and through 




Chapter VI. CRITICAL EXPLANATIONS ON NORTH AYRSHIRE 
COMMUNITY PARTNERSHIP PLANNING – NACPP CASE 
 
As elaborated in the previous chapter, collaborative governance has been around in Scotland since 
the late 1990s. Its adoption and implementation have been going through numerous changes and 
modifications. These changes and modifications reflect the diversity of logics that characterize its 
practices and regime. The logic of agonism is only one among those logics that continuously 
engages in the hegemonic game, competing with other logics to characterize the practices or 
regime of North Ayrshire Community Planning Partnership (NACPP). This chapter discusses the 
NACPP regime through the lens of LCE focusing on how the logic of agonism engages in the 
hegemonic game in order to highlight its dimension of coercion. The analysis through the LCE 
involves the deployment of its three basic units of explanation of Social Logics; Political Logics; 
and the Fantasmatic Logics (Glynos & Howarth, 2007). The Social Logics highlights the logic of 
agonism as a rule or grammar that informs daily social life, especially in the governance processes 
within the framework of NACPP. Elaboration on this aspect involves analysis of how and to what 
extent the logic of agonism becomes the norm that informs the practices of day-to-day social life 
under the NACPP, especially in relation to other logics. The latter takes the analysis on the political 
dimension – analysed through the Political Logics – of the logic of agonism in informing the 
NACPP regime. The constitution of the logic of agonism as hegemony necessitates its articulation 
as a nodal point under which other logics are subordinated or excluded. It is through this process 
each acquires their specific meanings as well as modification of their meanings. Though the limits 
signify the impossibility of the logic of agonism to hegemonize the practices or regime, in this case 
the NACPP, its constitution is necessary for the emergence of the logic of agonism as an objective 
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being. The limits that signify the lack of the investigated phenomenon as objective being and its 
‘ignoble beginning’ may always be potentially articulated as antagonism and, on its turn, to its 
dissolution. It owes its sustenance to the fantasmatic dimension which means its grips on its 
subjects who perform the practices that belong to the regime. The operations of this fantasmatic 
dimension determine whether the limits, either in the form of subordination or exclusion, is 
perceived as something natural, normal, or necessary or as coercion in subjective sense. 
1. Introduction: The Regional Revitalization through Co-Production 
 
The following sections discuss the NACPP through each of those basic units of explanation. The 
second section discusses how the NACPP installs a new set of practices; norms; rules; regulations; 
procedures and guidelines. The articulations of collaborative governance including CPP as 
‘normality’ is prevalent in the policy statements; documents; media coverage; and even daily 
conversations in the current state of democratic society. They and their performance define the 
meaning and identity of NACPP. This section elaborates how such articulations always involve 
contrasting with what-it-is-not. This elaboration leads us to the discussion in the third section that 
elaborates the limits of NACPP. As it has been elaborated in the Second Chapter, the constitution 
of something as objective reality necessitates the defining of its limits, which are the conditions of 
its possibility as well as, simultaneously, impossibility as a total and fixed objectivity. One of the 
manifestations of this political logic, often articulated simultaneously to inseminate the fantasmatic 
dimension that supports the NACPP regime, is that it-is-different with other previous or current 
collaborative arrangement. It is need-based and ‘the community’ takes the lead. The elaboration 
involves contrasting these articulations with critical voices from scholars such as Jonathan Davies 
and Madeleine Pill (Davies & Pill, 2012). The fourth section elaborates the fantasmatic dimension 
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that covers this lack that manifests and, thus, serves to sustain the regime’s grip on its subjects. 
The resort to affective dimension to maintain the cohesiveness of the NACPP regime elaborated 
in the previous section is deeply related with this dimension and, thus, is discussed in more detail 
in this chapter. The fifth section reiterates the dimension of coercion and its ontological status in 
agonism/agonistic pluralism which has its source in the nature of hegemonic game through which 
agonism/agonistic pluralism acquires its specific meaning.  
2. NACPP: The New Grammar 
 
The Social Logics is a unit of analysis in the LCE that focuses the analysis on the aspect of ‘rule’ 
and ‘rule following’ (Glynos & Howarth, 2007). In that sense, as an analytical tool, this concept 
is utilized to identify and characterize a concrete practice or regime of practices, in this case the 
NACPP to identify the specific rules or grammar that make those practices or regime meaningful. 
Some of its aspects have been discussed in the previous chapters, especially in Chapter IV, but it 
is better to briefly reiterate them here due to their import for the discussion here.  
The regime of NACPP has its roots in the dynamics of the paradigmatic shift ‘from government 
to governance’. This has been articulated in many literatures as well as policy documents and 
statements along the spectrum whose poles are those who see this paradigmatic shift as a façade 
of the neoliberal hegemony on one pole and those who see it as necessity with regards to the 
expansion of democracy (Pierre & Pieters, 2000; Bevir, 2007; Bevir, 2012) . The initial stage of 
this paradigmatic shift has been characterized by the emphasis of the introduction of 
managerialism logic previously common in the private sector into the public sector. This was 
justified as a manifestation of the recognition of the public’s right for freedom of choice and the 
government’s accountability to make public services more efficient and effective. This took place 
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during the Conservative’s rule under Thatcher and Major, often known under the heading ‘New 
Public Management’. While it seemed to work to ease the tension and constrain the state’s budget 
as under this arrangement many public sectors were privatized, it turned out that it caused another 
ardent problem as it widened the socio-economic gaps and excluded those who were unable to 
engage in an arena informed by the logic of market on equal terms as their other counterparts. This 
manifested in the doubling of the relative poverty rate during Thatcher’s administration and John 
Major’s; her successor, reflected in the GINI coefficient (Shepard, 2003, p. 6). 
This has been followed with Tony Blair’s New-Labour through its collaborative governance that 
aimed to rectify the defects that Thatcherism had by reintroducing some aspects of the social 
welfare program but targeted mainly to enable the individuals to engage in the arena predominantly 
informed by market logic. It can be said that the meaning of the social welfare program is modified 
in this articulation. It does not mean the fulfilment of citizen’s rights by the state but rather as 
state’s intervention to constitute or to mould the kind of subject that the market requires (Davies 
& Pill, 2012; Ives, 2018). Jayasuriya elaborates this phenomenon and describes it as ‘socialization 
of liberalism’ (Jayasuriya, 2006). Blair’s policy does not question, much less challenge the 
hegemony of the logic of market in public sector through the reintroduction of the social welfare 
policy. In fact, the social welfare policy is rearticulated in subordinate relations to the logic of 
market, reflected in the emphasis of the intended impacts of the social welfare programs to enable 
the recipients to compete in the job market (Grover, 2003). 
Across these changes, the narrative of ‘the necessity to change the public sector’ persists. The 
articulations often revolve around two principles which sometimes sound irreducible but are often 
articulated in one breath. They are ‘the need to reduce the tension on the state budget through 
efficiency’ on one hand and ‘the need to empower the society, to enable them to collaborate in 
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dealing with public matters’. This articulation also appears in the Christie Commission’s Report 
as ‘do more with less’ (Services C. o., 2011), referring to the situation where there has been 
growing demand for public services, yet less resources available. This does not mean that most 
people are not unaware of the dilemma. They, however, seem to rather acquiesce or even actively 
support the ‘collaborative governance’ regime such as the NACPP based on its positive articulation 
of such as ‘collaboration’, ‘inclusiveness’, ‘participation’ etc. rather than its negative counterpart 
of reduction of public spending and constraint on the state’s budget. On some occasions, the 
positivization of the latter; such as in the term of ‘efficiency’, is also proven to be appealing to 
some of the public. The public acceptance to this NACPP regime may not always be based on the 
acceptance of its positive articulation. Some indications of rather passive acceptance or 
acquiescence are also found, mentioned by one of our interviewees (CH, 2018). Such passive 
support or acquiescence is often based on the perception that ‘there is no other option available’. 
The regimentation of certain practices ranging from those which are legal-formally installed by 
the laws to rather semi- and informal practices further ‘normalize’ the NACPP as a regime. This 
normalization operates exactly through their very performativity. This includes activities such as 
formulations of Local Outcomes, Locality Plans, the partnership meetings, community meetings, 
and reviews of those set outcomes and plans. Some of these activities are formally institutionalised 
and provided by the laws, such as the Community Empowerment (Scotland) Act 2015. Some 
others, if not the majority, are rather informal or semi-formal at best. Even within these formally 
institutionalized practices, informality still permeates. The interviews disclose that these 




The relatively broad acceptance of the NACPP framework is also based on the articulation of 
NACPP with democracy. NACPP, as manifestation of ‘collaborative governance’, is associated 
with the expansion of democracy, involving a broader public in the arenas where they previously 
had limited access. Such articulations usually follow the discourse of ‘the need for a new way of 
governing and administering public services.’ The positive articulation of the necessity of 
collaboration associates it with public inclusion and participation in dealing with their own matters. 
Further, the emphasis on ‘the community’ in the articulation of ‘collaboration’, manifests in the 
initiative to establish the partnership at the locality level and the adoption of the ‘Fair for All 
Strategy’ can also be seen as influenced by the ‘traditional’ divergence of Scotland in comparison 
with other parts of the UK (McGarvey, 2012). This may also contribute to a relatively broad 
acceptance among the North Ayrshire public, as part of Scotland, toward the NACPP and the 
Locality Partnership frameworks. 
Interestingly, in order to ensure that the voices from the communities are heard, they have two 
kinds of representatives among the members of the locality partnership, beside the other members 
representing the locality partner organizations. The communities are represented by the elected 
council members representing the correlated locality and by the community representatives. The 
maximum number of the community representatives in the locality partnership is designed to be 
equal with the number of the members from the elected council (Council, n.a.). This can be seen 
as an attempt to ensure that the voice of the communities is substantively represented in the 
planning process on one hand and, most importantly, recognition that representation cannot fully 
represent the represented on the other. Instead of more truly representing the communities, the 
proliferation of the communities’ representatives in this arrangement rather discloses the split of 
the represented communities or its lack as a totally objective entity. 
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Despite the apparent dilemmas or contradictions and even ineffectiveness, such as represented in 
the Economic Review (2018) and Joint Inspection on Health and Social Care (2019), the majority 
of the public seems to be quite content with the notion of collaborative governance in the form of 
NACPP. This also happens in the broader context of Scotland, especially indicated by the decree 
of the Community Empowerment (Scotland) Act in 2015. Thence, the NACPP has become the 
framework as well as the arena that regulates the engagement and collaboration among the 
stakeholders or the regime’s subjects. What some of our interviewees told us about the 
disagreements that still take place in the partnerships could also be interpreted as disagreements 
over the specific concrete policy substances rather than the overall partnerships framework (CP, 
2017; SM, 2018). They tend to perceive it as something that is inevitable and constructive for the 
performance of the partnership frameworks both at the NACPP and Locality Partnership levels. 
They also tend to see this inevitable difference and conflicts of interests and demands from among 
the stakeholders can be solved through the available legal-formal arrangement supported with the 
adoption of an ethical standpoint compatible with the values that underlie the NACPP framework, 
such as exemplified in the ‘Kindness Initiative’. 
The ‘normalization’ of the NACPP regime often involves the articulations of it as an entity. In 
such articulations, NACPP is contrasted to something that it-is-not in order to give it an outline 
and specify what sort of entity this NACPP is. This indicates the political dimension in the 
constitution of the NACPP as an entity that the next section discusses. 
3. The Political Logics: the Limits of NACPP 
 
Much of the literature and policy documents reviewed and parts of the interviews articulate the 
NACPP and Locality Partnership as if they have a shared vision and consensus across the public 
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in North Ayrshire and the localities that comprise it. However, this ‘shared vision’ and ‘consensus’ 
are not as stable and all-encompassing as they may sound or seem. At the end of the previous 
section, it is mentioned that in order to give an outline and specify the NACPP as an entity, it is 
often articulated in contrast to what it-is-not. Such articulation indicates that its status as a ‘shared 
vision’ and ‘consensus’ is unstable and, thus, has to be frequently reiterated. Furthermore, such 
articulation indicates that the constitution of NACPP as an entity involves either subordination or 
exclusion of other possibilities. The Political Logics from the LCE provides the means to analyze 
the political dimension of an entity or reality by disclosing how its constitution involves continuous 
attempts to stabilize the ever-present contingency and the political nature of such attempts. Its 
political nature comes from the necessary dual process of inclusion/exclusion through the 
signifying logics of equivalence/difference in order to stabilize and specify the identity or meaning 
of the said entity or reality (Glynos & Howarth, 2007, p. 141; 143). 
Such contingency and transiency of an entity or reality can never be fully eradicated. Even on 
entities or realities that may seem to be straightforward, they are always permeated by this 
contingency. The moment when a consensus or shared vision and leadership are established, 
however, do not necessarily mean total eradication of tensions. For example, COSLA’s study 
mentioned in the previous chapter argues that CPP in general is plagued by multiple tensions. One 
of them is the tensions between the goals of partnership on one hand and community involvement 
on the other. The irreducibility of the two elements of partnership and community involvement or 
participation may be suspended at certain times, but it can never be totally eradicated (COSLA, 
1999). COSLA made this study in 1999. Over time, there is still no permanent solution to solve 
this tension. As shown in McKee’s study in the case of community-based housing governance in 
Glasgow (McKee, 2008). The community-based frameworks in the housing governance does give 
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the tenants options and opportunity to engage in the housing policy and make it more effective as 
they define what the policy is and should be based on their lively experience. However, from the 
lens of governmentality, this framework is still subjected to a certain ‘regime of truth’ imposed 
from above that conduct how the community should conduct themselves within this community 
framework. There are still regulations that put constraint on what the tenants can and cannot do 
with regards to the housing policy within this framework. Therefore, McKee’s paper concludes 
that this framework of devolution of power to the community paradoxically runs in parallel with 
centralization of political control as the government, both at local and national level, through their 
control over the parameter for community governance. The NACPP also faces similar situations 
though with some variations (JM, 2018). 
The interviews also disclose simultaneous challenges of engaging the communities to actively 
participate in the governance and policy process. Sometimes, the community is articulated in 
singular form. However, in its actuality, the community is comprised of diverse and constantly 
changing elements. Collaborative governance as huge as NACPP inevitably has to deal with and 
address these diverse communities and their correlated demands and needs which are not always 
compatible and sometimes even conflicting, with one another. Furthermore, these communities 
are not static. They are dynamic and irreducible merely to communal identity based not only on 
territory but also interest (Lightbody, 2017, p. 1). Some communities are harder to reach than 
others. In such situations, these communities are more likely to be ignored in the governance and 
policy processes and their interests left unaccommodated in the policies (Lightbody, 2017). 
Lightbody argues that those ‘hard to reach groups’ are more likely to be ignored in community 
engagement because it is easier to ignore them than attempting to eradicate the barriers that made 
them harder to reach (Lightbody, 2017, p. 6). 
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These tensions that manifest in the concrete practices of the NACPP regime are often solved 
through resorting to the available mechanisms that are intended to facilitate decision making in 
such undecidable situations. This may range from mechanisms which are legal-formally installed 
to rather semi-formal or informal mechanisms. In one of the interviews mentioned in the previous 
chapter, disagreements over the priorities in NA are solved rather through the former; through the 
use of an evidence-based approach (CH, 2018). Other interviews, in a rather general manner, 
disclose that the coordinators and managers often resort to an informal approach to solve such 
tensions, especially when engaging with the communities. Regardless of the formal/semi-
formal/informal distinctions, the point here is that the decision made in such an undecidable 
situation always implies double operations of inclusion/exclusion. Some or all aspects of the 
conflicting interest have to be modified or excluded altogether for the sake of making the intended 
decision and suspend the undecidable situation. 
Referring to the CPP framework in The Act as well as its application in the NACPP, it is important 
to mention here that there is logic of agonism that comes into play to facilitate the decision making 
in such undecidable situations. The NACPP, following the provision of CPP in the Act, tends to 
make sure that every decision making process and the decision produced are always subjected to 
review and the chance to modify or amend it (Parliament, 2015). Thus, in this sense, the NACPP, 
and the CPP framework in general, recognizes the wicked nature of most of the problems that it 
addresses, actually and potentially in the future, and the lousy nature of the solutions it produces 
to address them and institutionalize the mechanisms and procedures to modify or amend them. 
However, it is noteworthy that the domination of the logic of agonism in this aspect of the NACPP 
does not make it immune to subordination or exclusion. In such moments, the logic of agonism 
subordinates or excludes other logics such as the logic of technocratism or managerialism. The 
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‘hard evidence’ such as produced through the SIMD, in such moments, could be sidelined or 
incorporated to support the review on certain concrete decisions in order to revise or amend them. 
The ‘hard evidence’, and its underpinning logic of technocratism, is subordinated to the logic of 
agonism as it does not determine the ultimate decision in and for itself but is constantly subjected 
to review. So is the logic of managerialism, where it has to allocate resources, against the 
underpinning efficiency principle, to accommodate the constant review process. This is 
homologous to the subordination of those two logics under the logics of agonism in electoral 
regime in democracy. It is not a secret that holding elections expends huge resources and the results 
can never be fully predicted beforehand. They often produce elected officials against any objective 
calculations. Yet, the undecidable situation has to be opened up, so the public can decide for 
themselves whether to stabilize the undecidable situation. This is because such a regime like 
democracy bases its legitimacy on the recognition and institutionalization of the constitutive role 
of decision in such an undecidable situation (Lefort, 1988; Mouffe, 2000). 
The domination of the logic of agonism is not total and fixed either. In many other moments, it is 
the turn of this logic to be subordinated to other logics. This is reflected in various critical voices 
directed toward the idea of ‘collaborative governance’ that underlying the NACPP. Some of these 
critical voices come from the left that pointing to the strong and prevalent elements of neoliberal 
ideology in ‘collaborative governance’ as well as in the CPP framework. This is despite the fact 
that in Scotland’s context, as pointed out by McGarvey, the discourse of local government is often 
articulated as a counter-discourse to the dismantling of the Welfare-state initiated under Thatcher’s 
administration (McGarvey, 2012). One indications of the domination of the neoliberalism in the 
NACPP, as well as in the general CPP framework, is the replacement of the subject position of 
citizen into ‘service user’ or ‘consumer’ of public services. Haydecker argues that such divergence 
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will diminish in the future due to the centrally imposed procedures and mechanisms as well as 
their dependency to resources transfer from the Westminster and the limited options that Scotland 
has as long as they stay as part of the UK (Haydecker, 2010).  
Davies and Pill critically elaborate other aspects of the CPP and collaborative governance. They 
highlight the constant tensions between the logic of empowerment and the logic of abandonment 
of the public to deal with their own matters in the CPP framework (Davies & Pill, 2012). They 
critically argue that the collaborative and partnership framework should be perceived against the 
background of continuous cuts in public spending that ultimately leads to the abandonment of the 
citizens by their governments, both at the national and sub-national levels. In the context of urban 
revitalization, they argue that this tendency is parallel with the growing replacement of need-based 
public funding with market focused growth strategy (Davies & Pill, 2012, p. 16). Davies also 
criticizes the discourse of partnership, specifically ones that he describes as semi- or formal model 
of partnership and favours the bottom-up informal governing network. For the former he refers to 
the network governance promoted by New-Labour which for him articulates ‘partnership’ as “… 
the institutional mechanisms through which social consensus is mobilized in pursuit of neoliberal 
socioeconomics goals” (Davies J. , p. 201; see also Ives, 2018).  
The NACPP tries to address the critics by re-opening up the undecidable situation and foreground 
it by establishing the locality partnership, where the communities are expected to have a more 
equal footing in the partnership framework. It is also intended to mobilize a bottom-up informal 
model of partnership and the needs-based citizen-led regeneration programs that Davies and Pill 
favor. This, however, does not permanently solve the problems that people such as Davies, Pill, 
Ives and many others highlight. Lightbody’s report emphasizes that equality of access is 
insufficient to tackle this challenge. This is because having equal access does not mean that each 
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group has equal influence on the outcome of community engagement. This may come from various 
sources, such as level of education, language barriers, disability, and gender (Lightbody, 2017, p. 
9). Lightbody argues for the need to provide facilitation in order to make sure that anyone involved 
in community engagement has the same footing in the process (Lightbody, 2017, p. 10). In this 
sense, equity becomes a necessary measure to ensure that everyone has equal footing in the 
community engagement process.   
The emergence of the concept of equity indicates another lack that may plague the NACPP regime. 
In two documents produced in the same year, Sutton’s Engaging communities to co-produce 
Locality Partnerships: a Scottish First and The Fair for All Strategy, there seems to be tensions 
putting ‘equality’ vis-a-vis ‘equity’. Sutton explicitly states that the locality planning partnership 
is intended to create ‘equity’. This is articulated as part of the Fair for All Strategy (Sutton, 2017). 
However, the term ‘equity’ appears only twice in The Fair for All Strategy document. A term that 
has similarities of meaning with ‘equity’ is ‘proportional universalism’. This term appears in the 
section on reducing inequalities in access to healthcare services, that is supposedly universal but 
there are many factors that may differentiate one’s access for such services even though they 
potentially have equal access (Partnership, 2016, p. 6). This may indicate a strategy to implicitly 
rearticulate the emphasis of the broader policy of CPP that focuses rather on reducing inequalities, 
reflected in the priority given to those who live in areas which are significantly deprived in 
comparison to others in Scotland. 
The primacy given to the concept of equity can also be potentially articulated as a strategy for 
liberalization of public service and social policy. The logic may slide to the direction where certain 
groups or communities, considered to be facing barriers for having equal footage in the 
collaborative governance, claim to be entitled to preferential treatment, manifesting in various 
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forms that may lead to protest from other groups. These groups may fall under the category of 
those who are unable to engage equally on their own in collaborative government. This category 
may come into being only within a series of categories and cannot stand on its own. The most 
likely scenario is this category made in differential relations to its other, the category of “those 
who are able”. This may not necessarily be the case. However, reflecting on various cases of social 
policy in various countries, such categorization is part of the broader strategy of ‘socialization of 
neoliberalism’ (Jayasuriya, 2006). In such a scenario, preferential measures, in the name of equity, 
claimed to be intended for the sake of equality, become an instrument of social stratification and 
part of strategy of normalization of the subject position as ‘market actor’ instead of ‘citizen’ (see 
Ives, 2018). 
The elaboration in this section has demonstrated that the political dimension of the NACPP 
involves with the constant tensions between contingency of an undecidable situation and the 
attempts to stabilize it. NACPP, as a framework of collaborative governance, cannot be determined 
a priori as neoliberal institutional instrument as Davies describes, though such possibility does 
exist. This is because their relations are contingent to articulation. Certain aspects of the NACPP 
recognize the ineradicability of the contingency and its constitutive role and have been designed 
to institutionalize it. However, foregrounding the contingency through the institutionalization of 
the logic of agonism is still a stabilization nonetheless and as a stabilization it can never be total 
or permanent. The undecidable situation it foregrounds has to be backgrounded through the 
decision made in such situation that serves as a closure. On its turn, it is this closure that becomes 
the condition of possibility for the logic of agonism to continue to come to play by deconstructing 
it and foregrounding the contingency once again and thus is the logic of hegemonic game. It is 
impossible in the situation of both pure closure and pure difference. Thus, the limits of the NACPP 
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have to be continuously drawn by making a decision in an undecidable situation because otherwise, 
there will be no NACPP as an entity.  
This continuous hegemonic game, however, requires players. The social and political dimensions 
elaborated in the last two sections focus the discussion on the structural aspect of the NACPP. The 
following section focuses the discussion on the aspect of the agent in relation to the structure and 
how they become subjects that become the players in the hegemonic game. With regards to the 
constitution of the subject, the structural aspect discussed in the last two sections explains only to 
the extent of subject position. The topic discussed in the next section, however, moves further by 
discussing the subjectification or how and why the agent embrace the subject position the structure 
provides. 
4. The Challenge for Active Participation: Mobilizing Identification with the 
Collaborative Governance 
 
The constitution of subject, as elaborated in Chapters II and III, involves the fantasmatic 
dimension. The latter refers to the grips that a discourse has over the subjects (Glynos & Howarth, 
2007, p. 145). Amidst the multiple fragmentations and contingency of the structure, such as 
elaborated in the previous section, the fantasy serves as ‘the support that gives consistency to what 
we call “reality”’ (Zizek, 1989, p. 44 quoted in Glynos & Howarth, 2007: 146-147). Glynos’s 
study on the specific role of fantasy in sustaining workplace practice is highly relevant to the 
analysis of the fantasmatic dimension of the NACPP regime, in which the logic of agonism 
partially characterize (Glynos, 2008). This is especially crucial to see the role of the discourse of 
‘Kindness’ to provide the fantasmatic support for the NACPP regime. 
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Glynos describes that fantasy has three key features. They are: “First, it has a narrative structure 
which features, among other things, an ideal and an obstacle to its realization, and which may take 
a beatific or horrific form; second, it has an inherently transgressive aspect vis-a-vis officially 
affirmed ideals; and third, it purports to offer a foundational guarantee of sorts, in the sense that it 
offers the subject a degree of protection from the anxiety associated with a direct confrontation 
with the radical contingency of social relations” (Glynos, 2008, p. 287). These features that Glynos 
elaborates are useful for the analysis of the operation of the fantasmatic dimension that supports 
the NACPP regime, especially the discourse of ‘Kindness’. 
One of the main persistent challenges of the NACPP and the Locality Partnership has been to 
encourage the members of the communities to actively engage in the collaboration processes. In 
order to address this challenge, the NACPP often resorts to reaching out into the communities’ 
affective dimension that belongs to the register of the fantasy. Formally, the NACPP has 
collaborated with the Carnegie UK Trust in the ‘Kindness Initiative’ project. Informally, the agents 
of the NACPP, especially the locality partnership managers and coordinators, have often resorted 
to numerous informal approaches in order to convince broader communities and its members to 
actively engage and participate in the collaborative processes. The former tries to identify and 
nurture the conditions that make ‘act of kindness’ possible and try to embed them in the NACPP 
organization as organizational culture (Partnership, 2018; Ferguson & Thurman, 2019). The latter 
does similar things by tapping into the already existing and embedded cultural dimensions in which 
the communities and their members have emotional attachments in order to encourage them to 
identify themselves as the NACPP subjects.  
This is comparable to Davies description of ‘partnership’ as ‘mobilization of consensus’, though 
consensus here does not necessarily direct toward ‘neoliberal socioeconomic goals’. This is 
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because, as mentioned above, the relations between the NACPP and neoliberal goals are contingent 
to their articulations and not predetermined prior to it. The point here is that if a regime is to be 
functional, it requires the constitution of a certain kind of subject that is constituted through the 
agent’s identification or submission to the regime as an (symbolic) order. As elaborated in Chapter 
III, one’s submission into the symbolic order is driven by the agent’s constant pursuit of fullness 
which has no specific objective but only for the sake of pursuing. One’s submission into the 
symbolic order gives symbolic representation that becomes the objective that the subject’s pursue 
as the object of desire. What the structure is lacking is what’s presented to the agent as its object 
of desire which is promised to the agent as long as it inserts and submits itself into the regime as a 
symbolic order. 
The ‘Kindness Initiative’ seems to operate in this manner. It taps into people’s deepest desire, ‘to 
be desired by others’. What makes one desired by other people can never be objectively 
determined. Such absence of a specific objective indicates something that can never be fully 
symbolized. In this situation, ‘Kindness’ becomes the representation of this something that is 
absence and cannot be fully symbolized. This is also indicated by the emphasis this initiative gives 
to the informal dimension of organization and the voluntary nature of the act of kindness (Ferguson 
& Thurman, 2019). Related to this, this initiative even goes as far as recognizing the constitutive 
role of transgression that sometimes the act of kindness requires and, thus, foregrounds the 
subject’s agency to make a decision in such situations. It aims to condition the subject to make a 
decision in an undecidable situation, a situation that signifies the lack of the structure, and take 
upon themselves how to deal with this lack. 
The transgression, however, is also seen to be constitutive for the operation of the regime. This is 
indicated by the report’s elaboration that relates to the act of kindness with attitude toward risks. 
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In the framework of ‘opening up space’ that NACPP aims to achieve, the attitude towards risk is 
crucial because such process sometimes puts the subject in a diametrical position against some 
sedimented rules. Ferguson and Thurman observe the difference in attitudes between public sectors 
and community organisations where the former is more submissive to the formal organizational 
and structural rules and regulations while the latter is more innovative and willing to take the risk 
of paving a novel path to achieve what they aim for. 
Besides encouraging the subject to dare to decide in an undecidable situation, the discourse of 
‘Kindness’ also simultaneously aims to limit the possibilities of the decisions that the subject may 
take in such a situation. The rather obscure of ‘what kindness is’, the report only describes it as 
‘relational’, ‘potentially disruptive’, and anything but ‘what it is’, provides the imaginary unity 
that transforms the drive pursuing fullness without object into desiring impossible fullness through 
attainment of a specific object, no matter how vague it may be. Its transgressive potential is 
checked by the overarching sense of community, related to which certain act is determined whether 
as ‘kind’ or not. 
The focus on the ethos of ‘Kindness’ is also stated to have potential to deal with the contingent 
efficacy of the formal NACPP regime of economic regeneration. Ferguson and Thurman mention 
in the report that relates to the persistent problem of poverty in North Ayrshire: 
We have been concerned about talking about kindness in the midst of rising inequality 
and the broader context of austerity – and indeed it has, at times, been challenging to 
talk about kindness alongside unavoidable cuts to services. And yet, we have found a 
receptiveness to think about kindness in relation to poverty. Kindness is a value that is 
important for North Ayrshire – and for other local authorities, such as Calderdale 
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Council (2019) – because poverty persists, despite their award-winning innovation 
(Ferguson & Thurman, 2019, p. 18) 
More specifically addressing the challenging situation described by reviews such as the Economic 
Review and Joint Inspection on Health and Social Care in North Ayrshire, in the same passage 
Ferguson and Thurman continue: 
There is a sense, therefore, that a focus on kindness might just provide a different 
framework that enables local and national government to improve outcomes and reduce 
inequalities. However, alongside this hope is a recognition that it is not just a means to 
an end but of value in its own right. Even if material outcomes do not change, North 
Ayrshire Council can still make a difference to day-to-day experiences (Ferguson & 
Thurman, 2019, p. 18). 
In this sense, the discourse of ‘Kindness’ seems to play the role in helping the subjects to deal with 
the anxiety related to the direct engagement with contingency of social relations such as manifested 
in the challenging situation described in the reviews on the NACPP. 
Up to this point, the elaboration on the discourse of ‘Kindness’ and its articulation with the NACPP 
has shown that it has the three features of fantasy that Glynos describes. It has a structure of 
narrative that articulates the idealized situation either in the beatific or horror forms. The narrative 
of Kindness puts the beatific narrative on how a ‘random act of kindness’ has proven to be able to 
brighten someone’s day and encourage the audience to imagine the upscaling and institutionalize 
‘Kindness’ into organizational scale. Ferguson and Thurman’s report also explicitly describe that 
the ‘Act of Kindness’ located beyond the confined space of formal rules, regulations, procedures, 
and guidelines and its performativity often requires the subject to transgress them. This 
transgression does not necessarily mean a symptom of dissolution of the correlated regime. On the 
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contrary, it sustains it by enabling its subjects to deal with the anxiety that is related to the 
contingency of the social relations or the structural lack of the regime. 
However, up to this point, the research so far is still unable to determine whether ‘Kindness’ as 
fantasy operates as ideological or ethical fantasy. Critical scholars such as Haydecker, Ives, and 
Davies may give the description that the overall context tends to drive the ‘partnership’ and 
collaborative arrangement toward further expansion and entrenchment of neoliberalism. However, 
as elaborated in the section on the political dimension of the NACPP, the determinacy of those 
factors that those scholars describe on the trajectory of the NACPP is still contingent to its 
articulation. The attempt to rearticulate equality into the direction of ‘equity’ that emerge in the 
documents on ‘Fair for All Strategy’ and the Locality Partnership Framework demonstrates this 
contingency. The contingency of the ‘Kindness’ discourse, whether it is ideological or ethical, is 
related to the contingency of the NACPP. Ferguson and Thurman are also aware and anticipate 
that emphasis on the informal aspect and the communities’ capacity to manage themselves does 
not mean that the responsibility should be totally given to them. This is the neoliberal scenario that 
Davies and others have been critical about. Therefore, Ferguson and Thurman argue that the 
intervention from the state and government is still necessary, especially to create the conditions 
favorable for the ‘Act of Kindness’ (Ferguson & Thurman, 2019, p. 18).         
The point here is that the fantasy determines one’s identification or dis-identification with the 
regime and its mode of subjectivity. On its turn, the identification or dis-identification determine 
how the structural limits and limitations, necessary for the constitution of the regime or structure 
as an entity, are perceived whether as something necessary or as coercion in a subjective sense. 
This operates whether the ‘Kindness’ provides the fantasmatic support for the NACPP as an 
institutional mechanism for mobilizing social consent to achieve the neoliberal socioeconomic 
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goals or to support the logic of agonism in order to pursue further expansion of democratic 
principles in broader social fields. In either case, the identification implies the agent’s submission 
to the prohibition that the correlated regime or structure entails and, in return, acquires the promise 
of impossible fullness in the form of fantasy. The only difference between the two possible 
scenarios mentioned above is on their points of libidinal investment or cathexis. The neoliberal 
discourse offers a certain substantively reified signifier as the point of cathexis, such as individual 
freedom and autonomy, while the logic of agonism offers exactly the contrary that is the absence 
of such a substantive point of reference. 
The following section specifically discusses the dimension of coercion in the logic of agonism 
based on the elaboration of how it partially characterizes the NACPP regime. The discussion 
highlights how the dimension of coercion comes to the fore in the operation of logic of agonism 
in the practice or regime that it characterizes or installs in the case of NACPP. 
5. The Demands for Identification: The Coercive Dimension of Agonism 
 
The dimension of coercion in the logic of agonism in the case of NACPP comes to the fore in the 
elaboration of the political dimension of NACPP. The strongest characterization of this regime by 
the logic of agonism is in the areas where the regime defines its limits that distinguish itself with 
other modes of partnership or collaboration. From the previous elaboration it is apparent in the 
NACPP framework where it decides to recognize, foreground, and directly engage the contingency 
of community participation in the planning process through the locality partnership framework, 
the adoption of the ‘Fair for All Strategy’, and the collaboration in the ‘Kindness Initiative 
Networks’. The coercive dimension of the logics of agonism comes to the fore in such moments 
because its operation implies subordination and exclusion of other logics. 
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However, the traces of the subordination and exclusion can still be found in the other registers of 
social and fantasmatic dimension. From the elaboration above, in the social dimension, there are 
multiple rules and regulations, both formal and informal, foregrounding the contingency of any 
closure that the subjects use to live with to organize their affairs in the NACPP. The NACPP 
framework designs that public consultation through meetings are held regularly, in each there are 
always potentials to review and, if necessary, modify; revise; or amend the previous decisions. 
Furthermore, the emphasis on the ‘community’ in the NACPP partnership framework is 
operationalized by foregrounding their split or their lack as total objective unity. This is reflected 
in the formulation of membership in locality partnership, where the communities are represented 
by elected council members and community representatives in the partnership. 
In the register of the fantasy, the trace of the subordination and exclusion is found in the 
specification of a certain kind of subjectivity that NACPP, with its emphasis on the ‘community 
partnership’, requires. The interviews highlight the centrality of ‘communal sense’ if the NACPP 
framework is to function as expected. The lack of it has been one of the main challenges that 
NACPP has to address. There has been a persistent dilemma in addressing this challenge that 
NACPP has been facing. First, communal sense is not shared evenly across communities in North 
Ayrshire. In some areas, communal sense can still be found among the close-knit communities. In 
other areas the sense of communities is fragmented across various communities. In some other, 
communal sense has been replaced or modified by individualistic sense of modern society. This is 
somehow contrary to the NACPP design that requires ‘communal sense’ across communities in 
the North Ayrshire area and across council areas as well. 
Second, the NACPP agents are aware that such communal sense cannot be imposed but should 
emerge authentically and voluntarily from the communities themselves as recognition of 
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differences and interdependency among them. This communal sense or the lack of it cannot be 
reduced into a matter of cognitive matter either as it is related more to the affective dimension. 
The communal sense in this NACPP discourse or logic is represented as something that is absent 
that the subjects should desire following their submission into it as a symbolic order. However, 
communal sense or the lack of it is not effective enough to constitute the object cause of or object 
of desire. It is in this context ‘Kindness’ has a crucial role as positivisation of the negativity of the 
‘lack of communal sense’. 
The positivisation here is not total either. As apparent in Ferguson and Thurman’s report, there is 
no specific formulation of ‘what kindness is’ (Ferguson & Thurman, 2019). The report only gives 
outlines to it but does not elaborate its substance. The specificity of this ‘Kindness’ discourse 
points to the domain beyond the symbolic order, its disruptive potentials, and its recognition of the 
constitutive role of transgression. This discourse, to a large extent, keeps open the contingency in 
two senses. First it does not specify what ‘Kindness’ and ‘Act of Kindness’ mean. Second, it 
encourages the subjects to recognise the contingency of the regime as a symbolic order and the 
constitutive role of its transgressions. It is in this sense that it is justifiable to argue that this 
discourse is characterized by the logic of agonism. 
However, it should be bore in mind that subordination and exclusion are not absent in the adoption 
of this discourse of ‘Kindness’ to provide the fantasmatic support for the NACPP regime. For 
example, it subordinates the quality of ‘rule following’, in the sense that it deconstructs its 
determination claim on the performance of an organization by arguing that transgression also 
positively contributes to the sustenance of the organization practice or regime. This does not mean 
that rules and regulations are totally unnecessary. In fact, they are the conditions of possibility for 
transgression. For transgression to take place, it requires the symbolic order to transgress in the 
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first place. In this sense, the relations between transgression and the (symbolic) order are 
comparable to Laclau’s elaboration on relations between ‘temporality’ and ‘spatiality’. On one 
hand, the symbolic order, as the spatiality, cannot fully hegemonize its transgression, as 
temporality. On the other hand, the temporality has no chance whatsoever to hegemonize the space 
but only to foreground its incompleteness (Laclau, 1990, pp. 41-42).      
The subordination and exclusion, as the dimension of coercion in any other logic, takes place as 
closure or as making a decision in an undecidable situation. The foregrounding of contingency and 
the underlying undecidable situation that indicates the operation of the logic of agonism is also a 
closure or decision in an undecidable situation. Its institutionalization, as in any other practice or 
regime, also requires fantasmatic support that sustains the correlated practice or regime by keeping 
its subjects within the grips of the practice or regime. In other words, it sustains the practice or 
regime by continuously constituting certain kinds of subjects that the correlated practice or regime 
requires. 
The main point of this chapter is to highlight the dimension of coercion of logic of agonism drawn 
from the concrete case of the NACPP regime. The elaboration in this chapter foregrounds that as 
logic, agonism/agonistic pluralism continuously engages with other logics in characterizing or 
hegemonizing certain concrete practices or regimes. Even though it centres on the idea of the 
contingency of any closure associated with coercion, its engagement in hegemonic game to 
deconstruct the fantasy of totality of any closure is also a closure nonetheless. Mouffe, and Laclau, 
are fully aware that the radical contingency of any social realities does not mean that there is no 
closure at all. The radical contingency should be understood as the impossibility of closure as 
totality in the final instance. Continuous difference does not mean that there is no decision at all, 
but the difference of the decision as an unquestionable final decision once and for all. 
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The following chapter discusses how the elaboration on the logic of agonism and its dimension of 
coercion against Mouffe’s general theoretical framework of agonism/agonistic pluralism. Its 
operationalization as a logic that is competing with other logics to hegemonize certain concrete 





Chapter VII. THE DIMENSION OF COERCION IN MOUFFE’S AGONISM 
 
This concluding chapter highlights how the research and elaboration presented in the previous 
chapters answered the research questions and problem stated in the opening chapter. The highlight 
here covers the following points: (i) how coercion operates on the ontological plane and how it is 
constitutive for the social within Laclau and Mouffe’s framework of PDT; (ii) the more specific 
elaboration on coercion at work to constitute agonism/agonistic pluralism as a social reality. The 
elaboration on this point also answers the specific research questions set in the first chapter; (iii) 
The application of PDT theoretical presuppositions for empirical research through research 
strategy based on Glynos and Howarth LCE; (iv) The theoretical and practical implications and 
contributions of this research in the several relevant fields of study. This also includes 
recommendations for further research and study. This chapter is divided into 4 sections with each 
focusing its discussion on each of those points above.  
1. Introduction 
 
To begin with, the stated research problem and questions this dissertation aims to address are as 
following: The main research problem is: “How to explicate coercion on the ontological plane 
and define its constitutive role within the framework of Laclau and Mouffe’s theory of 
discourse and hegemony?” Putting this problem within the context of Mouffe’s 
agonism/agonistic pluralism, the problem is further specified in the questions: “How does 
coercion operate in the constitution of the agonistic structure and agonistic subject?” and 
“How is the shift of coercion between ontological and ontical planes always possible?” 
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The following sections describe how this research has addressed those problems and questions 
and, by doing so, contributes to the discussions on democracy, agonism, and coercion; further 
development of PDT in its relations to the topic of fantasy and how it is employed for empirical 
research. Last but not least, the elaboration on ‘coercion’ from the lens of PDT contributes to 
further open up the path for investigation on the relations between discourse and jouissance or 
enjoyment addressing the critics of normative deficiencies levelled toward PDT in general and 
also Mouffe’s notion of agonism/agonistic pluralism. The latter points to the import of 
understanding Mouffe’s agonism/agonistic pluralism within a specific ethical framework of the 
Ethics of the Real that underlies Mouffe’s concept of agonism/agonistic pluralism.  
2. The Ontological Status of Coercion: How It Works to Constitute the Reality    
 
One of the contributions of this research is to foreground the status and role of coercion by arguing 
for its ontological status. In other words, coercion is the condition for the constitution of our reality. 
As elaborated in the first three chapters, the coercion here specifically refers to one that operates 
on the ontological plane. As the name suggests, this is the plane that is related with the constitution 
and nature of our reality. The ontological plane here is contrasted against the ontical plane. While, 
the latter refers to the reality as we see it, the former focuses on the matters of how we come to see 
what we see as we see it and what makes it possible. This is the nuance on the elaboration of 
coercion presented here. Instead of elaborating whether a certain practice or set of practices can 
justifiably be categorized as coercion, this dissertation focuses on addressing how we come to see 
a certain practice or set of practices as coercive, what makes such views possible, and whether in 
this process of enabling there is coercive dimension involved.  
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Basing the investigation and elaboration on the constitution of reality on Laclau and Mouffe’s 
presuppositions, it becomes clear that the operation of coercion on the ontological plane to 
constitute the reality involves the constant tensions between the radical contingency and the 
primacy of the political. Both are co-constitutive in their continuous tensions in the constitution of 
reality that is basically social and articulatory and belongs to the register of the symbolic (Laclau 
& Mouffe, 2014, p. 100). They are co-constitutive because the social is always a results of certain 
hegemonic intervention that takes place in the field of articulatory practices that is marked by 
contingency as “…‘elements’ have not crystallized into ‘moments’” (Laclau & Mouffe, 2014, p. 
120). The contingency, however, comes into being only when there are attempts to suspend or 
stabilize it through articulation. Therefore it cannot be said though it can be shown in the very 
articulatory practice which is political in nature (Laclau & Mouffe, 2014, p. 113; 120). 
Coercion at work can be found in the articulation or articulatory practice itself. This is based on 
Laclau and Mouffe’s formulation as they describe the practice of articulation as:  
…, consists in the construction of nodal points which partially fix meaning; and the 
partial character of this fixation proceeds from the openness of the social, a result, 
in its turn, of the constant overflowing of every discourse by the infinitude of the 
field of discursivity. (Laclau & Mouffe, 2014, p. 100) 
Their description elaborates not only the co-constitutive nature of ‘radical contingency’ and ‘the 
political’ but also how the dimension of coercion plays its part to constitute the social reality 
through articulation that is intended to fix something that is always ‘could have been otherwise’. 
Yet, it is this fixation, which is political in nature and the coercive dimension is embedded, that is 
necessary as without it contingency would have been impossible as it becomes absolute. 
Contingency comes into being as the fixation becomes something that is impossible but necessary. 
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It is impossible in the sense exactly, as Laclau and Mouffe have described above, due to “the 
openness of the social” and “constant overflowing of every discourse by infinitude of the field of 
discursivity”. Necessary as the attempted fixation is needed to make the contingency come into 
being. 
The term ‘impossible but necessary’ seems to capture the co-extensive nature of the two 
underlying presuppositions in Laclau and Mouffe’s theory of discourse and hegemony (Glynos, 
2015) and their subsequent works. The elaboration on the response toward criticism levelled 
against Mouffe’s agonism/agonistic pluralism and its theoretical underpinning has shown that this 
tension or paradox yet co-constitutive nature of radical contingency and the primacy of the political 
have been overlooked. Consequently, the majority of the criticism shares the tendency to 
overemphasise on one presupposition not only at the expense of the other but also their paradoxical 
yet co-constitutive relations. Therefore it is not surprising to see that there are two camps of 
criticism towards Mouffe’s agonism/agonistic pluralism that seem to be contradictory to each other 
even though they elaborate the same theoretical concept.  
Since the elaboration of the dimension of coercion in Mouffe’s agonism in this dissertation takes 
the ontological plane as the starting point, foregrounding and making more explicit this 
paradoxical yet co-constitutive nature between radical contingency and the primacy of the political 
is central. The elaboration stresses the need to keep in mind two things; (i) the ‘radical 
contingency’ does not mean there is no fixation whatsoever, since it would have meant total 
fixation which is impossible, but it should be understood as the impossibility of total and 
permanent completeness. The latter refers to the situation where there is always fixation or demand 
for it, no matter how transient and partial it is; (ii) This fragile stability is what makes fixation or 
suspension of the contingency continuously necessary and relevant despite its impossibility in the 
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final instance. With this understanding in mind, it becomes possible to locate and identify the 
coercive dimension on the ontological plane. This dimension is embedded in articulation that aims 
to suspend the contingency. In other words, it is embedded in the political that precedes the social. 
On this point it is rather clear that Mouffe, and Laclau, are aware of the inevitability of the 
dimension of coercion and its constitutive role to the reality. Their elaboration on antagonism and 
articulation are followed up with elaboration on hegemony and autonomy (Laclau & Mouffe, 2014, 
pp. 125-128). This is further followed up with elaboration on the relations of subordination, 
domination, and oppression and how these relations always potentially shift from one to the other 
(Laclau & Mouffe, 2014, pp. 137-139). The elaboration on the unity and autonomy is helpful to 
further locate and describe coercion at work to constitute the latter. Laclau and Mouffe present 
autonomy here as the result of a certain unified system that is in turn always a hegemonic 
formation. In that sense Laclau and Mouffe argue that, “Autonomy, far from being incompatible 
with hegemony, is a hegemonic construction” (Laclau & Mouffe, 2014, p. 127). The constitution 
of any hegemony always necessitates a political moment where, in the context of the absence of 
an objectively given universal centre or privileged element, a particular element is set to occupy 
the position as universal representation of other particular elements. Which particular element is 
to occupy this position, as it is not predetermined nor given, is always the result of political struggle 
as the decision to set one particular element to occupy the said position implies the exclusion of 
the other element. The elements articulated become the internal moments of the discourse, while 
those that are not become elements (Laclau & Mouffe, 2014, p. 91). It is through this articulation 
that the meanings and identities of the moments and elements are fixed and specified. Including 
which particular element that serves as the ‘nodal point’. The constitution of certain nodal points 
is central here because it is required to suspend the continuous metonymical sliding of the signifier 
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over the signified. The latter refers to the total closure which is impossible, therefore its absence 
has to be marked and a certain signifier is constituted to signify it in the form of its absence. 
Mouffe started to write her concept of agonism/agonistic pluralism after she co-authored the HSS 
with Laclau and she must have had this in her mind when she wrote it down. Fully aware that 
agonism/agonistic pluralism is basically an order and just like any other orders it requires the 
compliance of its subjects, she elaborates this issue in her work on the form of political 
communities preferable to agonism/agonistic pluralism, between universitas and societas (Mouffe, 
1993, pp. 66-73) and ‘identification’ (Mouffe, 2005, pp. 26-27). In those works, however, she does 
not sufficiently mention and elaborate on how the constitution of such an order requires 
‘compliance’ from among its subjects. In The Return of the Political she modifies Oakeshoott’s 
conception on ‘societas’ by stating that such political community based on the common reference 
to certain ethico-political principles and rules is always a result of hegemonic intervention that 
necessarily involves the drawing of frontiers between ‘we’ and ‘them’.  
To introduce conflict and antagonism into Oakeshott’s model it is necessary to 
recognize that the respublica is the product of a given hegemony, the expression of 
power relations, and that it can be challenged. Politics is to a great extent about the 
rules of the respublica and its many possible interpretations; it is about the 
constitution of the political community is not something that takes place inside the 
political community as some communitarians would have it. Political life concerns 
collective, public action; it aims at the construction of a 'we' in a context of diversity 
and conflict. But to construct a 'we' it must be distinguished from the "them", and 
that means establishing a frontier, defining an 'enemy'. Therefore, while politics 
aims at constructing a political community and creating a unity, a fully inclusive 
political community and a final unity can never be realized since there will 
permanently be a 'constitutive outside', an exterior to the community that makes its 
existence possible. Antagonistic forces will never disappear and politics is 
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characterized by conflict and division. Forms of agreement can be reached but they 
are always partial and provisional since consensus is by necessity based on acts of 
exclusion. We are indeed very far from the language of civility dear to Oakeshott! 
(Mouffe, 1993, p. 69) 
Reading this passage what immediately comes to mind is “How agonism/agonistic pluralism 
distinguishes itself from other orders that always potentially subordinates or excludes it and how 
it maintains its hegemonic position.” However, what Mouffe comes to elaborate in the same 
passage is more about how Oakeshott’s model overlooks the antagonistic dimension that 
constitutes the political community he envisages in the sense of how it has to deal with diversity 
of demands from among the elements that constitute it. In other words, Mouffe still elaborates the 
antagonistic dimension in Oakeshott’s model but still focuses on something that is inside the 
political community that is contrary to her own criticism to Oakeshott’s model in the quotation 
above. 
What is missing is that she overlooks that as an order, agonism/agonistic pluralism is impossible 
in the last instance. This is what Roskamm and Yamamoto highlight in their criticisms toward 
Mouffe. Mouffe continuously evades the questions with regards to “What to do with those who 
refuse to identify themselves with the ethico-political principles of agonism/agonistic politics?” 
This question is crucial especially when it is put against the backdrop of the quote from Laclau 
cited in the very beginning of this dissertation. Following Mouffe’s, as well as Oakeshott’s 
argument that, what binds together the members of the political community is not certain 
substantive ideals of common goals but rather common set of rules, the refusal to comply with the 
ethico-political principles that agonism/agonistic pluralism endorses manifest in the very notion 
of foundationalism or essentialism. This can be found in, as Laclau states, both religious 
fundamentalism and the most refined of ‘Western’ social democracy. Mouffe does describe and 
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envisage the implications of her concepts on the empirical issues such as multiculturalism and 
refugees in relations to the limits of agonism/agonistic pluralism. This, however, does not 
comprehensively convey explicitly the coercive dimension necessarily involved and the 
compliance demanded from the supposed subjects (Mouffe, 2005, pp. 120-123). Most of Mouffe’s 
elaboration focuses on the antagonism whose recognition of its constitutive role she uses to 
distinguish her own model of democracy as agonistic-pluralism with other models including 
different conceptualizations of agonism, such as Connolly’s and Arendt’s. This explains why for 
some of her critics, Mouffe seems to overemphasize antagonism. Especially, the term ‘enemy’, 
which Mouffe takes from Schmitt, rather confuses the antagonism and its constitutive role she 
aims to highlight as it tends to blur the line between antagonism on the ontological and ontical 
plane. Menga focuses his criticism to Mouffe on this point (Menga, 2017). 
This dissertation takes the elaboration on coercion starting from the ontological plane by referring 
back to how Laclau and Mouffe conceptualize antagonism in the HSS. In the HSS, they define 
antagonism as a situation where ‘the presence of the ‘Other’ prevents me from being totally 
myself” (Laclau & Mouffe, 2014, p. 111). The identity of ‘self’ here is understood as discursively 
constructed, through the suspension of the contingency and fluidity of meanings and identities, 
which can never be fully eliminated. The antagonism here refers to this contingency and fluidity 
that always potentially dissolve the stability, the partial fixity, of the meanings and identities of 
the ‘self’ produced through articulation. In this sense, in line with Roskamm, antagonism is 
portrayed and understood rather as a ‘structural principle’ than a ‘personal feature’ (Roskamm, 
2015, p. 398). 
This is the first central concept to locate and identify coercion at work on the ontological plane. 
The political moment of suspension of the fluidity of meanings and identities through articulation 
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and the contingency that it pushes to the fringes but always potentially dissolve the stability 
produced. The suspension of the fluidity, of the overflow of meanings and identities across the 
field of discursivity, is the primal coercion. This coercion serves to suspend the meanings and 
identities of the elements or signifiers by ascertaining their differential relations in a (partially and 
temporarily) stable structure and by such stabilization it becomes possible to make sense of our 
reality. Otherwise, the elements or signifiers would have constantly fleeting, ever changing 
relations of difference and reality would be totally impossible. The inevitable dislocations caused 
by this stabilization are what Laclau and Mouffe argue as the ever present possibility of antagonism 
(Laclau, 1990, p. 42). Mouffe in her agonism/agonistic pluralism brings this argument further by 
stating the constitutive role of antagonism and the need to acknowledge and institutionalize it in 
order to overcome the current crisis of liberal democracy. 
The second central point is that this primary coercion corresponds with the compliance and 
submission of the subjects to the corresponding structure, in this case agonism/agonistic pluralism, 
for its constitution as a reality. It is necessary to bear in mind that agonism/agonistic pluralism is 
still an order that is based on certain rules or set of rules. Acknowledgement of antagonism as the 
limits of the objectivity of the corresponding political community and its constitutive role and the 
need to institutionalize it is the central rules in the constitution of agonism/agonistic pluralism as 
a reality. These rules require the subjects to submit themselves to it. This aspect tends to be 
overlooked especially because Mouffe puts her argument against the existing essentialism and 
foundationalism manifests in the current dominant neoliberal regime. The immediate image that 
comes to the fore is the deconstruction of the current essentialized dogmas and rules, especially 
ones that pertain to the idea of ‘The End of Ideology’. While this is true, it covers only half of her 
overall argument, as she also discusses about the continuous need for new regimes after the 
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deconstruction or modification of the previous ones. This is in line with Laclau’s elaboration on 
the relations between the sedimentation of certain discourse or hegemony that he describes as 
‘space’ and its disruption as ‘moment’. The disruption here refers to the moment when the 
contingent nature of the space comes to the fore. The ‘moment’ can never hegemonize the space 
but, the other way around, the space can never totally hegemonize the moment. The latter is the 
excess of the contingency that the space attempts to stabilize but can never be able to fully do so 
(Laclau, 1990, pp. 41-42). 
The elaboration in the previous chapters has put forward that these two points of the stabilization 
of the fluidity of meanings and identities through the introduction of a certain set of rules that 
govern the differential relations among the elements as internal moments of certain discourse and 
the demand for compliance from among its subjects are where coercion at work on ontological 
plane at work is located. These two points serve as a lens to highlight the coercive dimension of 
agonism/agonistic pluralism that is presumed as an order. As any order, its constitution always 
involves certain rules or set of rules whose compliance with are demanded from its subjects. In the 
previous chapters, however, the elaboration on the latter is preceded by elaboration to justify how 
coercion on the ontological plane can be justified as ‘coercion’. The elaboration in Chapter II 
grapples not only with the justification of coercion on the ontological plane as coercion but also to 
highlight the contingency of its meanings. 
3. Objective Coercion and the Constitution of Subject: the Contingency of Coercion 
and the Role of Fantasmatic Dimension 
 
 The contingency that becomes the condition of possibility, and impossibility as well, for the 
constitution of reality through articulation also permeates the concept of coercion. This is best seen 
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in, among others, the debate on the nature of coercion how it relates to issues of border policy and 
refugee between Arash Abizadeh (Abizadeh, 2008; Abizadeh, 2010) and David Miller (Miller, 
2020). Abizadeh opens the debate by arguing that the current border control policies are 
unjustifiable from the point of view of democratic theory. This is because it draws its justification 
from certain group of people, the citizens of the corresponding country, that does not match with 
the supposed subjects of democracy who are, he argues, unbounded by national borders (Abizadeh, 
2008, p. 38). Abizadeh argues that the current regime of unilateral border control invades 
individual autonomy, especially of those would-be immigrants, and for a truly democratic border 
control regime their consent is required to justify the imposition of such a control. David Miller 
responds against this by distinguishing between coercion and prevention, and the latter need not 
necessarily prevent autonomy. In the case of border control, though Miller acknowledges it may 
restrict freedom, it does not give rise to democratic entitlement. Abizadeh responds back by 
arguing that Miller misses his point as what he is trying to say is that in order to be democratically 
justifiable any law should owe its justification to those who subject to it and he argues that Miller’s 
response to his original text, with the whole distinction between coercion and prevention and 
between actual and hypothetical coercion, seems to evacuate the domain of democracy theory 
(Abizadeh, 2008, pp. 127-128). 
There are three points found to be crucial for the elaboration of coercion in this dissertation. First, 
Abizadeh defines the coercive dimension as invasive for the autonomy in the current regime of 
border control only by measuring it from the normative point of view of democratic principle. By 
doing so, he arranges all forms of coercion into a single chain of equivalence and portrays them as 
contrary to the democratic principle. Second, Miller deconstructs the chain of equivalence that 
Abizadeh constitutes by introducing distinctness of the forms of coercion through the categories 
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of coercion and prevention and actual and hypothetical coercion. Referring to Joseph Raz’s 
principle of individual autonomy that Abizadeh uses to justify his argument that the current border 
control regime is invasive to individual autonomy, he argues that not all of those categories mean 
the invasion of individual autonomy and the current border control regime falls into this category. 
Third, acknowledging the weight of Miller’s response, Abizadeh appeals to the normative 
judgement in his original text to back up his argument by arguing that Miller’s response, while it 
is technically true seems to evacuate the domain of democratic theory.  
The debate is illuminating due to there is there being an ‘unsaid’ dimension of coercion but this is 
hardly shown almost, especially in Abizadeh, namely the submission into and compliance with 
democratic principle. Abizadeh overlooks the ‘unsaid’ dimension of coercion by assuming that 
autonomy comes prior to one insertion and submission into the structure. Referring to Joseph Raz’s 
principle of individual autonomy, which specifies a concept derived from liberal principle, he 
conflates the two competing values within liberal democracy by focusing only on its liberal 
dimension. In doing so, while correctly stating that according to democratic principle the 
promulgation of (coercive) law owes its justification to those who are subject to it, he also 
generalizes that all would-be immigrants subject themselves to democratic ideals and principles. 
Subject themselves here refers to more than merely having certain laws based on democratic values 
and principles imposed upon them but to include identifying themselves as democratic subjects. 
Miller, on the other hand, retains the same assumption in his response to Abizadeh. The only 
difference is that Miller argues that the specific forms of coercion that he constructs through 
specifying the categories in Abizadeh’s general category of coercion do not invade individual 
autonomy. This does not change the underlying assumption that ‘individual autonomy’ is assumed 
to be complete and constituted prior to one’s insertion into the structure or symbolic order. The 
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‘castration’ the subject has to undergo as demanded by symbolic order is this ‘unsaid’ coercion. 
This ‘unsaid’ coercion that both Abizadeh and Miller take for granted is exactly what this 
dissertation aims to interrogate and elaborate. The ‘unsaid’ coercion manifests in the reference to 
the democratic principle as the governing normative principle that governs the Abizadeh vs. Miller 
debate on what is and is not coercive and whether the currently dominant border control regime is 
coercive or not. The debates between Abizadeh and Miller say very little about this ‘unsaid’ 
dimension of coercion as coercion and how it is actually the thing that makes the whole debate 
possible. 
Abizadeh actually does bring this to the fore when he refers to the democratic strategy for 
justification, in contrast to the liberal one, as he states: “The key difference, then, between 
liberalism and democratic theory is that while the former engages in a strategy of hypothetical 
justification to establish the justness of institutions and laws through which political power is 
exercised, the latter demands actual participation in institutionalized practices of discursive 
justification geared to establishing the legitimacy of political institutions and laws” (Abizadeh, 
2010, p. 41). He further specifies that the democratic strategy, in contrast to liberal strategy that 
focuses on substance: saying that a justification is “owed to all those over whom power is 
exercised” is to say something about the process: that all such persons must have the opportunity 
(1) to actually  participate in the political processes that determine how power is exercised, on 
terms that (2) are consistent with their freedom and equality” (Abizadeh, 2010, p. 41). Yet, he puts 
a constraint on these conditions by putting them merely within the terrain of consciousness as if 
the rationality on which their autonomy and freedom is something fully complete and transparent 
to them prior to their insertion into the symbolic order or structure. This debate helps to ‘extimate’ 
what has not been covered in the mainstream debate on coercion that is referred to as the ‘unsaid’ 
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coercion. This is apparent  on Abizadeh’s side when he constantly refers to democratic principle 
as the normative reference, such as his rhetorical appeal in his statement: “Anyone who accepts a 
genuinely democratic theory of political legitimation domestically is thereby committed to 
rejecting the unilateral domestic right to control and close the state’s boundaries, whether 
boundaries in the civic sense (which regulate membership) or in the territorial sense (which 
regulate movement).” (Abizadeh, 2008, p. 38) In contrast to his assumption that takes the centrality 
of this principle for granted, PDT sees the centrality of such normative principle, in this case 
democracy, as not something given and predetermined but always a result of hegemonic 
intervention. Mouffe uses the term ‘ethico-political’ to refer such normative value. The role of this 
‘unsaid’ coercion to make such debate on freedom and coercion possible is paradoxical. However, 
isn’t this sort of paradox the feature of the coercion on ontological plane that was discussed in the 
previous section? Therefore, the elaboration on the dimension of coercion and how it works on the 
ontological plane is taken following this trace.  
Such paradox, especially in relation to democracy, liberty, and constraint or coercion, is hardly 
new. Rousseau has elaborated this and described it in a sentence that is parallel to Laclau’s most 
favourite expression of ‘impossible but necessary’ that is ‘forcing people to be free’ (Rousseau, 
1999, p. 98). Bourdieu provides further hints to this paradoxical relation between consent and 
constraint or coercion when he describes, “All symbolic domination presupposes, on the part of 
those who submit to it, a form of complicity which is neither passive submission to external 
constraint nor a free adherence to values. The recognition of the legitimacy of the official language 
has nothing in common with an explicitly professed, deliberate and revocable belief, or with an 
intentional act of accepting ‘norm” (Bourdieu, 1991, pp. 51-52). It is this ‘complicity’ and 
‘submission’ which are beyond consent and constraint that makes Abizadeh’s assumption and 
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focus on the manifestation, both overt and covert coercion, problematic. The dimension of 
coercion that this dissertation aims to interrogate and elaborate is not only ‘unsaid’ but also 
sometimes ‘unrecognized’. More than merely overt or covert, this dimension is ‘latent’. The latter 
pertains to what Lukes describes as the ‘third dimension of power’ (Lukes, 2005). It becomes the 
‘unconscious’ that Zizek describes as something that ‘we don’t know that we know’ (Zizek, 2016, 
p. 265). 
The paradox points to the contingency of coercion on the ontological plane, to the cathexis process 
that takes place simultaneously with articulation. The constitution of a certain nodal point that the 
latter produces is supported with the infusion of libidinal drive into the empty signifier that 
becomes the nodal point. The infusion of the drive into these certain signifiers elevate them into 
the position of Freudian Ding or ‘the Thing’ (Zizek, 1989, p. 108). The latter refers to the 
constitution of certain fantasy to support certain discourse and the reality it produces (Zizek, 1989, 
p. 44). The nodal and cathectic points, however, are never fully fixed. The most recent example is 
how easily the public change their mind in the attempt to contain the spread of the Covid-19. In 
Indonesia and also in some other countries, initially there was strong resistance against regional or 
national-wide quarantine measures due to its severe restriction on freedom of movement and socio-
economic impacts. This opinion, however, shifted in a matter of days when the majority of the 
public demanded even stricter restrictions of mobility than initially proposed. These two 
competing discourses equally involve subjection of the agents into a certain set of rules supported 
by a certain fantasy. The discourse on quarantine is obvious but the discourse that prioritizes 
freedom is more subtle and only in such context of an undecidable situation does its coercive face 
becomes apparent. It requires the agent to comply with it by putting the primacy on freedom over 
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anything else. In the case of the Covid-19 outbreak, it is even above the freedom (of fear) from 
being infected. 
The point is not one which is the true representation of freedom or liberty but how each turns out 
to involve the dimension of coercion just as Laclau’s description quoted in the very beginning of 
Chapter I. The only difference is the cathectic point on which the respective adherents invested 
their libidinal drive and how each structure makes it possible. Mouffe’s agonism/agonistic 
pluralism as a structure or order are not an exception. The distinguishing specific feature of this 
agonism/agonistic pluralism is that it gives primacy not to the fullness of any principle in the 
positive sense but the impossibility of such. Further, the identification to the primary coercion 
enables the adherents to define what they see as coercion, as the obstruction to the realization of 
what they identify with, as something that its eradication will enable them to realize the fullness 
of their identity. 
The coercion on the ontological plane turns out to provide the ‘surface for inscription’ for the 
desire for fullness, which is absent and therefore it is desirable. This explanation on primary 
coercion or coercion on the ontological plane is based on the Lacanian triad and his concepts of 
desire and fantasy that is based on the assumption totally, in contrast to one that both Abizadeh 
and Miller adopt, the agent’s split subjectivity. In such way now it becomes possible to hold it in 
parallel with Laclau’s elaboration on the relations between hegemony and autonomy in which the 
latter is only possible through the former. In Lacanian sense, the autonomy that Abizadeh refers 
to, can only be articulated only after and through its insertion into symbolic order to constitute 
differential relations with what-it-is-not or what obstructs its full realization. Though it can be 
presented only in its negative form that is its absence or incompleteness. In return for the 
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‘enjoyment’ castrated from the subject, the subject becomes able to articulate its need into demand 
and its ego into subject. 
Therefore the primary coercion is not necessarily felt as coercion or ‘invasion of autonomy’ 
because the autonomy owes its existence to it through identification. Identification here is defined 
as the ‘psychological process whereby the subject assimilates an aspect, property or attribute of 
the other and is transformed, wholly or partially, after the model the other provides. It is by series 
of identification that the personality is constituted and specified’ (Laplanche and Pontalis quoted 
in Stavrakakis, 1999, p. 30). As the subject becomes able to articulate its needs into demands 
through its insertion into the structure or symbolic order, the symbolic order, in return of the 
castration of the subject’s enjoyment, gives the promise of its impossible recovery through their 
submission.  
What we have here is something that fits exactly Laclau’s description of ‘impossible but 
necessary’. The fullness or incompleteness is something impossible but it is necessary both for the 
subject and ‘the Other’. The subject needs it to give stability to their reality so they can understand 
and live correspondingly even though not fully. Sometimes even when the subject realizes that it 
experiences incomplete life, the subject gains consolation through the fantasy that it at least knows 
what is missing that makes its life incomplete. The fantasy has the narrative features of the ideal 
and the obstacle to achieve it. It also has a transgressive aspect besides the formally stated ideal 
that is also purported to give its capacity to protect the subject from anxiety in experiencing the 
contingency of its life (Glynos, 2008, p. 287). This fantasmatic dimension explains the grip of the 
structure, or the discourse, upon its subjects (Glynos & Howarth, 2007). This includes ensuring 
the subject’s quiescence, or the agent’s complicity in Bourdieu’s word, in having the castration 
and restriction the structure imposes upon them. 
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The subject’s identification to the structure via the fantasy also determines the shift of coercion on 
the ontological plane to the ontical one or the shift from the relations of subordination to relations 
of oppression. What is accepted as the (social) norms in one moment could be seen as coercion in 
the next second if the subject’s identification shifts to a different cathectic point and fantasy and 
the previous one is perceived to obstruct the full realization of the new identity. This process can 
go on indefinitely because every structure or order commonly belongs to the symbolic order or 
‘the Other’ whose fundamental mechanism is repression. 
The agent’s complicity, to use Bourdieu’s term, is located in its moment of decision whether to 
sacrifice the yet unknown enjoyment the symbolic order demanded or to continue in the imaginary 
realm of the ego. At this moment there is no subject, there is no ‘I’, as the subject only emerges 
through one’s insertion into the symbolic where the ‘ego’ is transformed into ‘subject’ and the 
‘needs’ are transformed into ‘demands’. Without further going into the Lacanian psychoanalysis, 
it is enough to say that the subject is and can only be constituted through the agent’s insertion and 
submission into the symbolic order. 
This ontological view on the constitution of the subject is in contrast to one that sees the subject is 
constituted outside and prior to its insertion into the symbolic order. In such a view, the insertion 
into the symbolic and the castration that it demands would have been defined as outright coercion 
and thus illegitimate because it violates the subject’s fullness assumed to be prior to its insertion 
into the symbolic order. On the contrary, the ontological view employed in this research sees that 
the subject is the product of the coercion or repression of the subjectification or subject constitution 
process itself. In such a view, coercion becomes more nuanced than a straightforward exhaustive 
category. The coercion that makes subjectification possible does not necessarily always appear as 
coercion in the subjective sense for the corresponding subject because the subject identifies itself 
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with the symbolic order or structure through which it becomes a subject. The transformation of 
coercion in objective sense into a subjective one requires the shift of this identification. 
It is on this concept of identification that the import of fantasy and fantasmatic dimension becomes 
explicit. The fantasy here is related to the concept of desire, referring to the desire that the subject 
identifies itself with and expects to satisfy through its insertion into the symbolic order or structure. 
The desire here in general can be defined as the desire for fullness that has been lost to the 
castration, yet the symbolic order promises that this ‘lost fullness’ would eventually be recovered 
if one keeps itself submitted into the order. It has been said that such ‘recovery of lost fullness’ is 
impossible, but it is necessary to keep the subject believing that it is desirable and possible in order 
to maintain its submission to the symbolic order. This ‘believing’ act is actually the libidinal 
investment or cathexis on a certain signifier, a process of upholding a certain signifier into the 
position of Freudian thing. The transformation of objective coercion into subjective coercion 
hinges on the shift of identification, in other words the shift of point of libidinal investment or 
cathectic point. 
This demonstrates coercion at work on the ontological plane and how it constitutes certain 
subjectivity. Taking this to look at Mouffe’s agonism/agonistic pluralism, the coercive dimension 
and how it operates to constitute it as a reality can be identified and specified. The elaboration in  
Chapter II and Chapter III explicate how Mouffe’s agonism/agonistic pluralism introduce a certain 
set of rules for the would-be subject to comply with. Mouffe explicates these rules mainly through 
juxtapositions of her concept against other concepts, such as Habermas’s deliberative democracy 
(Mouffe, 1999); Arendt’s pluralism; and Connolly’s agonistic respect. In doing so, besides 
explicating the specification of her agonism/agonistic pluralism, Mouffe also defines what 
agonism/agonistic pluralism should and should not. It is here the normative element of her 
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intervention becomes apparent. It is noteworthy to once again underline here that this normative 
element should be understood in correlation with the underlying presuppositions of the radical 
contingency and the primacy of the political. 
The elaboration on coercion at work on ontological plane to constitute reality foregrounds the 
continuous dialectics between coercion and consent. This is the studies from Jonathan Davies that 
sees, through the lens of Gramscian hegemony, that coercion is ubiquitous even under the currently 
dominant regime of collaborative governance (Davies J. , 2013; Davies J. , 2014). What 
distinguishes the elaboration in this dissertation, however, is its attempt to grapple with the aspect 
of ‘beyond consent and coercion’ that Bourdieu points out in his description on the subject’s 
complicity in constitution symbolic domination. The elaboration demonstrates that the coercion at 
work on ontological plane is constitutive to the subjectivity or the ‘self’ of its adherents. It gives 
them the sense of fullness even though it comes in the form of its absence as something that is 
missing but could be recovered as long as it maintains its compliance with the structural rules. The 
submission here is beyond rational calculation. It involves affective dimension and operates as the 
‘unconscious’ as described above, as ‘something that we don’t know that we know.’  
Mouffe’s agonism/agonistic pluralism comprises of certain set of rules around certain ethical value 
just like any other order. The main difference here is that the ethical value points to the ‘lack’ or 
‘incompleteness’ that agonism/agonistic pluralism argues to be constitutive and ineradicable. The 
ethical value that it stands for, however, is not some sort of completeness, not even in the negative 
form of its absence but its impossibility. The specific ethical stance that Mouffe takes here is what 
is known as ‘The Ethics of the Real’. In contrast to other ethical stances that displace the positivity 
of completeness or fullness to a certain ‘Thing’ that is still yet to come, known as the ethics of 
harmony, The Ethics of the Real is an ethic without ideal as it recognizes the impossibility of 
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completeness and its constitutive role instead of covering it (Stavrakakis, 1999). In relations to the 
fantasmatic logics, Glynos and Howarth distinguish between the former and the latter through the 
terms ‘ethical’ and ‘ideological’ fantasy respectively (Glynos & Howarth, 2007, p. 14). Mouffe 
agonism/agonistic pluralism and its PDT underpinning are obviously stands on the former. It is 
the ethical stance that Mouffe’s agonism/agonistic pluralism demands its subjects to identify with 
as the drive for the continuous attempts to sublimate antagonism. Identification and compliance 
with this set of ethico-political principles and the derived set of rules becomes the frontiers that 
separate and define agonism/agonistic pluralism as reality from what-it-is-not. Those who do not 
comply and identify themselves with them are pushed to the fringe of the social space.  
Combining the elaboration on Mouffe’s agonism/agonistic pluralism and its theoretical 
underpinning in Chapter I and on coercion at work on ontological plane on Chapter II, the locus 
and modus of the coercive dimension in Mouffe’s agonism/agonistic pluralism can be specified. 
How this can be used for empirical analysis, however, requires further interrogation. Analysis on 
the empirical case of ‘Community Participatory Planning’ in North Ayrshire is conducted to 
illustrate agonism at work, including its coercive dimension, and how to apply this framework for 
empirical analysis. The challenges are best described by Wagenaar as the weakness of the PDT for 
empirical analysis; namely: this framework’s lack of application on empirical analysis; the 
impermanence of social and political categories and phenomena; and the generalist; ineffectual 
nature of its ethos (Wagenaar, 2011, pp. 154-155). This conclusions on the attempt to apply 




4. Illustrating Agonism/Agonistic Pluralism at Work: the Case of North Ayrshire 
Community Planning Partnership   
 
When this framework is employed in order to analyse the empirical phenomenon of the NACPP 
as the illustrative case, it soon becomes apparent how a certain symbolic order which initially 
perceived as liberating in comparison to the previous one could transform into an oppressive one. 
The collaborative governance regime adopted in the NACPP has been promoted as a regime of 
governing that gives the common people at the sub-national level more voice in the policy process. 
While such moves have been lauded by the majority of the public, the same public also have 
concern that such a move is only a façade to justify ‘the abandonment of the public by its 
government.’ Furthermore, the collaboration is not as simple as many have foreseen or expected. 
It involves complex and intricate rules, mechanisms that manifest in endless cycles of meetings, 
debates, and manoeuvres not only between the government; both national and sub-national; but 
also among various elements that comprised the society. 
Investigation and analysis on the empirical case of NACPP, however, points out that while the 
contingency becomes more explicit, the whole structure and mechanism regulating the fora that it 
entails are designed and employed not only to accommodate the contingent situation but also to 
stabilize it. This has often been overlooked by the tendency to presume consent as rather apolitical 
matter and it would be very likely to be achieved as long as the parties involved are given the 
opportunity to decide for themselves. On both models of governance; one relies on market 
mechanism and the other on governance through public deliberation, there is one common 
underlying presupposition that the subject precedes the governance structure and it is not 
constituted after its insertion and submission into it. It can be added that the subject here is also 
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often presumed to be complete, either as a rational being pursuing maximization of 
benefits/minimization of risks or as a social being pursuing harmony. The discourse of 
collaborative governance in the case analysed often involves those two presumptions. While these 
presumptions have been effective in constituting an appealing fantasy, especially through 
juxtaposition between collaborative governance against the state-centric model that it replaces to 
highlight the merit of the former, the limits of such fantasy often come to the fore especially when 
the involved parties are facing deadlock in the decision making process. In such a moment, the 
political dimension of consensus comes to the fore and becomes more obvious, revealing that the 
subjects involved are neither completely rational or solely pursue harmony. 
The analysis on this empirical case does not intend to justify whether this case represents or does 
not represent agonism/agonistic pluralism as Mouffe has envisaged. The empirical analysis here 
is rather intended to answer the question of, “How is and to what extent the NACPP agonistic?” 
The question is formulated in such a way as to comply with the underlying PDT presuppositions 
that is also the underpinning of Mouffe’s agonism/agonistic pluralism. The reality of 
agonism/agonistic pluralism is not something complete and fixed either. In line with Roskamm’s 
criticism to Mouffe, agonism/agonistic pluralism is impossible in the final instance. 
Agonism/agonistic pluralism is treated not as features or qualities permanently embedded in a 
certain practice or set of practices but as logic that one certain moment characterizes them. As 
logic, agonism/agonistic pluralism can never totally and permanently hegemonize the practice or 
set of practices investigated as it always continuously engages in discursive battle with other logics 
for the hegemonic position. 
Putting agonism/agonistic pluralism in such a way enables the empirical analysis to see its political 
origin, its sedimentation into norms, and its contestation or resilience as well as the fantasmatic 
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dimension involved. The coercive dimension is ubiquitous in each of those moments. The 
dynamics, however, vary from one moment to the other as each moment involves different form 
and magnitude of tension between coercion and consent. The LCE presupposes three ontological 
dimensions of reality, the social; the political; and the ideological and ethical dimensions. These 
three dimensions also serve as the basic unit of explanation to describe a certain practice or set of 
practices and how and why they work. As basic units of explanation, the three ontological 
dimensions are conceived in terms of logics: the social logics; the political logics; and the 
fantasmatic logics respectively. When it is applied for explaining a practice or set of practices, 
Glynos and Howarth describe logic as “… the rules or grammar of the practice, as well as the 
conditions which make the practice both possible and vulnerable” (Glynos & Howarth, 2007, p. 
136). In relation to the main focus of this study, the coercion at work on the ontological plane, 
LCE facilitates to relate this plane with the ontical one as the three basic units of explanation can 
be grasped in relations to the ontological/ontical distinction (Glynos & Howarth, 2007, p. 153).  
The analysis on the empirical case is focused to identify when, how, and why the logic of 
agonism/agonistic pluralism comes to predominantly characterize the regime of Collaborative 
Planning Partnership in North Ayrshire. The specific case of NA is selected for the reasons 
elaborated in the previous chapters. The analysis, or explanation is probably  more appropriate, 
describes how when this particular logic comes to the fore to characterize the regime investigated, 
it does so by excluding or subordinating other logics as consequences of the operation of certain 
rules or grammar that comprise it. In the cases explained, this manifest in the detail rules and 
regulations how the existing decisions and policies have to be subjected to continuous review in 
which moment they could be questioned, debated, changed, or modified. Such process itself, at 
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least formally, is stipulated to involve as wide as possible community members through their 
representatives. 
The currently adopted collaborative governance framework has been articulated mainly in the 
narrative of bottom-up, participatory, and community self-reliance. The narrative of pressure and 
inability of the state to cope with all aspects of public life often accompanies this narrative. In the 
latter it is often stressed that the conventional way of dealing with public matters, referring to state 
centric model of governance, is not an option and the only possible alternative is for the other non-
state elements to take greater role. The economic decline, exacerbated by the current crises, in NA 
is often articulated as the factors that put them in the current position and justifies the adoption of 
the collaborative governance model at the sub-national level. NA has been one of the most 
deprived areas in Scotland and UK. In 2018 it stood as the 5th most deprived local authority in 
Scotland (Institute, 2018, p. 16). In this narrative the adoption of the collaborative governance 
framework at the sub-national level is articulated as the most viable and feasible way toward 
economic recovery.  
Other dominant logic which articulates the current regime is the discourse of ‘devolving the power 
to the community’. The project to set sustainable and workable collaborative governance 
framework in NA is related to the Scottish’ attempts to gain broader autonomy. The dominant 
discourse on this issue is that the power devolved should not stop at parliament house nor city halls 
but has to go down to the community. This discourse seems to predominantly characterize the 
regime of CPP in North Ayrshire. The specific articulation of this discourse in the council area 
also puts the emphasis on ‘equality’ as the ethico-political value intended to govern the dynamics 
of the policy process. It is important to underline here that NA Council has been experimenting 
with the collaborative governance framework for decades, even before the decree of Scotland Act 
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in 1998 that secures power devolution to Scotland. The council has won several awards for this 
initiative, which means that their work is widely acknowledged. 
The discourse that strongly characterizes this regime positions the community as the main actor in 
the governance process, especially on determining what, how, and to whom the public services are 
to be delivered. The dominant discourse puts high expectation that the communities involved could 
arrive at consensus. When the expected consensus is harder to achieve than expected and to ensure 
that the consensus achieved is effective, several procedures are developed to facilitate the process, 
such as evidence based tools and frameworks and the deployment of community organizers among 
the communities. 
The contingency of the consensus, however, is given specific attention and formally 
institutionalized in the framework. The consented plan is continuously subjected to periodic review 
where it can be problematized and questioned. This is based on the consideration on the 
contingency of the situation that the communities are facing and impossible completeness of 
knowledge and information upon which the decisions are based upon. One of the disruptions to 
this stability found during the field research, however, is the economic review by the end of 2018 
that describes that the economic performance in NA did not improve as expected (Institute, 2018). 
Rather a grim picture is also presented in the public sector, especially in relation to health care 
services (Inspectorate & Scotland, 2019). 
Such a moment is critical as it could cause a drift on the subjects’ cathectic point. New fantasy 
was then introduced in order to maintain the subjects’ attachment and submission to the structure 
and the structure’s cohesiveness, such as ‘the Kind Society’ project. Such fantasy operates to 
provide some sort of foundational guarantee that the subjects may use as protection against the 
anxiety caused by the contingency of the social situation and relations (Glynos, 2008, p. 287; see 
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also Zizek, 1989, p. 44). As long as the subject holds to this fantasy and identifies itself with the 
symbolic order to which this fantasy belongs to, the subject will continue to perceive the coercive 
castration it causes is perceived as something natural and keep itself subordinate to it. 
Relating this with Laclau and Mouffe’s relations of subordination, domination, and oppression, it 
can be said that the transformation from one form of relations to the others hinges on the drift of 
this cathectic point supported by the fantasmatic dimension. The same logic is also applied to 
Zizek’s category of ‘objective violence’ and ‘subjective violence’. It is important to underline here 
that the transformation from relations of subordination to the oppression ones or objective violent 
to the subjective one does not mean that the subject who endures the coercion has found the ideal 
fullness in and for itself. The new ideal of fullness, that it found hindered by the dominant structure 
it faces, also belongs to the symbolic order just with a different structural combination and a 
different fantasy, giving the corresponding subject new cathectic point. 
The actual and potential transformation of objective coercion into subjective one and vice versa, 
is related with the fantasmatic dimension that supports the corresponding discursive reality. The 
fantasmatic dimension here corresponds with identification and the constitution of subjectivity in 
the engagement between the structure, which is essentially discursive, and the agent. The 
discussion on how this transformation is always possible and the possibility cannot be fully 
eradicated starts with how the coercion on the ontological plane constitutes not only the 
corresponding entity but also its subject. In the constitution of the latter, it involves the subject’s 
submission. This is in line with Bourdieu’s argument that symbolic violence always involves the 
agent’s complicity. However, as discussed in the earlier chapters and because it involves the 
fantasmatic dimension, Lacanian perspective is considered to be able to provide more detail and 
systematic explanation here. 
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The lack of structure manifests when it demands the agent to submit themselves in order to become 
its subject. This is parallel to the closure as coercion on the ontological plane that defines the being 
of the structure discussed since the agent’s decision to submit itself to the structure implies 
subordination and exclusion of other possibilities. Such explanation, however, does not 
comprehensively address the question on how coercion on this plane, objective coercion, always 
potentially transforms itself into subjective coercion. Such explanation requires elaboration on 
how a discourse has or does not have grip on its subjects and this is exactly what the concept and 
category of fantasmatic dimension is for (Glynos & Howarth, 2007, p. 107). The fantasmatic 
dimension here serves to constitute the subject’s desire and enjoyment that inform its attachment 
to a certain discourse. Therefore, Glynos and Howarth see the subject here as the subject of 
enjoyment (Glynos & Howarth, 2007, p. 151). 
Fantasy as “the support of the cohesiveness of our reality” (Zizek, 1989, p. 44) is specified as 
having the following characteristics: (1) It has a narrative structure which features, among other 
things, an ideal and an obstacle to its realization, and which may take a beatific or horrific form.” 
(2) “It has an inherently transgressive aspect vis-a-vis officially affirmed ideals.” and (3) “It 
purports to offer a foundational guarantee of sorts, in the sense that it offers the subject a degree 
of protection from the anxiety associated with a direct confrontation with the radical contingency 
of social relations” (Glynos, 2008, p. 287). In the concrete case of NACPP this is apparent in the 
discourse of ‘kindness’ that provides the ‘fantasy of being kind subject’ that exceeds beyond the 
boundaries of material gains (Ferguson & Thurman, 2019, p. 18). The role of the fantasy is to tap 
into the agents drive and transform it into desire by giving it a symbolic representation as the object 
(cause) of desire (Lacan, 2005, pp. 579-580; Fink, 2004, p. 22) is apparent here. It informs the 
agent about something that they should desire and the promise to attain it through their submission 
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into the structure of NACPP. In the highly contingent and dynamic structure such as NACPP, the 
discourse of ‘kindness’ appeals no longer to the rationale of technocratic effectiveness and 
managerial efficiency as the idealized image, but deeper into the agent’s affection. It incites the 
agent to identify itself as the subject of the corresponding structure as it perceives that what it 
desires can only be achieved or satisfied through their submission that entails its castration, into it. 
The agent’s submission into the structure entails behaviors that are symptomatic in nature. 
Because, the final and full satisfaction is impossible and in order to maintain the cohesiveness of 
the structure that constitutes the reality, the source of satisfaction is substituted from the symptoms 
(Fink, 1999, p. 3). The subject becomes attached to the symptomatic enjoyment without achieving 
what it initially desires to attain and through it the structure maintains its grip on the subject. In 
such a way, the coercion at the ontological plane appears to be something natural as the subject 
owes its subjectivity to it and cannot denounce it to be coercive without risking to lose its 
subjectivity. 
The mechanism mentioned above also serves to provide “a degree of protection from the anxiety 
associated with a direct confrontation with the radical contingency of the structure. This appears 
in how the discourse of ‘kindness’ explicitly emphasizes the need to venture beyond the boundaries 
of formal procedures and mechanisms. In such a way, the political dimension of the structure may 
well become apparent, as its constitution and maintenance requires the transgression of its frontiers 
or boundaries, but its dislocatory or coercive impacts become less sensible. This is because the 
transgressing subject feels that it is relatively free from the limitations or closure caused by the 
structure during the moment of transgression, while it can still acquire the symptomatic enjoyment 
by doing so. 
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If we look into the logic of agonism, it becomes obvious that as any other discourse, it requires the 
fantasmatic dimension in order to constitute a certain form of subjectivity. The logic of agonism 
gives emphasis on the contingency and fluidity, correspondingly it requires the sort of subjectivity 
that acquires its satisfaction through enjoyment that is related to them. This sort of subjectivity can 
be illustrated through the description of psychotherapy for the obsessive. Fink, in his attempt “to 
take Lacan at his word, to read his texts a la lettre—that is, both literally and to the letter” (Fink, 
2004, p. vii), describes that the treatment on the obsessive is directed to enable the analysand to 
recognize the lack in the Other or the structure, symbolized as Φ (capital phi) thus enables the 
subject to recognize the imaginary phallus (ɸ, with lowercase phi) and stop to make it as the 
condition of its desire (Fink, 2004, p. 36). This should be understood as the absence of 
identification. The identification that Lacan denounces is the identification of imaginary unity that 
evolves on the ɸ, the phallus as a sign instead of signifier that lacks signified, or the other ego (al). 
On the contrary, he identifies the identification on the register on the symbolic, exactly to the lack 
of unity, which is, nonetheless, still identification. 
The transformation of the coercion on the ontological plane or objective coercion into a subjective 
one occurs when the subject feels that the enjoyment provided by the fantasy is decreasing. In such 
a situation, the subject perceives that its subjectivity is threatened, signifying the lack of 
identification. Such a situation may lead to, at least two options which is the subject’s to decide, 
first, keeps reifying the cathectic point on the object (cause) of desire and keeps bouncing on the 
wall that manifests in the decrease of enjoyment it faces. Or, second, as described by Fink in the 
treatment for obsessive in psychoanalysis, recognize the lack of the structure and stop to make it 
the condition of its desire. In both scenarios, desire and enjoyment play a central role. The main 
difference, however, is the sort and source of enjoyment. Glynos and Howarth describe that in the 
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former, the structure constitutes the subject’s enjoyment as the enjoyment of closure, while in the 
latter it is the enjoyment of openness (Glynos & Howarth, 2007, p. 151).  
The presence of enjoyment in both scenarios of ideological and ethical fantasy implies that the 
operation of logic of agonism also requires desire. The latter belongs to the structure of the register 
of the symbolic. With regards to Mouffe’s agonism and the Radical democracy Project, this leads 
to another question that is, “How is it possible to constitute desire (for democracy) if its bases of 
stabilization, no matter how contingent and transient it is, is deconstructed?” Mouffe with Laclau 
have explicitly stated that they base their theoretical formula on the ideas of ‘the impossibility of 
the social’ (Laclau & Mouffe, 2014; Laclau, 1990, pp. 89-92) and ‘the impossibility of democracy’ 
(Mouffe, 1993) in the final instance. This ambiguity is well recognized by Glynos and Howarth 
who explicitly describe that elusiveness of this concept in capturing empirical phenomena as, once 
an empirical fantasy is defined as fantasy, especially by the corresponding subject, it no longer 
functions as a fantasy, that is to support the cohesiveness of our reality (Glynos & Howarth, 2007). 
The case of collaborative or participatory governance is taken for several reasons. First, as an 
empirical case, this research considers that it is necessary to take the theoretical framework 
elaborated above on empirical research to address some of the major critics toward Mouffe’s 
agonism/agonistic pluralism and the PDT that underpins it. Second, in relation to the specific topic 
of this research, the dimension of coercion in Mouffe’s agonism/agonistic pluralism, the case of 
collaborative or participatory governance is a very interesting one as it has been claimed that it 
stands for anything but coercion, mentioned in diverse terms but especially ‘hierarchy’, ‘top-down 
approach’ etc. Related to the former, the case is a good one to demonstrate how the ‘consent’ 
championed in the collaborative or participatory governance is always accompanied by demands 
for compliance with certain rules from among the subjects that differentiate and characterize it 
256 
 
with other regimes or mode of governing. As elaborated in the previous chapters, coercion operates 
on ontological plane exactly through this fixation that implies the exclusions of some possibilities 
for the constitution of the reality investigated. On the latter, the case is a good example how on the 
empirical plane the discourse never exhausts the field of discursivity as the elaboration in the 
previous chapters demonstrates how agonism/agonistic pluralism as a discourse or logic competes 
with other discourses or logics to characterize the practice or regime of practice investigated. 
The case of NACPP taken without defining as representation of agonism/agonistic pluralism for 
granted. Heuristically, as a logic or discourse, agonism/agonistic pluralism cannot fully and 
permanently hegemonize the NACPP regime as the field of discursivity. Therefore, in order to 
analyse its coercive dimension, it is necessary to identify and locate the moments when the 
discourse or logic of agonism comes to the fore in characterizing this regime of NACPP. In this 
way, the concepts of coercion as well as agonism can be employed to investigate the empirical 
case without being reified. It is necessary to underline here that what agonism refers to is not 
specified to certain substance either but hinges on the underlying ‘ontology of lack’ that Mouffe, 
as well as Laclau, formulate in their two underlying presuppositions of radical contingency and 
the primacy of the political. In other words, the discourse or logic of agonism/agonistic pluralism 
in the practice or regime investigated is identified by certain articulations that highlight and 
foreground the ‘lack of fullness’ in certain meanings or identities and, thus, the political origin of 
their constitution in the practice or regime investigated.  
This can be further specified, following Mouffe’s conceptualization of agonism, that the said 
articulations are recognized as constitutive for and institutionalized in the practice or regime 
investigated. Therefore events such as public consultation, public deliberation and public review 
in the collaborative governance regime investigated are central in this research. Those events are 
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indicative of the moments where the supposedly fixed decisions or policies are questioned and 
new decision has to be made to stabilize them, whether it is continuation; revision; or alteration of 
those policies or decisions. This, however, does not mean that with these events formally 
institutionalized in the regime analysed, the collaborative or participatory governance regime in 
NACPP becomes essentially agonistic for several reasons. First, it becomes one only during this 
moment when the contingency of the relatively stable decisions, policies, and the issues they 
address are questioned, debated, and potentially maintained, altered or abandoned altogether. This 
moment is politically constituted and those involved should make the decision with awareness that 
the decision made, whatever it might be, is subject to another cycle of review and questioning. 
Alternatives or options excluded in one event possibly still come back in the next cycle as equal 
candidates with ones adopted. Second, even with such a formal arrangement where contingency is 
recognized and institutionalized, it will never totally and permanently hegemonize the regime as a 
social space. It manifests only as a moment and as Laclau describes, the moment will never 
hegemonize the space. Third, in relation to the second, there are also empirical examples how such 
a moment of foregrounding the contingency, even after it is formally institutionalized, becomes 
merely instrumental in reproducing the hegemony of certain discourse on the regime. This 
potentially could take place in NA with the discourse of ‘kind society’. The case of Collaborative 
Governance in Nantes, France is another example of how this scenario becomes actual (Griggs, 
Howarth, & Feandeiro, 2018). 
The last point in the previous paragraph points to the most specific coercive dimension in Mouffe’s 
agonism/agonistic pluralism; the underlying ethics that is the Ethics of the Real. This specific 
ethical position is required for the subjects to identify themselves with since otherwise those 
moments when contingency come to the fore would serve a totally different kind of purpose than 
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what agonism/agonistic pluralism intends to. What this Ethics of the Real refers to has been 
elaborated above and in the previous chapters, but the point here is that the logic of 
agonism/agonistic pluralism ‘demands’ from among its subjects not only compliance to certain 
rules but also identification with certain ethical values.    
Defining these features of agonism/agonistic pluralism as how Mouffe conceptualizes it and 
locates them in the practice or regime analysed are important but they are not the only important 
steps in this research. No less, or even more important step, especially in relations to the main topic 
of this research, is to demonstrate and elaborate how the agonism/agonistic pluralism moment 
requires specification if it is to be intelligible and feasible. Specifying the aspects that constitutes 
it is what brings agonism/agonistic pluralism into being. It indicates that agonism/agonistic 
pluralism as reality belongs to the register of the symbolic which its fundamental mechanism is 
repression as it always belongs to castration from the agent as the condition for its insertion into it 
to become its subject. 
The coercive dimension of Mouffe’s agonism/agonistic pluralism especially its operation on the 
ontological plane becomes more obvious when the analysis and elaboration takes this path. Besides 
specifying its features both through substantive elaboration and juxtaposition with other concepts, 
analysis that goes back and forth between ontological and ontical plane is recommended. For such 
research, LCE becomes a very useful analytical framework and tool as it addresses what Wagenaar 
describes as the main weaknesses of the PDT (Wagenaar, 2011, pp. 154-155), and by extension; 
Mouffe’s agonism/agonistic pluralism. Through its analytical categories of social logic, political 
logic, and fantasmatic logic, it provides the tools that enable the research strategy to stabilize the 
categories of social and political and the phenomena without essentially subsuming the phenomena 
investigated under those categories. 
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Worthy to underline here is the import of the category of the fantasmatic logic and how the LCE 
acknowledges its ontological status and systematically incorporates it in its framework. The 
systematic incorporation of the fantasmatic dimension in the constitution of reality facilitates the 
elaboration coercion and its ontological status in a non-essentialist way yet more visible. In the 
case of Mouffe’s agonism/agonistic pluralism, the demand for the subject to identify itself with 
the certain ethical stance would have not been harder to foreground without this category as basic 
unit of explanation. Through the fantasmatic logics it become possible in this research to 
investigate how the castration demanded by agonism/agonistic pluralism, as well as any other 
structure, does not necessarily lead to its articulation into antagonism. The fantasmatic dimension 
plays a central role to determine both the resistance to change and the speed and direction for 
change of the investigated practice or regime (Glynos & Howarth, 2007, p. 145).  
The elaboration on the case of the NACPP shows that the discourse of ‘Kind Society’ serves this 
fantasmatic function in two senses. First, it is intended to mobilize the broader public attachment 
to the NACPP framework and, thus, become more actively engaged in it. Second, it also serves the 
function to condition the subjects to be able to cope with messiness and the structure’s constitutive 
lacks (Ferguson & Thurman, 2019) as in the moment this research was conducted, the framework 
did not lead to the expected area revitalization. During that moment, the latter might be more 
crucial considering the socio-economic situation in North Ayrshire as reflected in the reports.  
Mouffe falls short on these aspects. She understands and elaborates the social and political 
categories with emphasis on the latter both in the HSS and her works thereto. However, she does 
not further develop them into a methodological framework that would have rendered her 
theoretical concepts applicable for empirical analysis. One that she misses here is to further 
develop the concepts of ‘moment’ and ‘space’ in relation to hegemony that Laclau has elaborated 
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(Laclau, 1990, pp. 41-42). This is actually what Glynos and Howarth do in the LCE. The under 
development of this aspect in Mouffe’s works on agonism/agonistic pluralism greatly contributes 
to the ambiguities in her elaboration and use of the concept of antagonism that critics such as 
Menga, Roskamm, and, earlier, Norval have pointed out. Without the mediation of those categories 
as logics it would have been very hard to stabilize the social and political categories and 
phenomena and Mouffe’s agonism/agonistic pluralism would be seen as either to overemphasize 
the contingency or the antagonism.  
Besides the underdevelopment of analytical categories for simultaneous explanations of social and 
political dimensions, Mouffe’s elaboration on agonism/agonistic pluralism does not systematically 
incorporate the fantasmatic dimension. She comes close when she discusses the form of political 
community envisaged to embody the agonism/agonistic features (Mouffe, 1993) and the role of 
affect and identification (Mouffe, 2005, pp. 26-29). However, the category of fantasmatic 
dimension, which is crucial to explain ‘identification’ and ‘affect’, has not been systematically 
incorporated in her conceptualization. This fantasmatic dimension is crucial in explaining the 
coercive dimension of the structure or symbolic order in general and, the main object of this 
dissertation, agonism/agonistic pluralism in particular. The fantasmatic dimension, upon which 
identification is based, is also crucial to demonstrate and explain how even in such a formally 
agonistic arrangement such as collaborative governance, different cathectic points and ethos could 
transform the reality both on the levels of the structure and subject. This can be seen in the 
discourse of ‘kind society’ articulated against the context of the dislocations caused by relatively 
below expectation policy performance the NACPP has produced per 2018.        
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5. Theoretical and Practical Implications: The Fantasmatic Dimension and the Ethics 
of the Real in Mouffe’s Agonism/Agonistic Pluralism 
 
To conclude this dissertation, this section discusses the implications from the investigation and 
elaboration in the previous chapters. The elaboration has shown the constitutive role in the 
constitution of agonism/agonistic pluralism as an order just as any other forms of order. This 
coercion has the ontological status as it is necessary to suspend the overflowing of meanings as 
they have limitless potential configurations that coercion comes to stabilize and makes the reality 
meaningful and intelligible. The stability produced, however, is never complete and permanent. 
Mouffe’s agonism/agonistic pluralism centres exactly on this impossibility. The impossibility 
here, however, should be perceived as ‘impossible but necessary’. Mouffe with Laclau have 
elaborated and conceptualized this in the Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. Laclau, especially, 
gives great detailed elaborations on this ‘impossible but necessary’ concept that provides rather 
simpler expressions of the underlying theoretical presuppositions; the radical contingency and the 
primacy of the political; in their theory of discourse and hegemony. 
The ubiquity of coercion has been demonstrated in the elaboration above, even in 
agonism/agonistic pluralism that is centred on the futility of it in the final instance. The stability 
that it is intended for is something impossible. But this does not mean that this dimension can be 
discarded. It should not be essentialized either. The former may lead to the discourse of psychotic, 
while the latter to obsession. Mouffe’s agonism/agonistic pluralism, in line with the theory of 
discourse and hegemony she co-authored with Laclau, takes the path in between those two poles, 
a path that is described as ‘Traversing the Fantasy’ in Lacanian Psychoanalysis (Zizek, 1990, p. 
259). The path taken by Mouffe’s agonism/agonistic pluralism further engages with the 
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impossible, the traumatic kernel, of the social. This premise of the ‘impossibility of the social’ is 
true even for what Mouffe envisages as agonism/agonistic pluralism. The elaboration in this 
dissertation demonstrates that agonism is impossible in the final instance. Its coercive dimension 
marks its limits to be permanently and totally complete. 
While the elaboration on the coercive dimension of Mouffe’s agonism/agonistic pluralism 
demonstrates that, as any other structure that belongs to the symbolic register, it demands 
castration from its subject, the next central question would be, “What does it specifically demand?” 
The substantive specific enjoyment demanded may have to be found in the specific empirical 
context. On the ontological plane, however, it can be specified that agonism/agonistic pluralism 
demands the enjoyment of the fantasy of fullness. It means shifting the cathectic point on two 
aspects. First, the point should represent the inevitability of lack; second, it also requires the shift 
of emphasis of enjoyment from “the absence of fullness” to “the absence of fullness”. The absence 
of fullness because desire (for fullness) belongs to the symbolic register and in the symbolic 
register fullness can only be represented by its absence. The shift of emphasis from the fullness to 
its absence that the Ethic of the Real demands may not change the existing structure but it changes 
the direction and energy of where to go from the existing structure. Furthermore, this process needs 
to be institutionalized as a recurring cycle as the new structure also operates in the same manner 
and has to be responded to, based on the same ethic.    
Further question such as, “Which cathectic point to that represents this lack?”, once again, 
substantively have to be looked for in the empirical context. On the ontological plane, however, 
there have been some clues, such as provided by Yannis Stavrakakis. Stavrakakis argues that in 
such situations the recognition of this constitutive lack and its institutionalisation requires, in the 
context of radical democracy, sublimation and identification with the symptoms (Stavrakakis, 
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1999, pp. 131-134). Sublimation from the point of view of the Ethics of the Real is different from 
one based on the ethics of harmony. The sublimation here does not refer to the ‘common good’ 
but, in contrast, to its impossibility. Stavrakakis describes its operation as: 
What I want to suggest is that sublimation moves beyond traditional ethical 
identification by taking into account the dimension of the impossible real. But what is 
most important in sublimation and relates to our discussion on democracy is that 
sublimation creates a public space. Although it can only be individual it nevertheless 
creates a public space—a certain unifying field (Stavrakakis, 1999, p. 131) 
Stavrakakis further describes the unifying field created by this sublimation as involving the 
creation of space that represents the faith left by the loss of the Thing, in which the individuality 
can be addressed publicly without reducing the former into the latter, and “… the possibility of 
constructing a ‘material’ edifice around the recognition of the real, the recognition of the lack that 
cross-cuts the subject and the social field” (Stavrakakis, 1999, p. 132). Referring to Lefort’s 
characterization of democracy, Stavrakakis describes that this sublimation is what democracy is 
all about.    
Merely sublimation is not enough since sublimation is inevitably contaminated by fantasy of 
imaginary unity that in the end may lure the identification of the sublimated object with the Thing 
and colonization of the field of sublimation. Therefore, sublimation here needs to be accompanied 
with the identification with the symptoms. The symptom here refers to “… that which is 
ideologically thought to introduce disharmony in the social that would otherwise be harmoniously 
unified under a certain utopian ideal” (Stavrakakis, 1999, p. 133). Putting the emerging and 
proliferating ‘liberation movements’ nowadays within Stavrakakis’ framework, these movements 
can be perceived as the symptoms that represent the unrepresentable in the dominant and 
hegemonic symbolic order.  
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While I agree conceptually with the sublimation and identification of the symptoms as ways to 
traverse the fantasy, instead of bypassing it, and recognise the constitutive role of the ‘lack’, I may 
have some reservation for which symptoms that we should identify ourselves with in the context 
of promoting the Radical democracy Project. There are several reasons for these: first, the 
symptom here is theoretically unlimited. It could range from the articulation of dislocations in 
various political movements we are familiar with to something that was probably unthinkable 
before. Second, some of these so called liberation movements are no less obsessive than the 
dominant or hegemonic order that causes the dislocations in the first place. It is based on certain 
harmonic ideals that presuppose, once the dominant or hegemonic order structure is eradicated, all 
dislocations and antagonisms would disappear too. This overlooks that after the dissolution of the 
previous order, new order will eventually replace it and every order inevitably causes its own 
dislocations and even owes its constitution to it. This is due to the dimension of coercion that is 
embedded in its ontology.  
In such situations, at this point, a possible way through is, following Stavrakakis, to identify with 
the symptoms and sublimate it in relation to the Thing, the impossible to achieve. The point here 
is to keep the constitutive lack at the centre of the picture. Thus, in responding to the ‘liberation 
movements’ it is necessary, in identifying with them, to keep in mind that the ‘New Order’ 
advocated  is inevitably constituted around the same constitutive lack and how such lack would be 
addressed, ideologically or ethically, in their order would be the main parameter whether they are 
worthy for ourselves to identify with or not. 
This, however, requires further investigation and deserves its own research. The point made in the 
previous paragraph is mostly conjectural and still tentative. It is based on the points found and 
elaborated on the dimension of coercion in Mouffe’s agonism/agonistic pluralism and its relations 
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with the fantasmatic dimensions, and how the latter still belongs to the register of the symbolic 
order that begets coercion in the first place. A more comprehensive answer for the question that 
this section specifically is addressing deserves research of its own. There are many aspects not 
comprehensively elaborated or even unelaborated, such as drive and synthome, in this dissertation. 
Investigation and elaboration on these concepts in relations to coercion and its contingency 
apropos its fantasmatic dimension is necessary to further answer the said question more 
comprehensively. 
‘Keeping the constitutive lack at the center’ becomes the main point that this dissertation aims to 
reiterate and argue for. Coercion or coercive dimension inevitably involved in the constitution of 
any order signifies this lack as it marks their limits. Foregrouding and explicating this dimension 
in operation in Mouffe’s theory of agonism aims to demonstrate that agonism/agonistic pluralism 
is not and never intended to become a panacea to eradicate all dislocations and antagonisms, in 
fact it is constituted with acknowledgement of their constitutive role at its centre. Understanding 
the ubiquity and constitutive role of coercive dimension in the constitution agonism/agonistic 
pluralism as any other orders helps to critically assess the criss-crossing discourses, especially 
during this time of crisis, that promises total eradication of all current miseries as well as better 
understanding on radical democracy project and the agonistic relations that Mouffe’s envisions as 
the main form of political relations in such democracy. 
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